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**FREEDOM AND CHRISTIAN
CONDUCT—AN ETHIC**



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TORONTO

FREEDOM AND CHRISTIAN CONDUCT AN ETHIC

BY

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President of Muhlenberg College

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PREFACE

After eighteen years of teaching Senior classes in college ethics, experience and experiment has led to the results formulated in "The Problem of Freedom." The purpose is to furnish a comprehensive ethics for students in a church college, which shall have in view the whole ethical development, both ancient and modern, and state it in a systematic philosophical form. There is an inclusion of the ethics of Christianity and its correlation with general ethical questions. No sane reason exists why the ethics of Christianity should be neglected in any fair, modern treatment. Its exclusion is simply due to an unjustified prejudice of certain philosophical attitudes. The point of view which is maintained is that of freedom as the great ethical question. Its solution is suggested through personality, which is expanded beyond its current meaning.

The aim of a course of ethics should not only be an acquaintance with the academic ethical problems, but also an awakening, a development and a strengthening of the moral sense in young men and young women. All great questions ought finally to receive a moral adjudgment. For this reason the practical relationships of moral life have been treated under the third main part, "The Functioning of Freedom." These practical applications of ethical truth have been found very helpful to the student, because they lead him to conscious deliberation of moral questions on a reasonable basis, and stimulate him to form a

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philosophy of life that does not omit the ethical issues.

Most paragraphs open with questions. These are intended to prepare the mind for the critical attitude of the discussion of a problem. The presentation is argumentative, and should be used as the basis of discussion in the class.

The manner in which classes have raised objections and asked questions has been a great aid in the solutions suggested. The main purpose of this book has also received criticism and approval from friends whose judgment is worth while. The gratitude of the author is expressed to all who have aided him, and especially to Mr. Horace Mann, who has prepared the index.

The literature given in the references at the end of each chapter is simply representative. The effort is made to lead the student to new views differing altogether from the position taken in this book, as well as those that are in agreement. In addition to the lists furnished and books quoted there is much valuable material in *The International Journal of Ethics*, and in *Hasting's Cyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

While there is a specific use for the college class in this discussion, it can be of value to general readers in centering their minds upon moral problems.

May this effort aid, not so much in acceptance of the author's ideas, as in the arousing of an interest in ethics, and a purpose to make it less superficial and more thorough in present day thought.

Muhlenberg College

Allentown, Pa.

January, 1923.

J. H.

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PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AS A SCIENCE

The age of problems. It is quite customary in our day to approach any body of connected facts and their laws from the angle of the problem. The modern mind seems averse to starting with great principles. It would rather derive these after asking questions and stating problems. And thus the method of the problem is most appealing. Nevertheless no problem can be merely presented, but it calls for the introduction of discussion and for certain data upon which any just discussion must rest. Problems and principles must be interwoven to arrive at the best results. To deal merely in problems raises questions and produces doubts without aiding in their proper solution. To begin with principles to the neglect of seeing problems brings about an unverified dogmatism. The true procedure balances problems and principles.

The problem of freedom. Our task is not, however, to enter upon the general logical question of problem and principle, but to endeavor to make clear one of the great problems of thought and life. Among the many subjects that should call forth the effort and interest of human thought is that of freedom. What do we really mean by freedom? Is it only a political problem, an economic question, a social difficulty? Or is its compass larger and deeper, and does it extend to that which is fundamentally human? The last supposition seems to be the best. It would make the problem in its fulness and fundamentality the moral problem. To determine the question of freedom would mean to outline the main questions of morality or ethics. It is this interpretation of freedom with which we are concerned. Our endeavor to give an answer will lead us to posit some sort of ethical system.

What is the problem of freedom? Is there any justification in the assertion, that the answer to the problem of freedom will lead to some sort of a system? A system is only really possible where there is a science. Is ethics a science or is it merely an art? Does it deal with data that can rightly be co-ordinated into a science, or is it only a collection of practical rules and maxims for human life? There can be no doubt that the question of our freedom as it eventuates in the doing of good or evil, right or wrong, touches the whole practice of life and all of human conduct. It enters into our thoughts, desires, habits, feelings, decisions, judgments, and actions. But does it follow,

that because the problem of freedom, or of ethics, has as its material the character and actions of men, that this material cannot be systematized? A system which makes possible a science is attained in one of two ways, or in two ways combined. The one is to collect all possible facts, and then to pass on to generalize them, and derive laws and principles. The other is to assume certain fundamental principles and then to establish them by deriving consequences from them that explain the existent facts. The problem of freedom can be discussed in either of these ways, and perhaps best by their combination. Ethics can therefore claim to be a science. We may perhaps define it provisionally as the *science of character and conduct that establishes real, vital, human freedom.*

What sort of science is ethics? To claim that the problem of freedom is a science does not settle the question. What do we mean by a science? Is there only natural science, or can the term, science, be applied justly to other groups of data than those that we find in nature? What types of sciences can rightly be distinguished in human thinking? The answer to the inquiries will help us to classify these sciences. There are sciences which we may designate as existential and descriptive. They simply deal with data as data, describe them and then deduce their laws. As an example of such sciences we may take chemistry, which is typical of the whole group of similar sciences. But a totally different class is that of the normative sciences. A norm is a standard

and it implies valuation. The sciences called normative rest upon value and worth. They include a judgment about data. It is necessary to include the existence of facts when we give an estimate of their worth, but the existence is not of prime importance. But to deal with mere worth because the emphasis is put upon it and to consider the existence as negligible is an error. How can a value be a value if the things to which it is attached are deemed uncertain. Value is not an agnostic escape from existence; it does not belong to fictions but to a definitely characterized set of existences.

What are the sciences of value? In human knowledge there are three great sciences of value. The first is logic, which gives the laws of correct thinking. It is not concerned with how we think, but how we ought to think when we want to think correctly. Since the modern movement of pragmatism there has been a constant effort to make logic descriptive and really to sink it into psychology. But the emphasis upon value as a reality which began in modern thought with the philosopher Lotze cannot be swept aside by the increasing mass of detail examinations as to how thought functions. The second normative science is aesthetics. This deals with the estimates of the beautiful. It asks, what is beauty, and what are the true standards of the beautiful? We cannot have any scientific approach to art unless we allow the valuations of aesthetics. It is the third valuing science with which we are concerned; namely, ethics or the science of

freedom. Its problem is to ascertain whether the judgments and estimates, good and bad, right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, evaluate facts that in their worth can be put into relations, which grow out of the actualities of value and are systematic and scientific. The description of human motives and of human actions resulting from them is not morality unless they are judged according to standards. The motives and actions must be real and with them as equally real there go the estimates of character and conduct. When we thus approach the facts of the moral life we have the material which is capable of scientific discussion, and we then arrive at as valuable and real a science in its place as any that claims our attention and study.

Is ethics related to other sciences? Why is it necessary to ask a question like this? Ought we not proceed at once to the discussion of the problem of freedom without further preliminaries? If we were inclined to the method so largely employed today we would simply proceed, and claim all that we could for our science; but this onesided procedure is making onesided men. It is a part of the defective education which never coordinates, and encourages students to elect courses as the Indian collects scalps. In ethics with its universal human claim it is necessary if anywhere to show its interrelation, and thus to put character and conduct into their proper place. A true science grows more valuable when seen in the light not only of its own claim but also in the light of all related human knowledge. We

must be led to think not only in detail and down to the minutiae, but also in the large relations of the whole and the great total of truth.

What sciences is morality related to? From which of them does it borrow facts and results? As soon as we begin to examine any ethical situation particularly in its practical functioning we shall be led back to psychology. To understand character we must know the human mind. As far as ethical value is clothed in desires, wishes, wants, motives it needs the study of psychology. Instincts and habits determine conduct and action. The problem of the will which is fundamental in the study of freedom presupposes knowledge of human behavior. The composite fact of conscience leads us into some sort of psychological analysis. In all moral valuation, therefore, we must be sure that our psychology is correct.¹ But the knowledge of the human mind does not of itself determine the value of conduct.

Again the problem of freedom cannot pass by its dependence on philology. The examination of the history of language, and the study of the meaning which man has put into human words, show us how some ethical terms have arisen and how man has understood them. The German ethical writers like Wundt² have paid some attention to the testimony of the common mind of man in the making of its words of moral import. Nietzsche in the effort to re-value all values has used his learning as a philologist

¹ Alexander Shand, *The Foundations of Character*.

² *Ethic*, Part I, Chapter I.

to convince us, if he can, how we must redefine the terms and words which have been abused in the interest of the weak. To the degree that language reveals the reflection of man on the questions of good and bad it is worth while studying in ethics.

But the question of freedom leads us to the story of freedom in human history. It is not without benefit that we can trace the history of morals. A notable example is the study of Lecky in his history of European Morals. Westermarck³ and Hobhouse⁴ have collected much material relative to early customs and practices of the incipient moral life. But it is not only in these and similar detail studies of morals in their historical aspect that we find a dependence of ethics, but also in any general history of man the moral life and advance or decadence dare not be omitted wherever man's manners and customs are traced to their moral import.

Similarly the problem of freedom must have some regard for economic conditions.⁵ Man's search for food and shelter condition his life. They do not make his virtues and vices as mere virtues and vices, but they often give direction and content to them. The moral valuation is not caused by the economic strivings of men, but it cannot be fully appreciated apart from them. Because the life of freedom affects the whole man his material interests must be considered. These concerns, however, must not be

³ The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.

⁴ Morals in Evolution.

⁵ Cf. "Goods and the Good," in Haas "In the Light of Faith," p. 180.

made the complete motive of man, and morals must not be reduced to an economic denominator. Some modern ethics, as e. g. Dewey and Tufts, seem to indicate the reverse. They color ethics so largely by economics, that one would almost receive the impression that morals are the outcome of economics.

The struggle to establish a science of sociology,—which up to this time has not succeeded if we judge from the diversity of treatment,—must be given some place. The collection of many facts relating to human society, the gathering of statistics, the practical consideration of the social bearings of marriage, divorce, the prison problem and similar questions, are not without use in any ethical study. The whole outlook on life as social raises the problem of the relation of the individual to society which cannot be overlooked in the study of freedom and ethical thought.⁶

After having shown to what degree morals are dependent on all of these sciences we may ask: Does ethics in turn render service to any of them? History if fully studied cannot remain under the dominance of a purely economic philosophy; it must give some room to moral judgments. Because man is not only an eating and fighting being, but also a being with a conscience his doings must be subject to judgments of right or wrong. When we study the movement of man's great ideas and ruling ideals we must apply some moral measurement. But this measurement must never be that of one age

⁶ Cf. Edward C. Hayes, *Sociology and Ethics*.

as applied to all ages, little as we can finally escape some ethical appraisalment.

One of the remarkable developments in the latest economic thought is the introduction of moral standards to problems of business, commerce, etc., in short to economic questions.⁷ Judgments resting on the golden rule, decisions growing out of moral ideals of truth, honesty, justice, and righteousness are being discussed among economists. Practical societies of business men are choosing service as their motto, and there is going on a moralization of our material pursuits. Ethics is conquering economics, and the good is attempting to standardize goods.

Sociology cannot escape the moral impress. In fact in many evil situations of society the sociologist is not only a mere describer of conditions, but also a preacher of righteousness. He has, often without knowing it, a code of social morality which he applies in his criticisms and denunciations. The great social movement of socialism, in addition to its material appeal, has frequently used the claim of justice and won men by its moral demands. Much of sociology has borrowed ethical ideas and is indebted to the underlying and universal moral conceptions of men. Thus morals give as well as receive in the great body of human thought and knowledge.

Is ethics universal? Matthew Arnold said that conduct is three-fourths of human life. Is

⁷ Cf. *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CI. No. 190—May 1922, "The Ethics of the Professions and of Business."

this true, or is ethics so universal as to constitute four-fourths? Are there any actions exempt from the moral judgment? Apparently there are actions which are ethically indifferent, to which the term "adiaphora" is applied. It seems to make no difference morally whether I wear a blue tie or green tie, whether I eat veal or lamb, whether I take a vacation at the seashore or the mountains, whether I go to visit one friend or another. Thus there may be many actions which do not appear to enter at all into the question of moral value. They are decisions entirely free and have no bearing on my virtues or faults. And yet even seemingly indifferent actions may gain a moral import through their connection and through the attitude assumed toward them. If my wearing a tie of one or another color is a matter of pride, or a departure from good judgment, and if my eating veal or lamb influences my health, and if my going to the seashore or the mountains becomes a subject of the most favorable place for my benefit, or a problem of thrift, and if my visit to one friend or another depends upon certain preferential obligations, then all of these actions are no longer indifferent. In this manner as our life is connected, and we grow in the knowledge of moral implications, there are fewer and fewer actions which are morally indifferent. In our ethical development the claim of the good or bad becomes more and more universal.

Does this universal claim of freedom make ethics paramount? Are its judgments to be applied to all spheres of life? If this be as-

serted then can e. g. art be for art's sake? It is true that art must seek simply the satisfaction of the sense of the beautiful. In its efforts it may portray in sculpture, painting, drama, novel, etc., both good or bad. It may idealize life, or it may show things in their bare reality.

Whether a subject is morally right or wrong cannot apparently limit the creative impulse of the artist. And yet it is a fact that the desire of the artist must be pure. In all its realism art cannot justly glorify what is morally ugly. The beautiful must be related to the good. The ancient Greeks saw the beauty of goodness, and their great thinker Plato desired the goodness of beauty for the protection of the young. Art has not only an artistic influence but at the same time a moral effect. For this reason there can be no indifference whether art is high and noble or whether it is decadent. In fact where the ethical life degenerates art finally also decays.

Another problem opens up, when we inquire whether all men are subject to moral judgments, or whether certain outstanding individuals are not subject to moral standards, and can, in the claim of their individuality and freedom, act as they desire? It may be that there are great characters who, with a larger vision and an outlook to the future, seem to violate the existing moral customs of society, and are nevertheless leaders of a new light. An outstanding example of such men is Socrates. A conflict between standards of society and the individual conscience will take place again and again. But does it follow, that creative powers or royal

positions justify extended privileges? We may understand the special difficulties and temptations of certain positions in life. The bohemianism of the artist, the prerogatives of the ruler can be sympathetically weighed. But when this has been done, can we grant a special morality to any one? Is e. g. Shelly, because of his poetic power, to be excused for his relations to Mary Godwin? Can we condone Byron's wild escapades? Is Wagner such a superman of music that his abandonment of his wife, his relations to Matilda Wesendonck, and his alliance with Cosima Von Buelow, are to be forgotten? Shall Poe's wild carousals be entirely excused? Surely with all possible allowance we cannot exempt these and like individuals from a fair moral judgment.

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CHAPTER II

FREEDOM AND RELIGION

The nature of the problem. Why do we try to correlate freedom and religion? Has the problem of ethics as freedom any bearing upon religion, and does religion affect ethics? These questions are not like the problems of the scientific character of morals formal and logical matters, but they deal with the living contacts and the real contents of ethics and religion. Ethics, with its basis built upon freedom, and its striving directed toward freedom, seems at first sight to have no value for religion as the search after the divine. The two are different in purpose and largely in content. But when we regard them as they form a unity in the total of human life, and as they go together historically, the logical separation is overcome by the actual relation.

What ethics does for religion. Does history give any information of an ethical influence upon religion? Is freedom a factor in man's dependence upon God? When we look broadly at the development of the religion and the morals of mankind, we find again and again that the permanence of religion depends upon its ability to measure up to the ethical advance. Religions have decayed when they could not adjust themselves to moral awakening. A

typical example is found in the religion of the Greeks. It was an amoral naturalism clothed into the stories of humanized gods. The gods had all the defects of their natural background and all the weaknesses of the Greek life. When Xenophanes saw that in natural religion men made the gods after their own image the seeds of doubt were sown. But it was the moral advancement of Greek thought beginning with Socrates which most effectually destroyed the old faith. Plato asserted that the stories of the gods were not fit to be taught to the young. This influence was also brought to bear upon Greek religion when the dramatist Euripides questioned the justice of the gods in the great crises of human existence. Thus the ethical advance outstripped the possibility of religion with its morals. Similar results follow either in the independent growth of morals among a people, or when an ethically superior religion comes to a group. The finality of a religion is its possibility of meeting all just moral growth of individual and common life. Consequently ethical content is very fundamental to religion.

Is freedom independent? To ask this question is to raise the problem whether conversely ethics is also dependent upon religion? This is the larger problem. The assertion is frequently made in our day that morals are autonomic, i. e. that they bear their law within themselves and are independent of religion. Ethical culture societies are endeavoring to show that different religious positions make no difference in morals, and that men ought to

develop a moral life unhampered by any religious consideration. At the same time many such ethical groups teach some kind of theism or pantheism. They also live upon many ethical customs which have developed historically out of some religion. While secularisation is going on, and morality itself, and industry, politics, education, science, family life, etc., etc., are divorced from religious influence, it still remains true, that religion has practically produced marvelous moral changes. "Not only have, by means of it, drunkards and criminals been reformed, prostitutes led to a pure life, sinners in general made to repent, the sick made well, but the character of whole communities has been radically altered, even transformed, in the course of a few years. Such facts as these are not open to even scientific doubt, because they are checked up by overwhelming evidence on the one hand, and by the general principles of normal and abnormal psychology on the other hand."¹

What does the history of religion show? Is there any evidence that in the various forms which religion has taken there is always an ethical implication? Modern speculation upon the common features of the development of religion begins with the assumption that the primitive religion was some sort of psychic, dynamic impersonal power grasped by feeling. It is called *mana*, after a term found by Codrington in New Zealand. Whether this assumption is justified or not, it at least implies that

¹ Chas. A. Ellwood, *The Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 34.

man projects a spiritual value into life, and this takes him away from a material view of life and affects all his customs and morals, because in primitive life religion determines everything. The next stage assumed is animism, which gives souls to all things and partly personalizes them as the young child still does. Under animism morals become more elevated. When men take a fetich they ascribe a virtue to it not only for their help, but they also accept some obligations. However low this form of religion is it carries with it certain duties. Somewhat higher is totemism, which takes some living form and makes it the symbol and power in tribal life. The largest social customs, and many duties of kinship grow out of totemism. There are frequent evidences of ancestor worship, and this is more powerful ethically and produces higher results than totemism for the individual and common life in obedience, etc. Polytheism with its glaring defects has many more moral relationships, and some of them rise fairly high when the gods are more social than natural. But the greatest advance is made when henotheism arrives, which is the taking up of the worship of one god at a time. It is introductory to monotheism, the worship of one God alone. Under monotheism the high ethical standards of Judaism, and the supreme ethics of Christianity have developed. When men depart from ethical monotheism and revert to deism they lose moral power because God is separated from the actual life of the world. A still lower reversal is pantheism, whether scientific

or poetical. Under polytheism pantheism was a striving after unity. When however it occurs, after the personal moral valuation of God, it destroys the inherent worth of good and bad and degrades man to an amoral naturalism. These outstanding facts and suppositions in the history of religion all support the claim that religion at all stages and in all forms has an ethic.

Religion, character, and conduct. Has real religion an influence upon character as this conditions conduct? Is it so universal as by its very existence in man to affect his morals? In its full value religion is universal and absolute. It is a life within man which is all embracing. Because life in us is a unity the power of religion touches every action. It helps to make character. "Character, which is central to morals and must precede the consideration of conduct, cannot remain untouched wherever religion exists as a fact and reality in the human soul. If character is dependent upon religion it follows that the nature of our conduct cannot be separated from the consideration of the religious life. As man is normally religious, he is, therefore, normally dependent in his moral life."²

Does religion influence our instincts? A problem which is not always realized is the reliance of the life of freedom upon our natural instincts. The instincts are the raw material of our life. If our morals demand some consideration of our instincts, can it be shown that

² Haas, "In the Light of Faith," p. 205.

religion bears in upon our freedom because it changes the instinctive roots of life? There is a large group of instincts out of which action readily follows unless by control and modification we overcome the urge of the instincts. If e. g. we select the instincts of acquisitiveness and combativeness and fear, we know that they must be hemmed in to make our individual and common life bearable. Can this change be brought about by the longing of freedom alone? Wherever we allow vital religion to lift us beyond ourselves we shall not press acquisitiveness to such an extreme as to endanger society, and make it acquisitive rather than cooperative.³ Combativeness which leads to war will be restrained when the considerations of the common regard of men for each other is reinforced by a religion of love. Fear which even in primitive religion is counterbalanced by awe and reverence⁴ is at last overcome when God is accepted as Father. But not only are certain instincts crowded back but others are given fulfillment through the religious attitude and thus produce new moral results. As an example we may refer to sympathy which may be taken as an instinct counterbalancing self-preservation and forming the basis of altruism. When religion of a high type takes hold of sympathy it enlarges sympathy beyond the immediate contacts, and gives it a universal human meaning. In this manner religion affecting our instincts works upon our ethical life.

³ Cf. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*.

⁴ Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 128 ff.

Our desires and religion. If we study our mental life we shall find that in addition to instincts we must give a large place to our desires. Instincts operate through our desires. Feelings and emotions are shot through with desires. We express our wants and our longing through desire. The psychological understanding of freedom must consider the pressure of desire upon character. But our problem is whether religion can so affect desires as to produce a difference in our morals? The communion with the divine certainly takes hold of our desires. Without religion desire is centered upon the immediate wants of the body and upon material life. But when the supernatural enters into our considerations it lifts our desires beyond the wants of the visible and natural and they seek a spiritual end. It is through such seeking that the whole ethical attitude is changed and men strive for higher values.

Religion and habits. Every tendency in our life in toward fixation of certain actions. This fixation is habit. Habit has a fundamental importance for morals. They rest on good habits. One of the central ideas of ethics is virtue, and what else is virtue but the habit of doing the good. Right formation of habits makes a steady moral life. Has religion any contribution to make in the forming of habits which will influence our life of freedom? Wherever religion crystallizes into certain modes of action that are not merely ceremonial, but touch our inner life and our relation to others, it makes for ethical habits. A very apt

illustration can be found in the virtue and habit of generosity. There may be in some men a natural inclination to communicate to others; the social feeling may be large. But when a whole group is distinguished by outstanding generosity we seek for a further cause. The Jews are marked for their liberality. For centuries their religion has taught them to give largely and has made the law of the tithes obligatory. This long training of the religious ideal has produced the habit of generosity. In the same manner all virtues in a group or in individuals are influenced very quietly but constantly by any religious, living ideals.

What value have motives? We cannot escape the fact that motives are also a part of our inner life that make character and produce action. Is the power of the motives untouched by religion? Is it not true that the intellectual and particularly the emotional content of motives is deeply affected by religion? "Let us look at a moral action and analyze it in order to demonstrate this contention. A student is in an examination and is put upon his honor to use no dishonest means in his work. The temptation arises that would move him to break his word and promise. What will be the strongest motive to keep him true? He may be kept by the desire not to forfeit the regard of his fellow-students. His character may possess a self-esteem which he does not desire to lose. But a more powerful and purer motive would be the motive that a man's honor is a high possession which is not to be lost, and a noble standard not to be violated. What is

the force of this ideal of honor? What is its origin? Does it not go back to the period of the prowess of the knights when the maintenance of honor meant respect for the truth, observance of purity and defense of woman? But no noble knight was able to maintain the strength of his honor unless he finally caught the vision of the Holy Grail. And though the origin of honor may today be forgotten, the character of honor as a motive and its idealization rise to a religious height. Honor even thus is not as powerful as would be a direct consciousness of the bearing of religion upon a moral issue. Can anything equal in potency the conception 'Thou God seest me?' The motive of the presence and holiness of God is all-compelling."⁵

Sanctions, ideals and religion. In continuing the study of the relation of religion to morals we are confronted with the problem, whether the sanctions and ideals of the ethical life can be helped by religion? Sanctions are the external and objective forces of custom, manners, opinions, laws, beliefs, etc., which impinge upon our motives. Ideals are our aims and purposes of life which we accept as our guiding stars. We accept sanctions in our ideals, and sanctions often lead to ideals and aid in forming their content. If we begin to enumerate some sanctions and ask, does religion make them different, we shall find that all sanctions can be elevated by religion. Religion itself does not stand as simply one of the sanc-

⁵Cf. Haas "In the Light of Faith," p. 213.

tions.⁶ Let us consider, as an example, the virtue of purity with its motive. We may be controlled by the sanction of law, or public opinion, or through the knowledge of the dangers of impurity when they are presented to us in all their awful reality and their terrible results. But if religion is an actuality to us, and the sense of God is real, there is a mightier sanction in the belief that our bodies are not mere products of nature but temples of God and His Holy Spirit. This belief goes deeper and is far more powerful than any fear of results, or any pressure of opinion, or any threat of law. The lack of the sense of the reality of God is no proof of its inefficiency.

Ideals can be created in many ways but whatever enters upon their formation must be personally weighed and adopted. The attractiveness of high ideas, the beauty of noble words, the excellence of good deeds, may shape ideals. Great characters will lead to emulation. Noble sentiments of literature and heroic appeals of art will lift us to nobler purposes and aims in life. The power of virtue will have its sway. But the question remains, can not religion do still more than any one of these, or all of them combined? If we select, as one instance, the ideal of service, what can give it the greatest impetus? The joy of life in helpfulness, the necessity of service for the common good, the inspiration of noble examples, the inherent beauty of the moral nature of service? All of these are effective. Nevertheless when we

⁶ This was the contention of Bentham and Spencer.

take service and raise it above its humanitarian appeal, and find in it the highest exhibition of divine love as shown in Christ, the Servant, we have an appeal that far outweighs all other considerations. The judgment of Christ, that what we have done to one of the least of His we have done unto Him, is the strongest motive to make service one of our controlling ideals.

The realization of moral freedom. One great difficulty has always confronted those who believe in and accept the value of the good. Does the good prevail, and has virtue its reward? Or do we not find that vice is frequently successful and powerful? The good do not always prosper, and the seed of the righteous does sometimes beg for bread. Is there consequently only a partial triumph of the good, and must we object to the statement of Schiller, that the history of the world is the judgment of the world? These questions cannot be answered from the mere considerations of the moral life. It was this conviction which led Kant to become the classic advocate of the necessity of a future life and the demand of a moral governor of the universe. Kant was moved to stress these religious beliefs as necessary assumptions to sustain the reality and permanence of the moral. Men need the belief in God and eternity that right may remain right. If God, in the definition of Matthew Arnold is "the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness" only in limited time, then there is merely a striving towards righteousness but no assurance of its victory. The full realization calls, however, not only for mere continuance, but also for the faith, that the

universe has a moral order and a plan to be fulfilled, because God is ethical and not mere force, or totality, or all-embracing, unique individuality. The ideal of freedom and its growth imply the endless unfoldment of life. Where God as supremely moral is denied, or where the future life is made uncertain, there both the individual and society have lost the necessary foundation for the faith in the good and the permanence and supremacy of a moral world order.

What message has Christianity? Does the Christian faith substantiate its claim that it has the greatest and best moral content within it? This problem we must meet not only here, but in connection with every question in our whole study. Must it not justly be a part of any full and fair discussion of ethics to compare its results with the claim of Christianity? If it is superior can we stop with any lower ideals? Is philosophical ethics truly universal and impartial if it passes by and simply ignores the ethical attitudes of Christianity?

When we endeavor to sum up briefly the ethical, idealistic conceptions of Christianity we shall find that its supreme principle of morals is love of man for man exhibited in brotherliness of thought, feeling and deed. It makes for individual rights and common justice, and seeks the general welfare because it inculcates sacrifice for the common good. By limiting the pursuit of material things it helps to overcome the strife and bitterness of selfish commerce, industry and labor. It militates against impurity and the mere life of sex, and elevates the ideal and life of the married estate. All

intemperance and dishonesty are opposed, and pride, hypocrisy and pretense are castigated. Arrogance and self-complacency are thrust aside. The individual man is to be free from false control of law, to become self-reliant and responsible. For the social life it proposes the ideal of the Kingdom of God in which His holy, just, and loving will for the good of men is to prevail. This ideal defends the weak against the strong, overcomes the practice of retaliation, destroys mere class-feeling and narrow national bonds for a common brotherhood. Race is to be no hindrance to unity. Rich and poor are alike; educated and ignorant, prominent and obscure, master and slave are on the same spiritual plane. The meek shall inherit the earth when non-resistance is appreciated as against the militaristic attitude of destruction. All life will be joyful, hopeful, helpful, leading into the social order, which compared with all our failures in the present and past orders, promises common happiness, justice and love.⁷

“Christianity has supreme moral power because it combines so many high ideals in Jesus Christ. In Him the divine perfection is presented in human form. His ideal perfection leads us to adore Him, and His saving love moves us to follow Him. Through His act His life is offered to us, and if we accept it He lives in us through faith. His strength, therefore, is shaped in our weakness and leads us to freedom. In Him all graces unite, strength and humility,

⁷ This paragraph rests upon: Votaw, “Primitive Christianity an Idealistic Social Movement: “American Journal of Theology, January 1918.

justice and mercy, holy zeal and forgiving love, purity and rescuing power for the lost. Thoughtful and active, forceful as a man and gentle as a woman, hating evil and saving men, full of strong impulse and yet calmly balanced, strong in the virtue of every temperament and without its weakness, He stands as the supreme moral ideal in whom age after age finds now inspiration. The moral perfection and inspiration of Jesus Christ is the guarantee of the permanence of Christianity in the world's moral progress. It is essentially true that if the Son makes us free, we are free indeed."⁸

⁸ Haas, "In the Light of Faith," p. 220.

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PART I. FUNDAMENTALS OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER III

FREE WILL

The basic problem. Is there any compelling reason for identifying the ethical problem with freedom? Are we justified in making the quest after an ethical system the problem of freedom? This basic question demands an answer; otherwise all that is claimed in the assertion of freedom falls to the ground. There can be no doubt that some of the immediate data of our consciousness are of such a nature as to lead us to the conviction that we are free in our actions. We seem to know and feel that we make our own judgments. Deliberation balancing possible choices is present. The selection of a choice appears to be our own, and we arrive at a decision for which we accept responsibility. There is no escape from the impression that we make obligations our own, or that we reject them. When we have done certain actions they meet either with approval or disapproval. In the case of disapproval we blame ourselves and accept the guilt of the accusation of our thoughts against our deeds. Remorse may follow, and its occurrence is best explained on the assumption of our freedom. Unless all of these

mental phenomena are deceptive they cannot be easily set aside in any explanation of freedom. Nevertheless the problem is larger and we must consider other psychological facts, and weigh in addition certain claims of the natural sciences and certain metaphysical questions.

Freedom is not only the problem of the liberty of our choices and action, but also the question of the aim of the moral life. Is it true or not, that we all seek happiness, however we may define it? If we accept this goal of human life, does it not follow that morals to justify their claim must attempt to solve this search after happiness. Now happiness is not possible except there be vital freedom. Liberty of mind and action is the outstanding essential element without which happiness is unattainable. Consequently freedom is the implied goal in human life, and we must ask how it can be best found and realized. It has a living content, and must not be confused with the negative idea of independence. When the American colonies declared their independence from England, they simply severed connection with the mother country. The relation of dependence was to cease. But the ideal of liberty which was in the minds of the founders of our country was larger. Human strivings in government and life cannot be found in mere independence but in a positive ideal of a fulness of happiness of life through liberty.

Freedom is more than an individual aim among men. To be real it must also be social. There must be a liberty for all and not only for each individual. My happiness and your happi-

ness ought not to clash; and the social good of liberty cannot be set aside without strife and destruction of happiness through the desire and contest for individual happiness. The common trend of society today as the outcome of the movements of history is very commonly characterized as democracy. Democracy is defined, as not merely the possession of common political privileges, but also as essential equability in all relations of life. Its three great ideas have been called liberty, equality and fraternity. The latter is the religious implication of democracy. Brotherhood must grow out of religion. Equality is the social demand of democracy; and it must be valued in its possibility by studying the history of society. But liberty or freedom is the moral demand of democracy. It is therefore not accidental or arbitrary when we assume freedom as the moral answer for the happiness of society. The more it obtains in its balanced reality, not as the selfish prey of individuals, or of groups in society, whether they be economic or national, the larger will be the sum total of human satisfaction with life and its common human joy and peace.

The metaphysical assertion. May there not be a direct metaphysical solution of the problem of free will? If this is possible our question can be solved without further discussion. The effort to cut the Gordian knot of freedom and determination has been made in modern thinking. After Immanuel Kant had endeavored to overthrow the power of theoretical and pure reason in the ultimate questions of life, and had found only a strongly bound and closely connec-

ted causality on the basis of mathematics and physics, he assumed that all this was phenomenal. The direct reality he asserted was in the human will. In the phenomenal world we are bound, in the real, noumenal world we are free. Fichte in his treatise on the vocation of man also chose to exalt freedom through the essential reality of the will. But this emphasis on the will took a direction not contemplated by Kant. Schopenhauer, who coined the famous phrase "the will to," made it the will to live. But this will led to misery, and became impersonal and like the energy of the universe. Thus freedom was lost in the depersonalized will as force. Von Hartmann followed Schopenhauer and explained all life through the philosophy of the unconscious, which is the blind urge of energy below consciousness. While these philosophers did not identify their impersonal will with the energy of natural science, this was the only logical outcome. And thus the free will was stranded through universalizing will. A partial rescue was provided in the speculation of Nietzsche who asserted the will to power. This will to power seems on the one hand the mere result of biological necessity just like the superman. But on the other hand there is a stressing of direct human will and action. Nietzsche¹ never resolved this contradiction. Bergson makes the self the author of the free act, and finds liberty in the inner, pure, qualitative character of duration². The open

¹ Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, gives a fair discussion of Nietzsche.

² Cf. *Time and Free Will*, espec. p. 169 ff.

reassertion of free will came through the pragmatists. William James coined the term "the will to believe." He claimed that one might take the choice of freedom over against the claim of necessity, and with equal right gamble on the freedom of will. There was no rebuttal of the claims of necessity, but only an acceptance of freedom as highly useful, practical and workable as a hypothesis in human life. Upon consideration of all of these efforts to establish the will to freedom, we cannot honestly conclude that this short-cut in the question of liberty is valid. It seems rather an escape of despair than a real effort to weigh and evaluate the difficulty of freedom and determination. The different arguments against freedom must receive our attention, and we must continue to estimate them and to correlate them with the claim of liberty.

What does psychology teach? Have we fairly considered all the evidence when we dealt with the immediate data of deliberation, choice, judgment, remorse, etc.? There are other facts whose import deserves mention. Whenever we come to any action motives have brought about the specific action. Sometimes a motive moves along a direct, straight course, and prevails without any apparent conflict. But mostly motives are complex, and in their movement there is conflict in which the strongest will win. Does this not demonstrate that our choices and deliberations are caused by motives and are not as free as they seem? Surely our mental life is not disconnected and our decisions do not jump up out of our mind like a jumping-jack out of

his box. But are motives forces in us that control us without our knowledge and power over them? We must be careful not to make of motives fictitious energies instead of freely adopted and chosen directions in the course of our actions. The motives are our motives; we chose them or reject them.

Another question arises when we regard the place and power of habit. Habit arises for the sake of economy in our life. But when certain habits have been formed they are fixed ways of doing things. In the face of the many fixed and determined actions through habit we can not claim that our ideas and volitions are undetermined and incalculable in their liberty. But after we have allowed for the fact of the large range of habits as the foundation of our virtues or vices which constitute our moral life, we may still inquire how did habits arise? Were they inherited or are they acquired, and did we control their formation? Surely it is true that whatever influence training has had upon us, we cannot escape responsibility for our habits. Some of them were made in the period beyond early childhood. To the degree that we were active in the making of our habits we are obliged to accept the praise or blame attaching to them. Our present habits may control us; but were we not masters of the past and responsible for it? It is also true that while habits are exceedingly powerful it is still possible through some great experience to break up habits and to reform a whole life. Habits are not absolute masters, and we are not their slaves unless we desire to be so.

The continuance of certain motives and the constancy of certain habits make our character. Whatever we do and all our conduct depends on our character. Is character so stable that it determines us to the exclusion of change? Can character be claimed as making against the freedom of action? What we do is certainly the outcome of our character, but our character was made by our past actions, decisions and ideals, for which we are responsible. It is never an absolutely static thing, but is being affected constantly by what we think and do. As years go on character will become increasingly fixed, but as long as men make moral progress character grows. Character not only determines actions, but actions help to make character.

A problem which is often slighted is the effect of temperament on the life of freedom. In the variety of temperaments, which consist of combinations of certain tendencies that are strong or weak, bright or depressing, joyous or gloomy, there exist certain guiding and determining characteristics of our mental life. From these we cannot escape. They influence our moods, and we are active or phlegmatic, melancholy or sanguine. But these temperamental conditions for which we must make allowance in judging men are no hindrance to freedom. They, like our instincts, are a certain kind of raw material of the mind which can be used and shaped. Temperament cannot be destroyed but it can be controlled, modified, and used in our choices even while it gives color to them. What we have found true in motives, habits, character, temperament, is true of instincts and all other

data of our mind that condition us. None of them enslave us, and they cannot be explained in the interest of absolute determinism. We are determined and conditioned by all that is naturally a part of our mind, but we are nevertheless in control of our freedom. A careful psychology does not destroy the sense and feeling of our liberty.

A further problem has been raised through the development of the measurements of intelligence by tests. A large number of school children were examined,³ and it was found that the great mass of children of the common people rated quite low. Only a small group coming from successful mercantile or professional classes had a high average. It was also ascertained that through the newer immigration the rate of intelligence was further depressed. Does not this limitation of mind militate against the claim of freedom? This difficulty is increased by the results obtained during the war. An examination of 1,700,000 men, both officers and privates,⁴ showed that the average mental age of Americans is about 14, and that 45,000,000, or nearly half of the whole population, will never develop beyond the mental stage of a normal 12 year old child. Only 13,500,000 will be superior, and 4,500,000 talented. What does this indicate as to personal and social liberty? Is the whole claim of freedom invalidated? Even if we question the wide applicability of all the psychological tests and restrict them to the

³ Cf. S. M. Terman, *The Intelligence of School Children*, and *The Measurement of Intelligence*.

⁴ Yerkes and Yoakum, *Army Mental Tests*.

limits indicated in the questionnaires, such as quickness of response, general knowledge, reaction to new situations, etc., it remains true that we must limit very much the responsibility we ascribe to people in general. But does the average mentality destroy liberty? The only effect of this new knowledge is not to expect the intelligent freedom of the highly developed group from the mass of men. But the consciousness of freedom and its right are not eliminated, and the average mind is still responsible within the range of its knowledge. There must be a gradation of responsibility, but no denial of the functioning of free decisions in accordance with the different types of mind.

The brain and free will. Psychology leads us back to the problem of physiology. Is not the mind dependent upon the brain and the nervous system, and since these are subject to natural laws of necessity, are we really free as soon as we examine the physical basis of mind? The old Greek atomists, following Democritus, found only mechanical motion in the brain, and reduced mind to such motion. Modern materialism has sought to solve the question through the chemistry of the brain. Its extreme slogan was: "Without phosphorus, no thought." The chemical claim is still powerful, and the many physiological facts introduced into the modern psychology admit the close connection of the brain with mind. It is not only the chemical actions and reactions, which are supposed to furnish the scientific explanation of many mental phenomena that are important, but also the functioning of the brain producing certain

feelings, emotions, and actions, the localization of bodily movements in the brain, etc., count. The theory of emotions advocated by Lange and James makes the physiological action prior to the mental. We are told that in reality we first cry and then we are sorry. Any antecedent mental movement is denied. The theory which obtained for a long time in modern physiological study of mind was that mind and brain moved along parallel lines. Was this close parallelism possible without endangering the mind at least to some extent? And when the question of causality arose, this query had to be answered, how can two movements be so closely parallel without dependence, or without reliance upon some superior antecedent existence? These inquiries did not lead toward mind but mostly toward matter.⁵ A newer group of physiological students of mind, under the leadership of Professor Watson, call themselves behaviorists. They reduce everything in the mind, even the most abstruse thought, to action. The final philosophy of action is not favorable to the independence of mind. The American school of neorealistic philosophers reduce sensation to physiological action, and deny the mental worth of consciousness. Under the pressure of all of these hypotheses the mind becomes naturalized to such a degree that its surface phenomena making for freedom are set aside in favor of the reign of natural law.

But there are other counterbalancing facts. It cannot be denied that mental conditions affect the brain. The assumption has not been proved,

⁵ Cf. Pratt, Matter and Spirit.

that only brain conditions affect the mind; on the contrary purely mental attitudes have material results. We cannot make our brain, but we certainly modify it through our mental life. Our ideas, emotions, volitions plough themselves into the brain tissue.⁶ There have come forth in our modern life different groups of mental healers, who have all produced sufficient results to make the claim not for any one of their separate platforms, but still for the broad fact of the curative effect of the mind upon the body. Psycho-analysis and psycho-therapy, despite some vagaries that have crept in, cannot be lightly set aside. Of course the extreme theories of Freud,⁷ Jung,⁸ and Holt⁹ are not the whole truth. Even the aberrations of the mind cannot all be classified according to careful alienists under the head of suppressed sex-thoughts, sex-feelings and sex-desires. But enough has been accomplished by the psychic investigators to justify the claim of the originating power and influence of the mind. The student of the mind cannot afford, in addition, to pass by the investigations of The Society of Psychic Research. If much of its material be doubted there still remains sufficient to show that there is evidence for telepathy and telekinesis. Thought produces passive and active results at a distance. In view of all of these considerations the mind cannot be reduced to the physiology of the brain. It has its own life

⁶ Thomson, *Brain and Personality*.

⁷ Freud, *General Introduction to Psycho-analysis*.

⁸ Jung, *Libido*.

⁹Holt, *The Freudian Wish*.

closely connected as it is with the body. And consequently as far as the mind is *sui generis*, and no after-effect of matter, it guarantees all the phenomena that indicate free will.

Biological theory and freedom. The physiological problem was already a biological question. But there is a need not only to grapple with the immediate problem of brain and mind, but there are great ruling biological suppositions that deeply affect the problem of freedom. The two great claims that bear upon liberty are the claims of heredity and environment. In any fairly full and honest examination of our real liberty we must reckon with the questions which both heredity and environment propose to us.

The assertion that heredity is all—controlling is the latest position in the debate, whether heredity or surroundings are the controlling factor in human life. The influence of heredity has grown through two causes. The first is the fact, that in connection with the increase of the acceptance of the neo-Darwinian theory of Weisman, viz., that no acquired characteristics are handed on but that only the original elements of the germ-plasm affect life, the investigations of the Austrian monk Mendel calculating the proportion of different strains in heredity¹⁰ were more and more established. The second cause is the increasing belief in the inference of eugenics. Galton in 1869 endeavored to prove that success was a family affair.¹¹

¹⁰ Cf. For a brief practical statement, Micou, *Basic Ideas in Religion*, p. 89 ff.

¹¹ Galton, *Hereditary Genius*.

More and more the good and bad qualities of men were supposed to be the result of inherited tendencies. These were not restricted to physical traits but they were also applied to mental characteristics and to moral attitudes.¹² The two outstanding examples which are frequently cited are those of the descendants of one Juke and of Jonathan Edwards. The Juke Family, descended from a vagabond born in rural New York in 1720, calculated for seven generations, showed that 310 were professional paupers, 440 were diseased through evil lives, more than half of the women were prostitutes, 130 were convicted criminals, 60 were thieves, 7 were murderers, etc. Thus the record continues one of degeneracy and crime. On the other hand Jonathan Edwards in 1900 had 1394 descendants. Of these 1295 were college graduates, 13 presidents of colleges, 65 professors, and many principals of educational institutions. 60 were physicians, over 100 preachers, missionaries and professors of theology, 100 were lawyers, 30 were judges, 80 held public office, one was vice-president of the United States, some were governors, others leaders in commerce and industry, 60 authors, 75 officers in the army and navy, etc. This record is supposed to prove the influence of good heredity. If these contentions are true and demonstrate the claim made for them, then of course our moral frame-work is made for us by our ancestors, and we cannot really be said to be free. Goodness is then the result of being well-born.

¹² For a modern treatise see Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*, Cf. also Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*.

But there are some facts that need to be considered before we can draw such a conclusion. If acquired traits are not inherited, how can mental and moral characteristics be handed down? The only escape is to suppose as Haeckel did that mind is in the germ-plasm. But how can this be substantiated by examination? Binet¹³ does claim to have found actions in the didinium, a very primitive form of life, which seem to indicate deliberation and to argue for a psychology of low forms. But this contention has not been widely accepted.¹⁴ The only deduction that can be made from the cases of Juke and Edwards is that there is a social inheritance. Man, as Professor Conklin claims, has not changed much physically for long centuries. His evolution has been intellectual and moral. But has this been the outgrowth of physical evolution, or the result of certain social surroundings through which the attainments of families and groups are preserved? The Jukes became Jukes and the Edwardses Edwardses through their social atmosphere and their opportunities in life. It is also to be noted that there is evidence to be found in considering the character of twins. There are two kinds of twins. The one consists of those who come from different ova, and they show physical and mental variations. The other kind come from the division of one ovum and are physically very much alike, e. g., in color of eyes, shape of nose, color of hair, etc. But

¹³ The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms, p. 11.

¹⁴ Cf. The extreme claims of N. Quevli, Cell Intelligence the Cause of Evolution.

are they mentally and morally similar? Do they show great common traits? This fact has by no means been established. Furthermore, the whole claim of heredity must be counter-balanced by the fact of variation. Through variation novelties occur. And in the higher forms of life, especially in man, the generalizations of the hereditarians are not correct when they omit the rise of spontaneity. The type is not all that there is, but along side of the type is the individual. The individual has peculiarities that the type cannot fully explain. There are variations of spontaneity which cannot be classified under the scheme of heredity.

The other element of environment dare not be passed by. Lamarck was the advocate of environment; and while he has been displaced to a great degree there are still some biological facts, that seem best explicable through its assumption. When biology is applied in the study of society the teachers of sociology claim that surroundings ought to count at least 50 per cent. A few years ago much ado was made about the power of environment in the practical study of the condition of young women seeking employment in stores. It was shown that their pay was so small, that in order to meet the demands of proper dress and living, and without considering at all any need of amusement or recreation, they were subject to the seduction of selling their bodies to keep alive. The temptation and its reality were portrayed so vividly that it appeared as though there was no choice possible, but that the conditions which were very wrong inevitably must

lead to evil. Is this description of the power of environment accurate? If so, then of course neither praise nor blame can be attached to persons for their actions, and freedom is a delusion. But the hereditarians, strange to say, refute the environmentalists. The American biologist, Professor Woods,¹⁵ claims that the growth of the power of choice in organisms diminishes the influence of environment. He says: "This may be the chief reason why human beings, who of all beings have the greatest power to choose the surroundings congenial to their special needs and natures, are so little affected by outward conditions. The occasional able, ambitious, and determined member of an obscure or degenerate family can get free from his uncongenial associates. So can the weak or lazy or vicious (even if a black sheep from the finest fold) easily find his natural haunts." This judgment opposes the strong claim of the advocates of environment, while at the same time it militates against the extreme hereditary hypothesis, although Professor Woods does not see this implication of his admission. The practical question again arises, that if we take two children in the same home, under the same influences, receiving the same education, etc., do they turn out the same? Is it not rather true that there are great differences due to their choices? Consequently the total result in considering the claims of both heredity and environment does not destroy the actuality of choice and free decision. That we

¹⁵ The Law of Diminishing Environmental Influences, Popular Science Monthly, April, 1910.

are morally forced to be what we are cannot be sustained by the proofs of the biologists.

Sociology and freedom. Are we not conditioned as individuals by social forces, and is not society itself a product of necessary laws, which destroy all claims of liberty? The sociologist has used some of the results of biology, notably the power of surroundings, in his efforts. He thus makes man unfree. But there are some direct sociological facts to be considered. The investigations of social psychology with their stressing of certain social instincts¹⁶ tend to show how the individual is under the compulsion of common instincts and feelings. Much is made of the influence of the crowd-mind and the mob-feeling, through which in any gathering or common group opinions and emotions are borne in upon men. Among all influences the most potent is imitation¹⁷ which rules largely in human endeavor and moulds us into certain common ways of doing things and controls our actions. But is the force of common social mental traits so strong as to abolish the decisions and actions of the separate mind? We may oppose the common power of feeling and thought. There are always quite a number of individuals who go their own way. It is only by our willingness that we can be carried along in the common stream. If we oppose and resist, the strongest social forces of mind can have no power over us. Through our own agreement or complacence alone can we be absorbed into the ruling

¹⁶ Cf. McDougal, *Social Psychology*.

¹⁷ Cf. Tarde, *Imitation*.

trend of feeling and opinion. The contagion of common ideas and emotions does not destroy our individual liberty of choice and judgment.

When sociology becomes more and more accurate it employs the science of statistics. But what do we learn from a study of social statistics? After the data have been collected we find that there is a certain regularity in actions that seem purely individual. There is a steady number of suicides, a definite average of births, an average proportion of marriages, etc. The fact that actions like these, and even distinctly moral attitudes, can be summarized into figures seems to indicate that there are underlying influences which shape men. But when the full value of statistics is admitted, it only demonstrates a certain regularity of actions. Does this regularity of ordered lives, or the calculable expectedness of crime, suicide, and similar facts, bring such pressure to bear upon the consideration of freedom as to negate it? Men still feel their responsibility and accept it. The great students of criminology on the one hand argue that influences and environment and heredity make criminals. But on the other hand the new practice of prison reform, probation and parole, rest upon the assumption of the possibility of change in the prisoner by appealing to his own power of will and decision. This is characteristic of other cases. Whatever our theory may be, in the actualities of life we act upon the presumption of liberty and choice.

In addition to the biological conceptions used by sociology it has also employed at times a

philosophy of society which makes the individual a mere number in the group. Our whole life as separate beings is virtually denied, and we are made the creatures of the family, the place where we dwell, the country that is ours, the religion we profess, etc. Are we such socially conditioned men that our individuality is no real fact? The saner philosophy of society does not destroy the individual life. It allows the balance of individual choice and common social direction.¹⁸ If we follow this conception of balance we cannot assume that society itself is the outcome of natural forces. The power and urge of food, shelter, sex, will not be the only influences that are considered. There will be a recognition of great ideas and ideals that are accepted by men. Great passions will arise kindled by eminent leaders. Men in their common life will think together and choose together without admitting that they are the mere playthings of unconscious forces. Shall the subhuman energies count, and the natural forces be weighed, as against the consciousness of men as to their liberty of action? In this apparent conflict of evidence the mind which has discovered the laws of nature ought not to be discounted, and its own right denied, while what it has established remains firm. Modern science with its rule has created an unjustifiable prejudice against the data of the mind. It wants to rule the universe from its restricted area of facts and laws.

Causality and freedom. All the different

¹⁸ Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*.

objections to freedom find their focus in the metaphysical problem of causality. Can there be liberty in a universe which is controlled by the reign and power of cause? From the lowest particle of matter upward there seems to be a continuous chain of cause and effect. So much has already been included, by the research of science, in the successive phenomena that touch each other causally, that the unexplained portion of existence would appear logically to fall in most readily with the hypothesis of the universal and unexceptional control of natural causality. This philosophic position has a great unity and grows upon us as facts accumulate. We do not seem to be able to really think a universe without causality. When this view of things enters human life it necessarily leads to a strong fatalism. In modern drama Ibsen in *The Wild Duck* has applied the power of causality working up through life to a family situation, which completely controls every act and deed, and fills us with an unescapable dread as we contemplate the utter human helplessness over against the tyranny of fate. The novels of Thomas Hardy are an exposition of the causal enchainment of man, whether we analyze *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* or *Two in a Tower* or the world-drama of *The Dynasts*. Everywhere life is contemplated as completely conditioned by the power of causality issuing into fate.

But is this sweeping assumption of the continuity and control of causality, deriving its interpretation from the energy observed in

matter, really true to the whole situation? When we begin with the minute particles of matter and the ultimate stressing of energy it is true that it obtains through all phenomena. But does the energy exhibited in the lowest forms of matter actually cause all things as we rise in the scale from the simple to the complex? When we pass from physics and chemistry with their laws to biology, do the same laws of cause explain biological facts? We find a certain plus not included in the sub-biological sciences. Therefore we frame new laws for biology. There is a physics and chemistry of biology but it does not unfold the fact of life and the organism. The continuity of physical and chemical laws within biology is evident, but there is an addition of something novel that has never found an adequate explanation through the pre-biological facts and inferences. The lower does not produce the higher by a mere continuity of the causal chain of the lower. The examination of the mind as we go on from biology to psychology opens up another break in the causal continuity. The facts of life and mind cause a distinct division which does not destroy the connection of the causality of what is below them, but proves the coming in of new data that interfere with any assumption of the absolute reign of causal necessity and continuity. Man as a living and rational being finds that there is a subsumption of the lower under the higher. The complex and more differentiated takes up into itself the simple and more homogeneous. The world becomes man's possession. "That is to say, he is free by

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the help of his world, and in virtue of the rational activities which he performs; even though nature also performs them in and through him. For the world becomes an object of his experience and the content of his self, as he interprets its meaning and determines its value and use. And it is this rational recoil upon the world which makes it his object, and constitutes the individual freedom. What was outer becomes inner.”¹⁹ It is this process of the rational and free permeation of the world by man’s thought and action which is the highest disproof of a blind and absolute causality. Man is the interpreter of nature and its causality and feels and knows himself in his immediate consciousness as free.

The difficulty of religion. There is a problem, which is not met by the general consideration of the dependence of ethics upon religion. Wherever there is belief in supernatural power there is some dependence of man upon it. To the degree then that man is so dependent he is not free. But man as an individual can accept or reject such dependence. No religion is compulsory in itself. The only compulsion has arisen through human custom or law. But there has been a real limitation through religion wherever men have been under the conviction of the power of fate. Back of all of the Greek gods there was a tremendous force in the belief in fate. In Brahmanism there is a unifying pantheism that virtually destroys individual initiative, makes man largely meditative, and

¹⁹ Sir Henry Jones, *A Faith That Enquires*, p. 225.

causes stagnation in society, which is static through the idea that all life tends toward the Absolute and in its present form is the delusive shadow of the eternal reality of rest that determines us. Nevertheless there are practical moral rules and freedom is still lived even if it is not believed. Buddhism with its doctrine of Karma, or reincarnation of men through their deeds, has a moral fatalism of acts, even though it denies the continuance of the soul. But with this fatalism it combines a moral theory of the suppression of desire and inculcates mercy and kindness. The Kismet of Mohammedanism with its strong accent upon predestination of human life still enjoins mercy and calls upon the decision of men. The belief in fate in religion is therefore not practically destructive of the exercise of freedom while it does take away the belief of men in liberty.

Christianity and free will. The Christian faith raises four questions about free will through its doctrines of providence, sin, grace, and predestination. There have been at all times three attitudes; first the position of those who stressed determination to the limit of fatalism; second, the group which in reaction almost denied providence and predestination to save free will; and third, those who mediated between the two extremes. Is there a just explanation which does not destroy liberty and still maintains the value of all Christian truths?

The doctrine of providence, through which we assert that our lives are in God's hand, so that all the hairs of our head are numbered, and the length of our days written down in God's

book, seems to take away our freedom. But this is not really so. It only asserts that the many things in our life which we cannot control, such as are under natural law or appear to be a matter of accident or chance, are really known to God, and are in the power of His fatherly goodness which seeks our liberty through His provident care and guidance.

Sin when it is given its full value, as the result not merely of individual choice and act, but also as the inherited burden of mankind, certainly spells our bondage. The deliverance of grace accomplished, if we accept the teaching of Paul, without our co-operation, makes our goodness apparently wholly the gift of God. Thus whether we are in sin or under grace we are not masters of our spiritual life. But this is not the total meaning of these truths. The slavery of sin, which is an experienceable fact, even though its guilt is not naturally recognized, calls for freedom. The awfulness of sin is stressed so strongly in orthodox Christianity because only by the recognition of the enslavement of men and human society through the evil of sin is the way to freedom possible. Grace is the necessary emancipation, which is the act of divine goodness to make us free. It the power to awaken in us the desire for the good and to give us the strength to do it. There is no limitation of life but a bestowal of the real energy and effective motive to do the right in its relation toward God as well as toward man.

Predestination taken in its absolute form, stressed by Augustine and Calvin, makes man

a piece of clay in the hands of the divine potter. Man is molded either into a vessel of honor or a vessel of dishonor by divine will which elects or rejects him independently of his responsible acts. But this form has been almost universally rejected through the growing appreciation of God's love for men. Predestination means on its positive side, in agreement with God's universal will for the salvation of men, that the redeeming goodness of God foreseeing the attitude of men takes hold of their will. The natural and formal freedom is made a vital freedom of the content of the good. Thus God through Christ predestines to the liberty of the children of God. The negative side is the persistence of men in the evil. God's foresight of this is not an act of His will to reject. Men cause their own rejection. The divine will is no power to evil. Evil rests upon the choice of men who will not see God's way for their deliverance and liberty. Thus interpreted Christianity makes for a real, full freedom of the good life in its fulness.

The total result of our study is to vindicate not an absolute freedom of an anarchistic, illogical sort, but an ordered liberty with limitations which, however, do not destroy it.

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CHAPTER IV

CONSCIENCE AND FREEDOM

The organ of freedom. After the establishment of the range of free will there arises the question, how the will comes to expression in moral matters in our whole mental life. The answer that men readily give is the reference to conscience. Through it the judgments and decisions are made. Choices of good and bad centre in it. Approval and disapproval of acts, praise or blame, penitence and remorse are expressed through the conscience. But to name the conscience only raises a new problem. What is the conscience? Is it a simple voice in us as the older moralists thought, or is it a complex experience which must be analyzed according to its component mental constituents? The latter question will receive an affirmative answer as we endeavor to consider what the conscience is and how it functions.

The meaning of conscience. There is a history in the rise and use of the term "conscience." What are its indications, and what did men intend to express through it? The first clear evidence of the word, conscience, is found among the Greek Stoics. They took the term "suneidesis," which had been used for

consciousness in general, and applied it specifically to our moral consciousness of ourselves and our acts. It became the co-knowledge of the good or bad within us. The Romans similarly used "conscientia," from which we derive our "conscience," and the French their word "conscience." The German term "Gewissen" means "Mitwissen" and expresses the very same idea as all the other words derivative from the Greek. From these linguistic facts it appears that when the idea of conscience was set apart from other ideas it began with an emphasis upon the intellect, which modern psychological analysis will not sustain. A further error was implied in the apparent assumption of a double consciousness, one given to natural things, the other to moral decisions. Thus the belief arose that the conscience is a definite unity within us, a single voice, divine in its content and form; instead of a composite of different mental functionings concerned with the good or bad, the right or wrong.

The judgment of acts. What is the most noticeable fact about conscience? What outstanding feature is felt when we speak of conscience? The very first element is the judgment of ourselves, our words and our acts. Conscience is a judge within us, either freeing us or condemning us in our conduct. It is not necessary that this judgment should come after the act, which happens when we go ahead in our thoughts, words and deeds without allowing any estimate to come to us of the moral value of what we are about to think, utter or do. But if we pause before any con-

duct there is a premonitory warning which judges what we intend to do in its moral bearings. I may be placed in a quandary in which I feel inclined, in order to avoid difficulties, to tell an untruth. The conflict in the situation may not be of my own making, but the result of a condition, as when e. g. the telling a sick man the actual state of his sickness may be detrimental, while not doing so is deceit. It is then that some judgment is made within us either for truth or for concealment. But most judgments are clear. I may be tempted to take an undue profit in a sale or to misrepresent what I want to sell. If conscience functions, and I allow it to speak it will mark my intention as wrong. In the same manner I see some person in imminent danger in the water. I come to the rescue at once, and in the doing of the act or just after it I hear the approval: "This was a noble deed." Thus judgments of our conduct are always going on. It may happen that we suppress the utterance of these judgments, but sooner or later they will press in upon our consciousness. The judgments are strong and have a call to action. The approving decisions invite obedience, the disapproving judgments inhibit action. But we are never forced to follow the judgment of our conscience. We can accept or reject its rulings. When conscience is powerful in us it comes with a compelling appeal but never with a compulsory force. The submission to conscience or the suppression of its judgment indicates the nature of our conscience. If we constantly disregard its promptings and pass by its deci-

sions we have a tough or hardened conscience. The increase of this attitude finally silences conscience for a long time or completely atrophies it. If we readily obey the judgments we have a ready or tender conscience. This is the normal, sound position, and makes for the liberty in the good. Sometimes a tender conscience may go beyond the proper balance, and become super-sensitive and critical about our own acts or those of others. We not only judge ourselves, but also others either rightly or wrongly. When this judgment is extreme, or fails to weigh situations justly and sympathetically, it creates a quibbling and contentious conscience that loses itself in details and minutiae, and fails even when there is justice in the judgments. The judgment in order to be true and cultivated must be broad, fair, equitable, and apply equal decisions to others and to ourselves.

The law back of the judgment. When conscience pronounces a judgment the question rises, on what basis is the judgment given? Before or after an act of ourselves or others we say either: "This is right," or "This is wrong." Why can we make such a statement? Is there a standard or law back of the judgment which gives us the right to make the judgment? We accept certain great principles as controlling our judgments of attitudes and acts. The earliest formulator of scientific ethics, Aristotle, recognized this law although he had no definite conception of conscience nor gave it a name. Resting upon his logic Aristotle

called attention to the practical syllogism.¹ In this syllogism the judgment is either the conclusion or the minor premise. When I say: "This act is just" I am drawing the conclusion in a syllogism even if I do not clearly formulate the major and minor premise. I may use a minor premise and say to myself: "This deceit of mine is a lie." The implied conclusion is, therefore it is wrong. But its foundation is a major premise which says, when definitely formulated: "Lying is wrong." When the judgment is a minor premise a major is necessary, and a conclusion follows. The syllogism is rarely put into its complete form. But the necessary implication is that there is always a major premise on which the judgment rests. This major premise is one of the laws of conscience. Thus we find in our mental life that there are certain standards and laws, which we have accepted, and upon which our judgments of the moral value of conduct rest.

The origin of the law. The existence of certain standards and laws in our conscience that may be traced to definite principles opens up the problem whence are these laws, and how are they derived? When we examine the content of the moral laws that controls us we find that it is derived from what has been taught us. We grow up in a certain family with its moral conceptions and practices. Then we are influenced by the type of religion we have and its ethical principles. The ruling practices of an age with its moral trend have a bearing

¹ Cf. Sir A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, Vol. I, Essay IV, p. 263 ff.

upon us. Thus the condition of the morals and the ethical attitude of the society in which we grow up first begin to shape us. When however we come to our days of discretion we will make individual choices and decisions either affirming or denying what we have received no matter how powerful early training and surroundings are.

But the problem of tracing the content of conscience to its sources is not the whole question. Why do the moral ideas and practices have the power of an inner law? It is this formal problem of conscience which lies at the root of the origin of conscience. A very common conception of today is that conscience is the voice of society in man. The conscience is supposed to be the rule of the social power in the individual, controlling him in the interest of the common life, and saying to him: "In the name of society I bid you do this." The moral laws certainly have large social relations, and make the common life possible. But are we conscious of this pressure of society as inherent in us? Do men accept the right as the demand of society? Is this its binding strength? Men have again and again revolted against the moral positions of their age and the society of their times without rejecting the conscience. In fact great moral leaders have frequently claimed the right of their own conscience, and have demanded their ethical freedom in the choice of right and wrong. The stories of Confucius and of Socrates show us how men are not the mere focus of their age, but through individual insight into moral truth

rise above those about them, and feel an urge which does not exhibit itself as social. Frequently the laws of conscience develop in the conflict of our thoughts and emotions. Martineau supposed² that it was out of the inner conflict of thoughts excusing or accusing each other that conscience arose. He confused St. Paul's description of the functioning of conscience³ with its origin. There are no psychological or social indications sufficiently definite to permit us in making a fairly adequate conjecture as to the origin of conscience.⁴ We know its uses but somehow its beginnings are hidden. It comes to us with a certain mystery about which religion makes its assertions, tracing the moral laws in their appeal and power to a gift of God. Ethics does not seem capable of solving this question with its resources. It only knows of the impelling power of the laws of right, which we often desire to get rid of but cannot. Nevertheless we have the liberty to overrule all the promptings of the laws of conscience by our desires and actions. We know and feel the force of the laws accepted as right, but we can freely disobey them and subject ourselves to the consequences of the violation of the moral order.

The intellectual elements of conscience. When conscience began to be studied separately the emphasis was put strongly on the intellect in

² Cf. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 53, 54, 401, 402.

³ Romans II: 14, 15.

⁴ Rogers, *Theory of Ethics*, Chapter III, is another effort that fails.

conscience. But modern psychological investigation has led students to stress the emotional power. Which of these two attitudes is more correct? The reply will appear as we attempt to analyse the parts which intellect and emotion play in conscience. Whenever we pass a moral judgment of any sort it certainly contains an attitude that either demands thought or has thought back of it. It is impossible to make a valuation of a moral act without some analytical knowledge. If we desired to pass judgment on a war, and say: "This war is wrong," we could not do so except certain facts were known, considered and estimated by us in reference to the war we wanted to adjudge. The moral principles also contain general statements, which are either first assumptions in conduct or generalized abstractions from the concrete conditions of life. No intellectually uncertain or colorless ideas can form the basis of the maxims and laws of our character and conduct. If I claim "Justice is fundamental in social morality," I am making a statement which has a meaning in every single part of it. There are large and strong intellectual elements in it, and it is rich in a far-reaching conception. The whole functioning of conscience would be blind and impulsive were it not for the rational content. It is just this rational content which gives soundness and stability to conscience and leads us as rational beings to accept its authority.

As far as the material of our moral laws controlling us comes from society it has a traditional aspect. But will the moral customs of society last if they do not rest on an inherent rationality

which justifies their currency and permanence? Sometimes reasonableness is sustained by the impossibility of the opposite. Hobhouse⁵ well says: "Reason comes by her own, not because men willingly and consciously accept her, but because unreason carried far enough produces misery and disaster. Sufficiently grave departures, whether to the right hand or to the left, either produce reaction or lead to social dissolution. Against dissolute practice, society will perhaps erect a barrier of a stringent theory, and save itself in turn from the consequences of the theory by a network of tacit understanding forming a secondary and more genuine code of conduct beside or behind that which men outwardly profess. The price of luxury is disorder, the price of undue strictness is insincerity, and both prices will be paid until men seek to found conduct on the dispassionate consideration of what is permanently in accord with the requirements of human nature under the conditions of social life." The conditions of social life fit into a moral order which is being realized, and beneath which there is a purpose. The moral development, as well as the development of nature, when regarded in its totality leads to the assumption of an inherent purpose. For this cause the laws of moral life in their individual and common application, and the judgment of conscience, rest upon reason which is practically effective because it is theoretically correct.

What is the power of emotion? After we have

⁵ The Rational Good, p. 168.

given full place to the intellect, have we really touched the impulsive and propelling power of conscience? If we examine a moral law it does not come to us merely in the cold and dispassionate form of an intellectual theorem. There is about it a warmth and propulsion of feeling and emotion. This distinguishes a moral principle in action from the mere consideration of it apart from its functioning. We may discuss an ethical question in an unconcerned and unapplied manner as we discuss any problem. But as soon as the moral law bears upon the immediate conduct it is accompanied by a strong inrush of emotion. When we consider the moral appraisalment in judging of character and conduct in its practical working we find an even stronger emotional tone than in the law. The judgment of the conscience is not delivered like the usual sentence of a judge as the exposition of the law involved. But the condemnation or acquittal comes with solemnity and power. It produces either depression of feeling or heightening of it. We may suppress the full force of the emotional urge but it is present and sometimes carries us whither we did not expect to be carried. A deed that has been done often leaves behind it an effect of emotion that must spend itself no matter how long it takes. The student Raskolnikoff, who is the leading character in Dostoevsky's "Crime and Punishment," shows how impossible it is for him finally not to betray himself and to reveal the deed which he tries to hide. It is the constant emotional pressure that makes him restless and does not allow him to bury sin in forgetfulness. This

power of emotion like a mighty stream frequently overflows the whole life. The great classic analysis of it in the drama is found in *Macbeth*, when both *Macbeth* and *Lady Macbeth* are overwhelmed by the horror and inescapability of the murder they have committed. The undercurrent of their minds is mighty emotion. This emotion has various degrees according to the culpability which is felt to be in an act. A minor transgression is followed by sorrow or regret. Either of these may be short-lived or continue for some time according to the emotional strength that produces the reaction in us after the judgment of conscience. When an attitude or action leads to a more severe condemnation it is succeeded by remorse. Remorse has tremendous tone of feeling, and is often not overcome very readily. A change may be effected if after the experience of sorrow, or regret, or remorse, we turn about in the direction of the freedom of the good. This mental reversal is repentance. It is the acceptance of the full condemnation with its emotional burden, the resolution to reject the condemned act and attitude, and in future to choose the opposite and seek the good. The act approved of is accompanied by a feeling of either satisfaction, or joy, or peace. It may also contain an impetus to continue in the good through the current of the encouraging emotion. But no matter how strong the emotional trend may be we can brace ourselves against it. It is powerful but it does not control us finally without our volition. Even the temporary outburst of its strength can be overcome, and if it pre-

vails it is only as we allow it to do so in the conflict which ensues between it and our set desire and will.

The conscience and volition. It is self-evident that the knowledge and emotion pertaining to right and wrong lead to action or inhibit it. But are there any further contacts? In the study of volition desire plays an important part. It is the longing which seeks to satisfy a want. This longing often emerges into a motive, and the motive brings about the action. The motivation to action arising in desire can enter into conscience when our desires adopt the moral laws as a want to be realized. If, e. g., we take the saying "honesty is the best policy," and change it from the diplomatic form into the moral law, and say: "honesty is right," we may make honest words and actions our desire. Then we begin to incorporate the moral law into our motives. The promptings and appeals of conscience become connected inwardly with the functioning of our volition. It is this end toward which conscience is striving so that there may be a joyous approval of judgment. The inner identification with the moral law makes us free to the degree that the right becomes our desire. On the contrary the liberty of a good life is hindered as far as our desires remain unmoralized. If, e.g., I give way to the impulses that crowd in upon me, especially in the first days of adolescence, and listen to the pressure of sex without controlling it, it implants itself in my desire. Unless a contest takes place to dislodge the mere natural instinct from the conscious desire the impulse will con-

quer. Conscience with its law of restraint of sex and its call to purity will speak in vain. My action will follow the motive controlled by the desire that is amoral and becomes immoral with the continual rejection of the appeal of the moral law. We must implant the moral principles into the course of mental phenomena that lead to action.

Is there a social conscience? The conscience has always been accepted as acting in and through the individual mind. But in the last decades the assertion has been made again and again, that there is and ought to be a social conscience. What is really meant by a social conscience? It is frequently forgotten that the individual ought to have a social conscience. By this term we mean, not that we ought to consider our actions of right or wrong as they affect other individuals, but as they bear upon social groups and society at large. Those who are leaders in the state, the church, in politics, in industry, in commerce, etc. by their very position must decide moral issues representatively, and they can do this rightly only if they acquire a moral sense and judgment that has the social outlook. But in addition to the leaders every one in society has a social influence, and must accept social obligations. It is being realized in business today that strictly speaking there is no private transaction. Every article sold, and the price charged for what is purchased, have a connection with the whole conduct of business and the whole scale of prices as they affect society. There must be an awakening among all people to understand

how their actions touch the life of society. Among some people there is the idea that liberty is mere individual choice. For this reason they resent, e.g., quarantine that is put upon their homes when there are cases of contagious disease. They do not realize the interconnection of men in society, and the fact that there must be common liberty, and consequently that there must be common rights. The usual conscience has not been developed to function socially.

The other meaning of the social conscience is the common attitude of society on moral issues. Of course we must not suppose that there is some unitary super-mind and super-conscience in society. We dare not create social fictions that are unreal. But it is a fact, that through the ideals of leaders, through common organs of public opinion, there is found and expressed what is in the minds of the many. There is a congruence of certain moral laws and judgments in the common and public outlook. Through the merging of the attitude of many, and through the testing of the average conscience, we arrive at a common conscience which judges social matters.. Society will be sound as far as more and more of its ideas and actions are controlled, not by political, or economic considerations, but are adjudged by a living and developing social conscience with high standards.

The authority of conscience. A very important element in the analysis of conscience is the problem of its authority. Its moral law comes to us and impresses us with a feeling that it is authoritative. We may accept or reject the

rulings of the authoritative call of conscience, but we cannot deny the claim of authority. The authority of conscience is reasonable and not arbitrarily compulsory. Through it we are not to be enslaved and made permanently dependent, but it is the way to real liberty of the good. Its imperative is invitation and appeal, even if its pronouncement is direct, definite and unbending. We may overhear the call of authority but it will reassert itself.

Connected with the authority of conscience is the problem of its infallibility. It cannot be denied that we can do nought else than follow our conscience when it approves of an ideal and attitude. But this does not imply that the conscience is unerring. It may not be faulty in following such knowledge as it has, but its knowledge may be wrong. The conscience of the early New England people was correct according to their conviction of right when they burned witches, but we know now that their conception of right in this respect and their belief in witches was wrong. When Calvin approved of the burning of Servetus, he thought that his approval was a high and just moral act. Today we know that his standard was wrong. Thus conscience is never infallible in its content. One age condemns the position of an age that is gone. Different people, especially those of the low tribes, have consciences that are devoid of what we consider the very fundamentals of moral law. We can only judge men as they follow their conscience, but we can not claim that honesty of obedience to one's conscience implies the correctness of what conscience dictates.

The authority of the conscience is not destroyed by the defectiveness of its contents. From the crudest beginnings it has constantly risen to a better appreciation of the good. Progress has not been uniform, but there have been periods of retrogression. The formal authority finds its best content when conscience is under the influence of two developing causes. The first is the growth of right reason applied to morals. When men seriously reflect upon the good, and observe the effect of evil, they recognize what makes for happiness and freedom. Action does not always follow reflection, but to the degree that we allow reasonable considerations to guide us we will eliminate the ignorance that in part prevents higher moral standards. Enlightenment aids moral progress and helps in giving sounder content to conscience. The second cause that elevates conscience is the content which a great religion furnishes. While low forms of religion have stood in the way of ethical advance, the high forms have presented conceptions of such a range, and kindled emotions of such power, that conscience is very much lifted up. The best religion is that whose ethical content presents ideals which it will take the centuries to work out. This is the claim of Christianity. It aims to make the authority of conscience complete for liberty and goodness through its perfect moral content and ideal.

Christianity and conscience. It is only through the writings of Paul that we are introduced to the Christian conception of conscience in its beginnings. Christ in the figurative term "the

light of the body is the eye,"⁶ has stated the fact of the conscience. But the actual word only came into use in Christian truth through Paul. In the letter to the Romans Paul has the idea of conscience in mind, when he describes the existence of the law in the mind of the Gentiles who do not have the revealed law of Israel. He well describes the conflict in the conscience between thoughts as they accuse or excuse each other.⁷ The actual inner process of conscience is realized. But more important is the fact that Paul⁸ sees in the conscience that in man which is to accept the pure truth. He emphasizes the appeal of divine revelation as saving truth to the conscience. This is for him the centre toward which religious truth tends, and before which it must approve itself. It affirms the essential Christian position which makes all of its truth ethical in purpose though not in immediate character. The conscience is conceived of as paramount; and neither reason with its logic nor emotion with its unsteadiness are fundamental. Out of this attitude we must judge all questions of truth, its authority and infallibility. No demand of dogmatic consistency must stand in the way of the moral verification of all spiritual truth before the conscience.

⁶ Matthew VI: 22.

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CHAPTER V

FREEDOM AND PESSIMISM

What is the problem? A very real difficulty arises as we consider whether the trend of life is toward evil or good. The theory of pessimism is that this is the worst of all possible worlds. Its opposite is optimism which claims that we are in the best of all possible worlds. The great advocate of optimism in modern times is Leibniz who in the interest of religion wrote his theodicy. In this treatise he seeks to prove that such evil as is in the world is due to human finiteness, and the nature of liberty. The world, Leibniz thinks, is the best of all possible worlds that God could make and still retain freedom. Whether this position is tenable or not, it is valuable because it indicates the problem of the relation of freedom to evil. There are two sides to this question. The first is that the existence of the choice of right or wrong makes possible the wrong choice. This is the risk of freedom. The other side is the question, whether freedom is worth while and really helps the cause of the good if the whole drift of affairs is toward evil. The first consequence of the problem of the relation of freedom to good or evil is self-evident. It is the second which gives us concern and constitutes the question of pessimism.

The causes of pessimism. There are several great causes of intellectual, emotional, and volitional pessimism, disregarding for the moment the pessimism of mood. Among these those which characterize our age are naturalism and realism. It would seem that naturalism ought to be the friend of hope. When it becomes tinged with religion and arrives at pantheism it says with Pope: "Whatever is is good." There is no room for the distinction of good and evil where any kind of pantheism rules. But the actual naturalism, either neglecting its pantheistic consequence or contradicting it, takes the real world as one of absolute necessity. Man seeking the outlook of hope does not find it but is always subject to inexorable law. The desire for freedom is a deception. Morals and religion are really illusions in a universe of mere forces and energies. Where men think and feel themselves constrained to accept the conclusions of natural science alone as fundamental and ultimate they must abandon moral and spiritual values. Then bowing to the inescapable reign of iron natural law they grow sad, weary and hopeless when the cry of their heart calls for goodness and its liberty. No one has better voiced the hopelessness of naturalism than Matthew Arnold in his poem *Dover Plains*. He hears faith's

"Melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world."

The second great cause in our day is realism.

The attitude of an extreme realism has entered into all art, and into the whole view and philosophy of life. It claims to be the honest portrayal of facts as against the idealism which lifting its head into the clouds forgets that we are walking on the earth. As a protest realism serves to correct an unreal idealism which has lost itself in the dreams of romanticism. But when realism becomes the ruling outlook and crowds out the striving after the ideal it destroys ideals. The destruction of ideals and their value undermines the worth of morals and freedom. To see things as they are is of service if we make the effort to make things as they ought to be. Realism however discounts such an effort for betterment. It wants to dwell in the slums it has discovered, and to keep the fig-leaf of decency removed. Through realism men learn to dwell in the tents of ungodliness and to delight in the examination and description of all that is ugly, mean and bad. This vile world is the paradise of realism. It loves the shadows of Main Street, and glorifies the low aspirations of Alice Adams.¹ The decadent dramas of Strindberg, the free verse that dwells in nasty places, and the moving picture that portrays the worst in human life luridly, are exalted. Painting and sculpture by the power of realism depart from purity of color and the glorious beauty of the human form, and unfold the riot of impure color and exhibit the extravagance of form. If this is life and all that it contains and all that it may hope to be then

¹ The popularity of such a novel as "Babbitt" is a sad sign of a most commonplace, decadent realism.

surely there is no place for the hope and glory of human freedom. If realism rests on facts and if its facts are final then we must hang our heads in shame and despair.

Pessimism and human moods. There is a kind of pessimism which does not rest upon naturalism or realism, but is the growth of the mood of man. A mood is composed of a number of emotions which have attained permanence and color the whole feeling of our mind. It is a settled attitude of feeling toward all experience and bends it to its own condition. Where the common feeling is bright there is optimism, but where it is gloomy there is pessimism. A depressed mood of gloom may be the result of wrong physical conditions of the body or the consequence of mental disorder. But there are men whose experiences have soured them or who are hopeless when they view the course of things. Such men fall into the mood that is dark and become pessimistic. There are others who assume pessimism and strike an attitude of "Weltschmerz." With all these different types of men there can be no debate. Their attitude is a matter of taste. Sometimes there is a weariness and ennui of the world which is the result of a dissipated life which has drunk the wine of evil indulgence to the dregs. The mood which is pessimistic as the result of such a life is the punishment of the wrong choice of evil. There are temperamental pessimists who are well represented by Jacques,² when he approves of the fool's philosophy:

² "As You Like It," Act II, Scene VII.

“ 'Tis but an hour ago since it was nine,
And after one hour more't will be eleven,
And so from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe,
And then from hour to hour, we rot and rot,
And thereby hangs a tale.' ”

This makes a stale and unprofitable world.

Can we know and be glad? We begin to come to the real issue of pessimism when we ask as our first question, what is the outcome of knowledge? Does it lead to hope or despair; does it make us optimistic or pessimistic? At the outset there seems to be joy in the attainments of the intellect. We are satisfied as little by little we learn to know. But as soon as the effort is made to go below the surface of truth and to dig into its depths we find great hindrances. Knowledge which begins with curiosity when it seeks to satisfy itself fully ends in doubt. The striving of the intellect comes to an impasse. The more we know the less we know, because all new knowledge when searched out leads to further problems. The searching and critical intellect infects us with “problemitis.” The great classic representation of man seeking happiness is Goethe's Faust. One part of the search is the quest after knowledge. But neither medicine, nor law, nor theology satisfy the deep intellectual longing of Faust. He has tried all of them and in vain. It almost breaks his heart that we can know nothing rightly and thoroughly. Thus knowledge leads to despair. It has not kept its promise of giving joy and peace and liberty to the earnest seekers after truth.

A short glance at the development of philosophy in some of its connected movements of

thought confirms the conviction of the final futility of the intellect to lead to liberty. The Greeks began with assuming some material principle as explanatory of the world. But the early explanation of matter, even in its atomic form, failed to answer all questions. Then Anaxagoras first discovered the necessity of some sort of mind-stuff to account for the order of the world. Absolute rest and existence was tried by the Eleatics, and Heraclitus sought to solve all the problems of the world through movement. Then after Socrates endeavored to help morals by clear conceptual thinking arose Plato with his vision of ideas and ideals. Aristotle brought down to earth the eternal beauty and goodness which Plato had seen. He showed men a universe of causes and final purpose, high thought moving the world, and men with moral aims. But the great ethical strivings of these leaders of thought soon split up into advocates of pleasure, Epicureans, and defenders of reason, Stoics, who fell back into a material metaphysic of the world. The end of the Greek development in the followers of Plato and Aristotle, and in the students of all schools, was scepticism. The mind had tried the different alternatives, had reached great heights, and then despaired of any real solution. The history of English thought gives a leading place to three speculators, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Locke endeavored to find the secret of the human understanding, and its relation to an outside world. He was led to assert that some qualities of things like color were not in things but in the mind. Berkeley developing

the analysis of the mind came to deny all experience of matter. Restricting the investigation to immediate knowledge he found only sensations and ideas. Both were finally mental, and the mind the only real existence. Hume carrying the analysis still further found only phenomena in the mind. He could not see any evidence for mind itself, but only defended impressions and notions. Thus the conclusion reached was sceptical, and there was no real substance, or cause, or existence, beyond the immediate appearances in experience. The more keenly the mind searched after itself the more mind destroyed itself by doubt. The German development in the philosophy of the nineteenth century began with the endeavor of Kant to fix the limits of theoretical thinking and to overcome the scepticism of Hume by a thorough critique of pure and practical reason. But the criticism of Kant was followed by the egocentric idealism of Fichte. Kant's strong emphasis of the ego with its categories grew into an absolute ego. Hegel followed as the great defender of absolute reason as a movement. But when the heights were reached idealism failed and materialism ruled again. Blind will and impulse gained a foothold. The outcome was confusion and uncertainty. Agnosticism was the end just as it was the result in the common sense speculation of the Scotch thinkers. The line of succession did not stop with Reid but led to Hamilton with his philosophy of the unconditioned, then on to Mansel who in the interest of faith doubted the possibility of the absolute; and at last Spencer adopted

Mansel's attitude in his *First Principles* and argued for the Unknowable. Any careful student of the history of philosophy must find that all ultimate questions have not been solved, and that every movement of thought has ended in agnosticism or doubt. And agnosticism is nothing else but an inconsequential scepticism unwilling to follow its own logic.

When we look at the efforts of men to frame theories of the best way of teaching the truth we are not very much encouraged. Great pedagogues have arisen from time to time with high visions, but after a time they were discarded. Pedagogy has been one series of experiments. There has always been a contest between the old and the new methods. Neither were absolutely right. Change succeeded change and small minds were always announcing that the last word had been said, and now the golden age of education had arrived. Today the apostles of the practical and the utilitarian and the vocational hold the field. But if we but wait they will pass from the field of endeavor and some new universal nostrum of education will be announced. Meantime every sort of education has spoiled as many minds as it has helped. Men finally educate themselves in spite of all theories. The best efforts of the mind to teach the mind are vain and in the great things of liberty we go on groping our way, blundering through, and stumbling blindly on. All our pedagogy leaves us in the lurch and we are not solving the great disturbing problems of our day.

The intellectual part of civilization is not

hopeful. The increase of knowledge has not been accompanied by increase of general intelligence.³ The ancient Greeks on the average were intellectually more advanced than the the average man today. Along with the failure of the increase of brain-power has gone a constant addition of new knowledge. The intellectual structure of civilization has grown too heavy for the minds of men to bear. Knowledge has been very much subdivided and there are many narrow specialists in all departments of learning and in every profession, but broad knowledge is dying out. It can no longer be assimilated because of its excessive details in every department. If we take e. g., the study of history it is evident that the growth of its material is so tremendous that we can either know only a small part thoroughly or a larger part rather superficially. The growth of the knowledge of civilization is its own destruction. If we are to have large knowledge some of the present intellectual civilization must be lost, and the slate partly wiped clean. Otherwise we shall all become grubbers in minutiae and lose the general knowledge, and with it the broad sympathy that makes for common respect of rights and universal liberty.

When we weigh all of these indictments against the intellect the case seems very serious. But there are certain contrary considerations. The intellect is not the whole of human life. We cannot and ought not stake all of happiness and liberty on the success or failure of our logic. The limitations of reason must

³ Cf. above page 35.

be clearly recognized and the impossible must not be asked of it. Ultimate questions may not be solved easily to the common satisfaction of men. But the striving after them has not been entirely without result, and we have at least learnt the possibility of our knowledge. The periods of scepticism have been followed by times of renewed search. It must not be forgotten that we have not reached the goal, and that the development is still going on. In the search there is the joy of the work. The very effort of the intellect is its liberation. In many departments of knowledge we have attained established facts. Our knowledge of nature and science has given us many data that have changed our whole life and freed it from much superstition and narrowness. There has been no such complete failure as the pessimists would have us believe. The difficulty in final problems has thrown us back upon faith and strengthened our spiritual life. Experimentation in education has brought along with its changes increasing understanding of the child and has given larger liberty. Subdivision of knowledge invites more and more people to think and makes knowledge more universal. There may be periods of loss and backwardness but is the total history of knowledge one of despair or one of progressive advancement? Along with its scepticism philosophy has unfolded the intellect and has often given us glimpses of the world and of mind which experiment has afterwards established. Atoms were projected in Greek thought before modern chemistry. Heraclitus saw the world in motion

long prior to modern physics. Plato had visions of the essentials of life and the greatness in suffering evil centuries ago. We can find not only errors in the course of human thinking but also great permanent truths. There is therefore no reason why we should despair of the value of real knowledge if we know its place and function. As it adds a share to truth it helps to make us free, for all real truth makes free.

The emotional dilemma. It is particularly in the sphere of the emotions that pessimism makes its strong attack. Before the mind's eye is called up the vision of all the pain, the woe, the misery and the evil of the world. What a picture of suffering, sadness and despair! Are not suffering, woe, sin, and evil paramount, the most positive facts in human life against which joy, health, goodness are utterly insignificant? But this appeal must not carry us away, powerful as it is; for it does not prove that all is wrong and evil. We cannot shut our eyes to the awful fact of suffering, sickness and sin, but they are after all not the total of life. The recognition of their existence only helps to save us from a blind optimism that finds that all is well in the world when all is not well. Whether the good overbalances the evil, or the evil the good cannot be determined absolutely. It all depends upon the point of view of the one who speculates about this subject.

But there is another emotional pessimism which assails the very centre of our life. The danger of the life of sense led Brahmanism to

draw men away from the world of deceptive and alluring sense, the world of externals and appearance to the peaceful rest of the world of reality found in the absolute existence, the universal mind. This tendency of Brahmanism was further developed by Buddhism. According to it the great bondage of life is the enslavement caused by desire. It is the desire to live and do which brings about all evil. Nothing but distraction of life follows. We are carried hither and thither and arrive nowhere in this world of "Maya," deception and illusion. We must cease to want and stop desiring to live. Our aim must be to find the great "Nirvana," the haven of rest and peace. Only through the cessation of all wants and the obliteration of all desires and emotions can we escape the "Karma," the re-creation because of our deeds.

The religious philosophy of the East was introduced into the West by Schopenhauer. He sought to show by psychological analysis that when we have not we want. We are unhappy in our wanting. After we get what we want we are still unhappy because the realization is less than we pictured it to be. But still we want again. Therefore whether we have or want we are always miserable. Even if the getting is partially satisfactory the very nature of desire grows through the getting. Desire is insatiable. This condition is the very essential of our life, and causes pain and misery. "The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering accomplish no more than to make it change its form. It is essentially deficiency, want, care for the maintenance of life. If we succeed,

which is very difficult, in removing pain in this form, it immediately assumes a thousand others, varying according to age and circumstances, such as lust, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety, ambition, covetousness, sickness, etc., etc. If at last it can find entrance in no other form, it comes in the sad, grey garments of tediousness and ennui, against which we then strive in various ways.”⁴ But there is no real escape from the evil. We are always tossed about by “many a conflict, many a doubt.” “Thus between desiring and attaining all human life flows on throughout. The wish is, in its nature, pain; the attainment soon begets satiety: the end was only apparent; possession takes away the charm; the wish, the need, presents itself under a new form; when it does not, then follows desolateness, emptiness, ennui, against which the conflict is just as painful as against want.”⁵ How can we escape from the snares of the fowler, desire? The tremendous truth of this analysis of desire is not answered by the counterclaim, that there is joy in the striving, and that some satisfaction grows out of the possession of what we want. This answer is only relatively true. Striving is not pure joy; it has its great disappointments. The seeking of the satisfaction of desire and emotion is not the same as the search after knowledge. Its efforts have only a passing value and give only a temporary rest. The solution is in the content and object of the desire and emotion. All objects, like pleasure.

⁴ The World as Will and Idea, Book IV, par. 57.

⁵ The World as Will and Idea, Book IV, par. 57.

wealth, social power, etc., have no permanent worth. They are purely relative. But if the object of desire is moral and spiritual, and seeks fundamental human values, as e. g., righteousness, truth, there is no defect in the desire. Such hunger and thirst are satisfied. It is not the wanting, but what we want which determines its good or less than good value.

The pessimist questions the satisfaction of art. He asserts that there is no real joy in art, but only a great burden. It is true that Schopenhauer inconsistently believes that the contemplation of art brings partial deliverance. But the real attitude must make the desire for art equally futile. It has no solution for human restlessness. The great artists despair in their greatest creations. They are driven on, and the driving power of the creative instinct is painful. Nothing is born without woe. When the best is reached of which a great artist is capable, he knows better than any critic that the best is bad enough. The spirit of discontentment is necessary to the progress of art. Contentment and satisfaction kill the highest aspirations. The artist who is too much pleased with himself has already failed. But is this discontent evil? Does it show utter failure? Surely it is the way of progress and greater attainment. The relative merit of any work of art does not make it, its spirit, and its producer subject to evil. There is a relative satisfaction. Of course the depth of the human spirit is never filled no matter how deeply one drinks of the refreshing fountain of art. We must return in the greatest joy and

good of any art unfilled again to the source of beauty, to beauty eternal.⁶

Are our actions satisfactory? In the conception that life is an endless and dissatisfied striving, which Schopenhauer advocated, there is included the tendency of the will toward action. The will itself as the human effort to live must be negated. Its very nature just as the nature of desire is supposed to be evil, for it is closely connected with desire. Willing and striving, as our whole being, can be compared to an unquenchable thirst. And the foundation of all willing is need, deficiency and pain. This is but a partial truth, for there is no mere loss in willing, but despite its many failures we rise through it to better things. If willing is evil, action is evil, and all life must be declared to be evil. But there are positive contents in activity and life which do not permit us to ascribe only failure to its efforts.

The necessary trend of the will toward the wrong makes a stronger appeal for pessimism. We accept certain ideals and acknowledge them to be good. But the acceptance of ideals is all too often not followed by the appropriate action. We praise what we do not do; we blame in thought what we frequently do. Our approval does not guarantee our action, and our disapproval does not bring about inhibition of action. There is a drifting of action and a lack of earnest effort to overcome our moral indifference and to break up bad habits. The easiest way is pursued although we know the better way. But we are not ready to take upon

⁶ Cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 210 ff.

ourselves the better way with its denials and hardships. It is the old confession: "*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*" The honest words of men who know themselves admit with Paul: "For that which I do I allow not: for what I would that I do not; but what I hate that I do."⁷ "For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not that I do."⁸ The confessions of Augustine and Rousseau, different as they are, confirm these statements. The honesty of self-knowledge is, however, not the end. Where moral laziness is overcome, and we do not admit our wrong actions with complacency as though the situation could not be changed, the consciousness of our failure in action will lead to renewed effort to become better. The deeper our feeling about the rift between ideal and deed, the more hopeful is the future. Out of the recognition of our real selves there will come new earnest search for betterment and the desire for some cure and help which can overcome our moral deficiency. When morals appear to be lacking in the motive power of the ideal then the question arises whether religion is not the one thing needful to stimulate more consistent action through an ideal religiously sanctioned and strong with emotion. Religion can lead to the liberty which moral striving seeks.

Civilization and pessimism. Is civilization a success, or is it a failure? Does it inspire us with hope or despair? Prior to the experiences of the world-war the examination of various

⁷ Romans VII: 15.

⁸ Romans VII: 19.

civilizations led to the belief that past civilizations had failed because of great economic break-downs in society. Our own civilization was supposed to have such a large range of opportunity and to be under the control of such sentiments as to what constitutes economic advantage that any serious catastrophe seemed impossible. We had grown so reasonable; we had approved so eloquently of the common interests of mankind; we had established leagues of peace and built great palaces of peace; and we were being carried upward by the inherent impulses of a progressive evolution which was daily making us better. A finer and broader Christianity, and a considerate tolerance valuing what was good in every faith was welding us together into a common human brotherhood. Then came the great disillusionment that taught us, that we were not controlled by ideal forces, but that we were under the control and power of economic selfishness. The reasonableness of economic advantage did not appear. Men saw only more colonies, more commerce, and more industry to be obtained by selfish nationalism accentuated through lustful militarism. The war was not caused by a conflict of idealisms but was purely material in origin even though we had to give it a moral justification as it proceeded. There was a clear demonstration that neither morals nor religion had entered into the great world affairs and relations. Both seemed utterly powerless and became the slaves of militant nations to defend their actions whether right or wrong. The aftermath of the war has increased jealousies

and hates, and brought about economic upheavals and most unreasonable rebellions and strikes. Civilization is utterly sick and there is apparently no physician to heal it. The advocates of progress are routed. Professor Dewey may claim:⁹ "The world war is a bitter commentary on the nineteenth century misconception of moral achievement—a misconception however which it only inherited from the traditional theory of fixed ends, attempting to bolster up that doctrine with aid from the 'scientific' theory of evolution. The doctrine of progress is not yet bankrupt. The bankruptcy of the notion of fixed ends to be attained and stably possessed may possibly be the means of turning the mind of man to a tenable theory of progress—to attention to present troubles and possibilities." What an utterly weak solution of a pragmatist! Men had been trying to envisage truth in purely relative terms of evolution and progress. The failure was the loss of great stable ideals and ends in morals and religion in actual life. The evil was the absorption of mankind in the desires, the conflicts, the cruelties of food, clothing and shelter. Science itself did not liberate but became the servant of destruction. Socialism was bankrupt. The morals of freedom were set aside for the liberty of vagrant and destructive desire. The analysis of the present situation makes us hopeless of the immediate present if the same ideas and ideals persist. The new attitude demanded and needed is a change by which we actually will permit the liberating power of righteousness to

⁹ Human Nature and Conduct, p. 286.

control us. We have too long surrendered to being factors in a movement; we must become free by moralizing all relations. A better world will come only as we emancipate ourselves from the thralldom of material evolution as all-controlling, and conquer economic forces through an idealization of life sustained by compelling religious convictions. If men will not seek this freedom they will die in their sins. There is no hope for a shallow optimism built on unreasoning assumption of the natural goodness of man either individually or socially. A new theory of freedom must be elaborated which reinterprets the eternal laws of right and applies them to the present evils. We need not greater flux, but greater stability and balance of liberty. This attitude will give promise of real progress in the freedom of the good.

Religion and pessimism. Is it necessary to raise the problem of the relation of religion to pessimism? Does not every religion exalt the hopes of man, and lift him into the sphere of the spiritual where dwell peace and joy forever? The fact remains nevertheless that there is a strain of pessimism in religion. It must grapple with the actuality of evil. Sorrow, sickness, sin, and death make men serious and sad. It is religion which must enter into these moods and experiences of men and endeavor to overcome them, not by denial but by an inner grasp of their effect upon the spirit. While the outcome may be hope it is a sobered hope and not a mere optimism of ideas. The strongest pessimism of religion is however the outgrowth of the failure of the

ordinary objects of human pursuit to satisfy the thirst of the soul. The book of Ecclesiastes with its cry: "All is vanity" well voices the breakdown of knowledge, love as passion, power, ambition, etc. It shows the course of human life from youth to age, when the days come of which we say that we have no pleasure in them. Life itself in its externality cannot fulfill its promise. The purpose of this pessimism is to draw men away from the secondary and minor things of life. When the unsatisfactory result of all that men fight for and strive for in their ordinary pursuits is realized, then religion can create a desire for the things invisible and eternal. No religion can thrive on this—worldliness; it must have a transforming power for the temporal issues through an other-worldliness. Where the latter does not exist the emptiness of life remains and the only reply of a religion without a better hope can be: "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity." Morals need hope in the good that liberty may be maintained. If religion destroys this hope the ethical life suffers. Consequently we need a religion with sufficient assurance of the final permanence of the good to maintain well supported moral aims.

Is Christianity pessimistic? How foolish to ask such a question, is the reply that at first comes to your mind. Has not Christianity been the outstanding religion of hope? It has brought new motives into the world, and presented men with the optimism of love in its teaching of God. Its keynote has been: "Rejoice, and again I say, rejoice." Christ has

filled the world with a spirit of the power and triumph of the good. But there are teachings of Christ that contradict this unqualified optimism which so many find in Christianity. There is an emphasis in the sayings of Jesus upon the degeneration of the world,¹⁰ which culminates in a repeated warning of eternal punishment.¹¹ In no other part of the New Testament is there such a statement of the unquenchable fire and the worm that shall not die as in the words of Jesus. He does not hope for a universal salvation of men, and such a triumph of the good that all will choose it. The realism of evil as conceived by Jesus is not set aside by His strong teaching of God's intention of love for man. According to Him many travel on the way of destruction, and few find the narrow way of life.¹² Many are called but few are chosen.¹³ The great mass of men seeing see not and hearing hear not for their heart is waxed gross.¹⁴ Only the few faithful disciples ascertain the truth because they really seek it. Even among them there is Judas Iscariot who cannot be saved, for he is the son of perdition. The choice of most men is for the evil. Hell will be full and heaven with its many mansions will not be overcrowded. Men regarded in the mass will make a sorry mess of freedom. When we face these sayings what is our answer? We cannot do

¹⁰ Matthew XXIV: 29 ff.

¹¹ Mark IX: 43-45; Matthew XXIV: 51; XXV: 30; XII: 32.

¹² Matthew VII: 13, 14.

¹³ Matthew XX: 16.

¹⁴ Matthew XIII: 12 ff.

away with the words of Jesus by textual or higher criticism; the evidence is not sufficiently strong to eliminate them. Sentimental universalism and a desire to make men better that Jesus makes them simply disregards the sayings of Jesus. Is Christianity a correction of Jesus? Or shall we follow Him and admit that as far as the multitude of men are concerned hope must be abandoned? Is freedom a failure through the blindness of men? Perhaps there is a clue to a solution if we put a pragmatic value upon the words of Christ. He may desire to awaken men from the thralldom of sin and evil by stressing the awfulness of sin and its consequences. Because He loves the people He warns against the drifting with the crowd that does not seek the good. The power of the love of Christ for men impels Him to testify so definitely. The emphasis of the rescuing teacher and savior ought possibly not be interpreted as a mathematical statement or a historical fact of the future. The freedom with its risks must be appreciated to stimulate men to make the right choice of liberty in the good. Actually the impress of Christian truth on the whole agrees with the outcome of the other arguments considered, in showing the possibility of meliorism, i. e., of becoming better if we have the best in view. Nevertheless the power of evil must be reckoned with and there can be no easy optimism as a fact. Optimism must be a belief resting rather on the value of the good than on the immediate action of men. It cannot be made a self-evolving process, but the result of the free choice of men as they are led

to recognize the good and as they are willing to accept the motives of ethics and the sanctions of religion.

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CHAPTER VI

THE LEADING ETHICAL IDEAS

What do we mean by the leading ethical ideas? In every science there are some great underlying and controlling ideas which give an insight into the inner nature of the science. In whatever way these ideas are defined and understood indicates how the whole problem of a science may be solved. The ideas are clothed into words whose meaning and import must be studied to arrive at the ideas. Terms are frequently employed without careful study and thus confusion is caused. It was in consequence of this difficulty that Locke set aside several chapters¹ on the use of words in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. And in similar manner Bertrand Russell thinks it worth while to study words for the sake of ideas.²

What are the ideas that recur again and again in the study of ethics? We shall find that we cannot go very far in the consideration and discussion of any question in morals without coming into contact with the terms "ideals," "ends," "the good," "right," "duty," "virtue." These are the recurrent

¹ Book III.

² *The Analysis of Mind*, Chapter X, p. 188 ff.

terms employed in every ethical study. It was Schleiermacher who at the beginning of the nineteenth century criticized former ethical study and called the attention to ideal, duty and virtue as the three great ethical ideas. As ethical writers think of these terms and ideas they will see the whole problem of life.

What are ideals? No term is more often upon our lips than the word "ideal." Where does it come from and what does it mean? We must go back to Plato to find an answer. According to this thinker the real world was not to be found in our direct experiences of sense. These were thought to be only shadows in a cave.³ The essential reality was in the forms and shapes of thought. These existed apart as eternal beings in the upper world of pure thought. Nothing that we experienced in sense was supposed to have any reality except so far as it participated in the "ideas" (Thought-forms). The application of ideas to all things could not be sustained in the long run. But the great ideas of Plato were ideas like beauty, truth, courage, temperance, etc., leading to the highest idea, the good. It was after all the permanence of the ethical and its objective existence which Plato sought. Now these moral ideas and spiritual realities have come to be designated as ideals. Ideals are great existent spiritual realities that we are to reach up to. Such conceptions as righteousness, or truth, or honesty, call for an answer. Are they mere conventions arrived at in the

³ The Republic, Book VII, 514.

course of human experience, and do they mean simply certain customary practices combined in a common name? Or are they powers making for right in the world whether men accept them or not? Do they testify to an inviolable moral order not of human making? Are they evidences of the essential moral implications of the universe? Are men makers of ideals or followers of them? What is the strength of the appeal of justice, purity, etc.?

The modern advocates of development oppose every claim of great objective ideals. They attack the value of independent moral ideals. Professor Dewey well represents this attitude. He claims that the thought of the ideal which is an actuating force in Plato rests upon the conception that: "Moral realities must be supreme."⁴ He continues: "Yet they are flagrantly contradicted in a world where a Socrates drinks the hemlock of the criminal, and where the vicious occupy the seats of the mighty. Hence there must be a truer ultimate reality in which justice is only and absolutely justice."⁵ There is no sympathy on the part of the pragmatist Dewey with this hope. He sees only the present functioning and success of ideals in human striving, and claims: "An ideal becomes a synonym for whatever is inspiring—and impossible. Then, since intelligence cannot be wholly suppressed, the ideal is hardened by thought into some high, far-away object. It is so elevated and so distant that it does not belong to this world or to ex-

⁴ Human Nature and Conduct, p. 50.

⁵ Ibid. p. 50.

perience. It is in technical language transcendental; in common speech, supernatural, of heaven not of earth. The ideal is then a goal of final exhaustive, comprehensive perfection which can be defined only by complete contrast with the actual. Although impossible of realization and conception,⁶ it is still regarded as the source of generous discontent with actualities and of all inspiration to progress.”⁷ This dream-world with its unattainable perfection is rejected. “Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by man. Hence every situation has its own measure and quality of progress, and the need for progress is recurrent, constant.”⁸ But what causes progress? There are certain driving ideals whose content changes but whose power is not derived from the varying course of experience. If progress is going somewhere whither is it going? The denial of ideals above man makes a shifting morality. Of course the ideals must be incorporated into life, but where there is no high idealism in morals, and we simply call that right which happens to obtain at any time and which works, we shall not advance. Our wagon must be hitched to a star no matter how

⁶ The denial of the conceivability of the ideal is a misrepresentation.

⁷ Ibid. p. 260.

⁸ Ibid. p. 282.

far away the star is. The readily attainable ideal is a moral failure. Our present moral progress is so uncertain just because we have sunk our ideals into the slough of expediency. We have lost faith in a final moral order, and making our morals without ideals we are stuck in the morass of doubt as to permanent moral ideas.

There is an ideal in which man believes constantly, which leads to a better state of life. What helps to this realization? It is not the outcome of a mere process and does not rely on functioning alone. Thomas Hill Green is right when he posits a divine principle "as the ground of human will and reason; as realizing itself in man; as having capabilities of which the full development would constitute the perfection of human life; of direction to objects contributory to this perfection as characteristic of a good will."⁹ This divine principle is the ideal. To surrender it means to lose the real incitement to moral progress. Right would not be right, nor justice be justice unless they had more than a temporal basis. Our understanding and practice may be imperfect, but the perfect beckons us on as we believe in it amid the encircling gloom. The pragmatist has no kindly light, but only a relative practice which he follows. It is true that the historic fortunes of an ideal are not always fortunate. The ideal does not always control events. Will its abandonment, or its transferral into the passing thoughts of changing days, help us? If the recognition of an eternal meaning in

⁹ Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chapter II, p. 214.

justice has had such a struggle in mankind, will the denial of the right as right, as God is God, produce better results? Hobhouse has a glimpse of the value of the necessity of God to make the ideal permanent, when he says:¹⁰ "When God has become the ideal of goodness—a position only reached at an advanced stage of religious development—it would certainly seem that the character attributed to God must reflect the essential elements of perfection as conceived by man." To bring the ideal into life constantly, to elevate every stage of moral advance, is always necessary. For this reason it is best to describe ethics under the conviction of the ideal. The effort must be to sum up our aims under some controlling ideal which finally reaches up into God. The positing of freedom is an effort at such an ideal, and we must endeavor to find its real content.¹¹

The good and the end. What do we really mean by the term good? How is it related to the end? These fundamental queries receive varying answers, just as in the problem of the ideal, according to the fundamental view we take of life. Professor Dewey represents the pure developmentalists, when he states: "In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every evening. It is unique in its every presentation. For it marks the resolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself."¹²

¹⁰ *The Rational Good*, p. 15.

¹¹ See below, Chapter IX.

¹² *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 211.

The good is wholly therefore within the psychological process. There is no fixed good and no final good beyond the immediate experience. Hobhouse also begins with the good as within experience. He says: "What is good appears, generically, as an element of experience which is in harmony with feeling."¹³ "Good is a harmony of experience and feeling."¹⁴ It "signifies something which, in the connection in which it is applicable, moves feeling, and through feeling disposes to action."¹⁵ But Hobhouse is not content with the mere immediacy of the good as feeling. He believes that it must be rationally demonstrable. And the rational good is the fulfillment of vital capacity as a whole.¹⁶ Furthermore "the rational good is objective,"¹⁷ and "the function of the rational impulse in practice is to embrace this world in a single system of purposes."¹⁸ Hobhouse holds to the Platonic ideal of harmony, but not like Plato through a balance of fixed psychological faculties in man. He rather thinks of the harmony as a principle in a developing world of discord. But this principle making for the good, is a teleological principle.¹⁹ There is a realization that development cannot be development without an end or purpose. This purpose is the good. And thus we have arrived at the conception regnant since

¹³ *The Rational Good*, p. 93.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 96.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 80.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 198, 156.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 99.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 100.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 226.

Aristotle that the good is an objective finality. If this idea is lost we can only know of change but not of development.²⁰

What, then, is the good? In general usage what does it signify? A good axe is an axe that answers its purpose by cutting well. A good horse is a horse with the qualities and characteristics that make it usable because it answers the purpose of a horse. It was Aristotle that made this signification of good clear for all times. He well says at the opening of his ethics: "The good is that at which everything aims."²¹ Everything aims at some good, but we must try to find some absolute good. "If then there be one end of all that man does, this end will be the realizable good—or these ends if there be more than one."²² "But the best of all things must, we conceive, be something final. If then there be only one final end, this will be what we are seeking,—or if there be more than one, then the most final of them."²³ But it is by finding what is the function of man as man that we shall ascertain this good. In this manner Aristotle approaches the ethical problem of the good as in harmony with the final cause exhibited in the whole universe.²⁴ Despite modern attacks upon Aristotle he has not been surpassed in the logical formulation of purpose and end as involved in the conception of development. And it is only

²⁰ Cf. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*.

²¹ *The Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. by F. H. Peters, p. 7.

²² *Ibid.* p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 13.

²⁴ Cf. Sir A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, Vol. I, Essay IV, p. 221 ff.

the superficiality of modern thinking that has dared to propose the mere process of evolution as a solution of all things, a process which is "going but we know not where."

With such a conception of good the question of one of many ends in the moral life also receives its solution. Professor Dewey, who has not profited from such enlightenment as Hobhouse could have given him, persists in an unqualified attack upon Aristotle. Speaking of the Aristotelian view of the end in nature, he continues: "Such a view, consistent and systematic, was foisted by Aristotle²⁵ upon western culture and endured for two thousand years. When the notion was expelled from natural science²⁶ by the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century it should also have disappeared from the theory of human action."²⁷ But it has not disappeared because it is essential to human character and conduct. Hobhouse knows that: "If a man has no dominating purpose or creed that effectively directs his life as a whole, he has as a rule threads and finaments of purpose running through and connecting branches of his conduct."²⁸ The ultimate end is however harmony through development. Ethical theory demands a teleological view of reality and defines the nature of the

²⁵ Could Aristotle have foisted anything upon the world, if it had not met the demands of human thought. This kind of modern criticism of Aristotle on the part of those who are devotees of natural science, and do not know other departments of life from within, is a sad commentary upon broad knowledge in America.

²⁶ To the loss of a consistent philosophy of the universe.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 224.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 20.

end. In the pursuit of the end there dare not be mere abstraction. And the advocates of the end recognize this fact and are more consistent than those who have shifting aims without a single, dominating purpose for life. T. H. Green speaks for the idealists when he says: "The idea, unexpressed and inexpressible, of some absolute and all-embracing end is, no doubt, the source of such devotion, but it can only take effect in the fulfillment of some particular function in which it finds but restricted utterance."²⁹ The great end must be translated into individual deeds and acts. This is its acceptance and interpretation. Thus freedom, which we make the end, must receive content through all the moral choices and deliberations of man. Nevertheless it remains as an end inviting us to an ever higher and better life and bestowing upon us the chance of real liberty.

Rights or right? What is meant by rights? In the eighteenth century the doctrine of rights was developed. It claimed that man had inherent rights, such as the right of life, liberty and happiness. The French Revolution aided in adding to national declarations the sacred right of property. These rights were regarded in a purely individual manner, and were supposed to belong by nature to the individual. They produced an individualistic and atomistic view of life and conflicted in essence with the reality of common and social rights. In addition happiness and liberty are rather ends than

²⁹ Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chapter II, p. 216.

rights, and life is better regarded as a possession. The absolute right of property is never really individual but rests on the will of society, and has no place as absolute in vital religion. The counterbalance of duty³⁰ is not adequate to meet the claim of rights in their individualistic sense.

The modern claimants of development also believe merely in rights in opposition to right. Hobhouse confuses the issue by rejecting what he considers "the fanaticism of abstract right," in the interest of the principle of harmony in which "there is no absolute right short of the entire system of human well-being."³¹ But the well-being of men as a harmony does demand a right as supreme. Dewey as usual is the radical rejector of every great ideal. He thinks that the advocates of right are anti-empirical and neglect social conditions.³² In his opinion: "Right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account. Its authority is the exigency of their demands, the efficacy of their insistencies."³³ But what gives power to social insistency but the ideal of right. Mere rights could never become such without the impelling belief of right back of them. To describe how men see rights does not tell the why and wherefore. The ideal of right in morals makes the rights.

³⁰ Cf. Mazzini, *The Duty of Man*.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 189.

³² *Ibid.* p. 324.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 326.

Right is the standard of the good. It is the end translated into the idea of law. Just as the functioning conscience has law,³⁴ so there is the idea of a supreme standard which embodies the good. Grotius had insight into this meaning of right, when he said: "There is also a third signification of the word *right*, which has the same meaning as law taken in its most extensive sense, to denote a rule of moral action, obliging us to do what is proper."³⁵ If the end is to be summed up into freedom, the right must be the law of liberty that in all its details gives voice to the right of the law. This right is the natural right in ethics. And of this it can justly be said: "Now the law of nature is so unalterable, that it cannot be changed even by God himself."³⁶ With such a conception of right in the law of liberty, that God who gave us liberty cannot change its right, we receive a basis for right that gives it proper authority and worth. The pluralists of rights have only social usage and usefulness with their changes as a foundation. There is therefore no essential right left for the rights. Rights have ceased to have the quality of right. We are then compelled to stand for right, and to find in separate rights its interpretation but not its fulfilment, which is given only in its inherent idea.

What is duty? When we have considered the right carefully it leads us to the question: What is its import?" The right includes an

³⁴ See above, p. 57.

³⁵ The Rights of War and Peace, Book I, Chapter I, par. IX.

³⁶ Grotius, Ibid. Book I, Chapter I, par. X.

obligation, and when we accept the obligation of the right we have recognized our duty. Our duty is what we owe. "The word, I need not say, expresses that there is something which is due from me,—which I *owe*—which I *ought* to do. Nor perhaps is it insignificant, that the *tenses* of this verb have lost their distinction, and *one* alone, and that the past is made to serve for all; as if to show that obligation escapes the conditions of time, and is less a phenomenon than an essential and eternal reality, which, however, manifested at the moment, is not new to it. In any case the word expresses the sense we have of a *debt* which others have a *right to demand* from us, and which we are *bound* to pay."³⁷

But the sense of the *ought* of duty is disputed by the mere describers of development. Some of them find in *ought* simply the expectancy which prior experience has created of a certain regularity of procedure. When we go into a laboratory we know that if we mix two parts of hydrogen with one part of oxygen we ought to have water. This result is looked forward to and ought to come about. Human actions are analyzed in the same manner. An honest deed ought to be done because it lies in the expectancy of society from us, and if our conduct is regular it will follow. But duty does not function in this impersonal way like a natural process. The element of its emotional obligation impressing itself upon us is entirely neglected in this explanation. Therefore other

³⁷ Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, Book I, Chapter I, p. 19.

developmental thinkers are silent altogether about duty.

Duty comes to us with a claim. "The moral judgment imposes on us an obligation. It says this is right and that is wrong, this is what you must, that what you must not do. It seems to state a fact and also to impose a command."³⁸ The command is the law of conscience now accepted by us as right. Out of it arises the: "Do this." The command comes out of our self. "When I do a thing that is right because it is right I do it for a reason which I myself acknowledge as good, and binding me because it is good."³⁹ It is Kant who has largely stressed duty. He holds that a moral action gets its value not from its object, but its principle. He goes so far as to say: "A man's will is good, not because the consequences which flow from it are good, nor because it is capable of attaining the ends which it seeks, but it is good in itself, or because it wills the good."⁴⁰ "Duty is the obligation to act from reverence for law."⁴¹ The command of duty is an imperative. The imperative need not be followed, but is accepted if we are really reasonable. But the imperative is not a means to something else, i. e., it is not hypothetical, but categorical. There is nothing problematic about it. "This imperative is *categorical*. It has to do, not with the matter of an action and the result expected to follow from it, but simply

³⁸ Hobhouse, *Ibid.* p. 105.

³⁹ Hobhouse, *Ibid.* p. 106.

⁴⁰ The *Metaphysic of Morality*, Section I.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* Section I.

with the form and principle from which action itself proceeds. The action is essentially good, let the consequences be what they may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality.”⁴² The Kantian emphasis upon duty has gone too far in two directions. First, it almost discounts the good as an end. The conception of the good is cancelled in favor of duty. A number of modern moralists have followed Kant in the effort to make duty the one ethical idea. But the absoluteness of the claim, although it shows great moral earnestness, is one-sided and does not permit of the conception of ethical development. After all the Aristotelian concept of end and purpose is truer, and more efficiently answers the whole moral demand. Second, the stressing of the imperative conceals the danger of elevating the strong and compelling appeal of duty into the idea of force. Some later writers have used terminology which makes duty almost a power that makes us unfree. In her book on: “The Good Man and The Good,” Mary W. Calkins attempts to unify freedom and duty, when she states: “The explanation of the paradoxical combination in the moral experience of the seemingly inconsistent factors of submission and freedom lies precisely herein: in the fact that the law to which I submit is neither an inexorable nature-law, or uniformity, nor yet an external social law—the imposition of another’s will—but is rather, the law, the imperative which I, as ruling self, impose on myself, as compelled self.”⁴³ The

⁴² Ibid. Section II.

⁴³ p. 13.

“compelled self” is almost too strong a term, and implies bondage to the “ruling self.”

The better solution is to follow the suggestion of duty with its authority in the same direction as we follow the indications of the law of conscience.⁴⁴ Can its authority be found in ourselves or in society? “Suppose the case of one lone man in an atheistic world; could there really exist any ‘authority’ of higher over lower within the enclosure of his detached personality? I cannot conceive it; and did he, under such conditions, feel such a thing, he would then, I should say, feel a delusion, and have his consciousness adjusted to the wrong universe. For surely if this sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something *higher than we*, having claims on *ourselves*—therefore no mere part of it;—hovering over and transcending our personality, though also mingling with our consciousness and manifested through its intimations.”⁴⁵ This higher than our self Martineau cannot find in a phenomenon or in the universe but only in the personality of God. When ethics thus leads beyond itself it does not make duty absolutistic like Kant and give it no final basis, but it acknowledges our freedom rightly and fully even in the face of the claim of duty. At the same time authority becomes the authority of the God who wills our goodness through our freedom. The balance between the authority of duty and our liberty is assured.

What are virtues? The definition of virtues

⁴⁴ See above, p. 57.

⁴⁵ “Martineau, *Ibid.* Vol. II, Book I, Chapter IV, p. 104.

must follow duty. Virtues are the habits that are formed by doing our duties. They become the customary actions of our doing the good. Now what are these habits indicative of? Are they mere natural adjustments in varying situations? Dewey thinks that he can bring morals to earth be naturalizing virtues. In his view: "Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-door world. They can be studied as objectively as psychological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements."⁴⁶ In other words, there is no ethical *ought* involved in our actions of a habitual nature. Our conduct in virtues or vices is the result of being shaped. We have no freedom in choosing our virtues. Neither right nor the good are involved. Men are children of a process just like a process in physiology. Whither has the claim of liberty of the pragmatist gone? The purely naturalistic conception of habit has led Dewey to destroy the value of all virtues in his philosophy.

In order to see the right relation of habit to virtue we must return to the despised Aristotle. He says: "The virtues, then come neither by nature nor against nature, but nature gives the

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 16.

capacity for acquiring them, and this is developed by training.”⁴⁷ Virtues are acquired through doing. “It is by our conduct in our intercourse with other men that we become just or unjust, and by acting in circumstances of danger, and training ourselves to feel fear or confidence, that we become courageous or cowardly.”⁴⁸ Virtues are trained powers for the good. “The proper excellence or virtue of man will be the habit or trained faculty that makes a man good and makes him perform his function well.”⁴⁹ If we change the term faculty into fixed mode of action we shall have an entirely correct and modern, tenable explanation of virtue. There is great worth also in the definition of Thomas Aquinas:⁵⁰ “Virtue denotes some perfection of a power. The perfection of everything is estimated chiefly in regard to its end: now the end of power is action: hence a power is said to be perfect inasmuch as it is determined to its act. Now there are powers which are determined of themselves to their acts, as the active powers of physical nature. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one line of action, but are open indeterminately to many, and are determined to acts by habits. And therefore human virtues are habits.” The virtues are habits freely formed out of the ideal of the good, and seek to make our life stable in action.

The interrelation of ethical ideas. As we

⁴⁷ Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1, p. 34.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Book II, I, p. 35.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Book II, 5 p. 45.

⁵⁰ Aquinas Ethicus, Quest. LV.

passed from one to another of the ruling ethical concepts there grew on us the problem of their relation and connection. It is necessary to obtain a unified view of our ethical life and to note how the one concept touches the other. The ideal is the end or purpose which we choose to make our actions one and consistent. Among the many ends as ideals we find the vital one and this becomes for us the paramount good. It is not one good among many, but the one supreme good of morals. The good seeks expression in the form of a law or standard. The right is the unfoldment of the good. But the obligation of the right as it is accepted by us is what we mean by our duty. Duty is the ideal of the good acknowledged as right and followed as a call to action. Virtue is the duty of the good as it has become habit; and through the economy of habit it makes the good the constant action in our life.

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PART II—THE FINDING OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER VII

FREEDOM THROUGH PLEASURE

The claim of pleasure. After our discussion of the fundamentals of the moral life seeking freedom there arises the problem, how we shall find freedom. What is the good in which and through which freedom can be realized? Where shall we seek the content of freedom? The reply which has been given very frequently in the history of morals is, that pleasure is the real end of life. It is supposed to be the vital part of happiness. Pleasure is the dynamic of action. The good is the agreeable and the pleasurable. The true choice is pleasant. The pleasant is present wherever life functions normally. In the physical and natural world it is an indication of well-being. In the mental life it is equally true that where the pleasurable exists there is heightening of mental life. Pleasure is the unfailing symptom of the good of freedom. Liberty is joy in the full and unhampered exercise of life. On the contrary pain is the evidence of some disturbance in life. It is the accompaniment of disease in the body. In the mind the painful exists where there is a

lowering of life. The restriction of freedom and its undue limitation always produce the restlessness of the pain of subjection or servitude. Does it not follow therefore that we ought to pursue pleasure and avoid pain? Pleasure accentuates the life of feeling. Without feeling we cannot live. It is the closest to us and the most intimately subjective of our experiences. When we study our life in its full and actual concrete existence, and ask what is the real material of our experiences, we must admit that feeling and sensibility constitute that which largely makes life, and its value as joy and happiness in the full exercise of our functions in freedom.

Ancient hedonism. Because of the claims of pleasure we must inquire how it has been interpreted. How did the theory of pleasure, or hedonism, arise? Long before there was any theory of hedonism men as they lived their lives and sought the satisfaction of their senses and their feelings were unreflective adherents of pleasure. In the unmoralized and half-moralized state of society happiness was interpreted as pleasure. And wherever men today gravitate back to a lower stage, or live without careful moral ideals and culture, they are hedonists, lovers in pleasure if not technical defenders of it. But pleasure is not only present at an early stage as an end but it is also constantly sought and found by many men. The first effort to defend it as ethical theory is made by Aristippus, who founded the Cyrenaic school. Departing from the Socratic idea that the pleasures of the soul are the real pleasures, Aristippus considers all pleas-

ures as alike. Pleasure as pleasure is to be desired. Since it is highest where it is most intense we must seek the intense pleasure. There can be no real distinction in quality in the pleasures of men. They can only differ in degree. But where can the most intense pleasures be found? Certainly not for the average man in the intellect. The real seat of pleasures universally is in the life of sensation and feeling. But sensation and feeling as remembered are not vitally real. They must be enjoyed in the present. Life consists in the immediate and fleeting moment. The enjoyment of the present is happiness and liberty. We do not know what the future has in store. Let us live as children of time. This is the sunny side of life forgetting the evil. The classic expression is found, in Omar Khayyam, when he sings:

“Some for the glories of this world; and some
Sigh for the prophet’s paradise to come;
Ah! take the cash and let the credit go,
Nor heed the rumble of a distant drum.

Come, fill the cup, and in the fire of spring
Your winter-garment of repentance fling;
The bird of time has but a little way
To fly—and lo! the bird is on the wing.”

But there is another form of Greek hedonism which modifies the extreme position of Aristippus. It was through Epicurus that the pleasure of the moment was discarded for lasting pleasure. He says: “Pleasure is our first and kindred good. From it is the commencement of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back, and make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure

is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but oftentimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And oftentimes we consider pains superior to pleasures, and submit to pain for a long time, when it is attended for us with greater pleasure.”¹ Sometimes a good is treated as an evil, and vice versa because of the final outcome. “It is not an unbroken succession of drinking feasts and revelry, not the pleasures of sexual love, nor the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a splendid table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Of all this, the beginning and the greatest good, is prudence.”² “And we think contentment a great good, not in order that we may never have but a little, but in order that, if we have not much, we may make use of a little, being genuinely persuaded that those men enjoy luxury most completely who are the best able to do without it; and that everything which is natural is easily provided, and what is useless is not easily procured. And simple favors give as much pleasure as costly fare, when everything that can give pain, and every feeling of want, is removed; and corn and water give the most extreme pleasure when any one in need eats them.”³ Because life did not always give even the simple joys the Epicu-

¹ Letters of Epicurus, p. 129.

² Letters of Epicurus, p. 130.

³ Epicurean Ethics, Book X, XXVI.

reans, as well as the Cyrenaics, at times became pessimistic. Then they only hoped to be free from pain and fear, and to cultivate a temper of indifference to pleasure and pain. There was a search after a tranquility of soul in which, undisturbed and unassailed by any change of fortune, men could live at ease fearing no event of life and having no dread of death.

It is one of the strange perversions which ideas and terms sometimes suffer in the course of history, when we find that today Epicureanism does not signify the balanced and calm contentment of Epicurus, but the joy of the present for which Aristippus contended. In most books on ethics the modern term is used without doing justice to Epicurus himself. Thus Dewey says, "Epicureanism is too worldly-wise to indulge in attempts to base present action upon precarious estimates of future and universal pleasures and pains. On the contrary it says let the future go, for life is uncertain. Who knows when it will end, or what fortune the morrow will bring? Foster, then, with jealous care every gift of pleasure now allotted to you, dwell upon it with lingering love, prolong it as best you may."⁴ This position is really Cyrenaic. Dewey does not represent the real Epicurus, but only the modern perversion of the term. He follows the present verbal usage and not the original historical facts.

What is utilitarianism? In the teachings of Epicurus there are occasional references to the usefulness of his doctrine of pleasure. But it belongs to modern English ethical thought to

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 205.

have connected the idea of utility with hedonism. The country in which were worked out the economic theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo also produced a Jeremy Bentham and a John Stuart Mill, both economist and philosopher. The economic utilitarianism affected English moral theory, and vice versa. "To the English Utilitarian democracy—which he formulated as a logical deduction from principles of ethics and psychology—meant, in fact, the supremacy of his own middle class, and Liberty meant the plenitude of opportunity for its commercial ambitions."⁵

The first great formulator⁶ of modern utilitarianism was Bentham. He begins the discussion of utility thus: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to adjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The *principle of utility* recognises the subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law."⁷

⁵ Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, p. 8.

⁶ Hume was also utilitarian in tendency.

⁷ *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chapter I, par. I.

Pleasure is the benefit, the good, the advantage, the happiness which utility produces. The ethical life works its way out like an economic movement of goods. The terms *ought*, *right*, *wrong*, etc., only have a value as conformable to the principle of utility. But utility does not function without certain sanctions, which enforce conduct. "There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered separately, they may be termed the *physical*, the *political*, the *moral*, and the *religious*."⁸ The physical follow from the ordinary course of nature, the political from the persons who are the sovereign or supreme ruling power in the state, the moral from each man's spontaneous disposition, and the religious from a superior invisible being either in the present or future life. Pleasures and pains must be expected to issue from these sanctions. In order to appreciate rightly the value of a lot of pleasure and pain, and to measure it correctly, Bentham proposed what has become known as the "hedonistic calculus." He says: "To a person considered by *himself*, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by *itself*, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances:

1. Its *intensity*.
2. Its *duration*.
3. Its *certainty* or *uncertainty*.
4. Its *propinquity* or *remoteness*."⁹

When applied to a number of persons we must

⁸ Ibid. Chapter III, par. II.

⁹ Ibid. Chapter IV, par. II.

add 5. Its *fecundity*. 6. Its *purity* and 7. Its *extent*. In the calculated balance and proper proportion of these qualities one could find the right way to estimate and judge moral values through pleasure. This calculus was supposed to be supported by the practice of mankind. When morals come to the problem of motives it must be remembered that "pleasure is in *itself* a good: nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, without exception, the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort of pleasure. It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably, that *there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one.*"¹⁰ Man's motives are good or bad only on account of their effects. They possess no internal character. Any act that produces pleasure is good; any act from which pain follows is bad. If e. g. self-sacrifice brings pain it is bad. If avarice produces pleasure it is good. Bentham has developed in some respects the most consistent and the baldest system of utilitarian hedonism.

John Stuart Mill with his careful, logical mind has modified Bentham. While he admits that the theory of utility means nothing else than the rule of pleasure, he frames this definition. "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,

¹⁰ Ibid. Chapter X, par. X.

wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”¹¹ Mill makes two changes in the doctrine of utilitarianism. First, he distinguishes between pleasures in reference to their quality. There are higher and lower pleasures. The higher are intellectual and agree better with the dignity of man. It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Mill resents the accusation that human beings are “capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.”¹² While it is admitted that utilitarian writers have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., i. e. in their circumstantial advantages, there is a standard of quality. “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of

¹¹ *Utilitarianism*, Chapter II, p. 9.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 10.

small account.”¹³ Those acquainted with the pleasures of sense and of mind always prefer the latter(?).¹⁴ The second modification of Mill is that the principle of greatest happiness is made the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It is given a social meaning which is larger than that suggested in the hedonistic calculus. There must be a rational balance between individual and common pleasures. The usual external and internal sanctions are accepted, but the ultimate sanction is found in the subjective, conscientious feelings of mankind. The proof of utilitarianism is held to be realized in the fact, that human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness, or a means of happiness.

Henry Sidgwick still further rationalizes utilitarianism. He openly demands reason as a regulative principle for the distribution of good through the virtues of prudence, benevolence and justice. Nevertheless the ultimate good is found in universalistic hedonism, which may conveniently be designated by the single word, utilitarianism. Sidgwick holds that “it is an assertion incontrovertible because tautological, to say that we desire what is pleasant, or even that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears pleasant.”¹⁵ And this statement is explained through the assumption that we really in all things desire pleasure, which is in its largest sense coterminous with happiness.

¹³ Ibid. p. 12.

¹⁴ Cf. The weak defense of Mill, Ibid. p. 12 ff.

¹⁵ Methods of Ethics, Book I, Chapter IV, par. 2, p. 44.

For if "we 'sit down in a cool hour,' we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects¹⁶ by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings."¹⁷

Evolution and hedonism. Why did an evolutionary conception of the theory of pleasure arise? There are two reasons which caused the utilitarian form of English ethical hypothesis to become evolutionary. First, the biological interest aroused through Darwinism naturally was in sympathy with the idea of pleasure, for it was connected as a constant symptom with physical life in its formal functioning. When evolution sought to be the controlling view of life it found ready at hand an ethical idea which fitted in with its fundamental assumption. The continuity of utilitarianism in its hedonic coloring was thus brought about as the evolutionary point of view gained in acceptance. The manner in which hedonism could be adapted to various modern movements of thought gave it its vitality. Second, the stressing of conduct in hedonism permitted it to be made a part of the whole development of life. All action was supposed to be one, and the manner in which hedonism seemed to substantiate the underlying assumptions of evolution strengthened Darwinism. At the same time the opinion came about that now in the proof of the full adequacy of evolution up into moral life, ethics itself was made a real natural science and a part of the whole cosmic process.

¹⁶ This refers to possible objective choices and preferences.

¹⁷ Ibid. Book III, Chapter XIV, par. 5, p. 401.

Spencer is the outstanding advocate among the many writers on evolutionary ethics.¹⁸ Studying movement and action as they produce conduct, Spencer finds "that conduct is distinguished from the totality of actions by excluding purposeless actions."¹⁹ This distinction rises by degrees according as the adjustment of acts to ends are more efficient. Among men "the adjustment of acts to ends are both more numerous and better than among lower mammals; but we find the same thing on comparing the doings of higher races of men with those of lower races."²⁰ But the final purpose of the adjustments is the life of the species. Since conduct is an evolution actions are good or bad as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends. The process is a shifting one and therefore we must make ethics relative and not absolute. "Instead of admitting that there is in every case a right and a wrong, it may be contended that in multitudinous cases no right, properly so called, can be alleged, but only a least wrong; and further, it may be contended that in many of these cases where there can be alleged only a least wrong, it is not possible to ascertain with any precision which is the least wrong."²¹ Therefore as the goal to the natural evolution of conduct is also the standard of conduct in morals, and as that conduct is good which conserves life, and that bad which destroys it, "ethics has for its subject-matter,

¹⁸ Cf. C. M. Williams, *Evolutional Ethics*.

¹⁹ *Data of Ethics*, Part I, Chapter II, par. 4, p. 10.

²⁰ *Ibid.* Part I, Chapter II, par. 4, p. 13.

²¹ *Ibid.* Chapter XV, par. 10, p. 301.

that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution.”²²

When Spencer comes to a closer grasp with his problem in his *Principles of Ethics*,²³ he arrives at the conclusion that the genesis of moral conduct is the control of the lower, primitive, presentative simple feelings by the higher, later-evolved, representative and compound feelings. He introduces again the sanctions of Bentham reducing them to three, the political, the religious and the social. These are however called preparatory or pre-moral controls within which the moral control evolves. The moral control is within man and consists of the necessary natural results of an action. It looks to the future and through feeling of the results there arises the sentiment of duty.

Duty has an element of coerciveness, but conduct strives to be free functioning. The sense of moral obligation will cease as we become really moralized. “While at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it.”²⁴ The consciousness of the *ought* ceases and there is a simple, pleasurable feeling of satisfaction. When men fit in more fully into the harmony of life they will act as spontaneously as they now see and smell. Conduct will become entirely natural, and it will function as a matter of course exactly in substance as our glands act, or as any

²² Ibid. Chapter II, par. 7, p. 21.

²³ Vol. I, p. 127 ff.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 129.

purely biological movement occurs. Then we will be almost unconsciously good. We will bear fruit as do the trees, but not because they are good or bad, but because they are more highly developed. It all depends upon time until the upward curve of conduct will have arrived at the freedom of the law of the curve. We will be free in the balance of a naturally evolved human society in which there will be neither duty, conscience, nor law, for they will not be needed.

The golden age of society will be brought about by the natural conciliation of egoism and altruism. They have always been dependent upon each other and in the course of evolution the reciprocal services of the two have been increasing. Altruism will rise to a level when the happiness of others will become a daily need. The cause of unhappiness will decrease and sympathy will increase. "As the moulding and remoulding of man and society unto mutual fitness progresses, and as the pains caused by unfitness decrease, sympathy can increase in presence of the pleasures that come from fitness."²⁵ Like any living organism man and society will develop into health and power. The dead tissue will be cast off and happiness will be the increasing life. Morality will grow just like Topsy "grewed." We shall have heaven on earth merely through the natural process of evolution. All our hopes will be satisfied not through any choice that we make but purely by the course of cosmic evolution.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 129.

Pleasure and reason. When, after portraying the position of hedonism in its various aspects, we come to consider what is its value for morals, we must ask: "Is it self-sufficient?" The answer is given by the history of hedonism. It shows the constant pressure of the theory of pleasure toward reason. It was not possible permanently to maintain the Cyrenaic position of the immediate, present life of sense and feeling. The Epicurean attitude demanded the calm calculation of reason. The calculus of Bentham merged into the idea of utility. It is true that Bentham, in a note of July, 1812, added at the beginning of his work, tried to escape from the consequences of utility, when he says: "This want of a sufficiently manifest connection between the ideas of *happiness* and *pleasure* on the one hand, and the idea of *utility* on the other, I have every now and then found operating, and with but too much efficiency, as a bar to the acceptance, that might otherwise have been given, to this principle." But utility was the more powerful idea, and in the use made of it by Mill it overshadowed immediate feeling. Man's dignity, the difference in quality between actions, the emphasis upon the pleasures of reason, all demonstrated the logical necessity of adding reason to mere feeling. Sidgwick found it still more incumbent upon his thinking to make reason regulative and controlling. The apparent re-assertion of mere pleasure in evolutionary ethics is counter-balanced by putting pleasure into the process of evolution. But the development of the uni-

verse cannot be understood without the implication of reason and purpose.

Because hedonism did not maintain itself in its original, pure form, it raised this problem: "Why cannot feeling offer the principles for the organization of ethics as a science?" The whole procedure of the hedonists shows the constant call upon other principles than those of feeling to make their view of moral life fairly consistent. It does not lie within the nature of sense or feeling, of pleasure or pain, to furnish laws for a scientific statement. We may describe their functioning, but we do not obtain ideas from such a description that are fit to produce a science of ethics. There will always be an inadequacy in the theory of pleasure because of its flowing character to furnish a foundation for morals. The concrete changes in the life of feeling do not allow a place for firm ethical laws. Deliberation will have no real outlook upon the future. Dewey shows the inadequacy of his position, when he says: "The present, not the future is ours. No shrewdness, no store of information will make it ours. But by constant watchfulness concerning the tendency of acts, by noting disparities between former judgments and actual outcomes, and tracing that part of the disparity that was due to deficiency and excess in disposition, we come to know the meaning of present acts, and to guide them in the light of that meaning."²⁶ There is no use in fostering conscience or reason, but only impulses and habits. Thus the pragmatic ethics are evolu-

²⁶ Ibid. p. 207.

tional psychological description, and they can not formulate a real science because they live within sense, impulse and feeling.

Is pleasure happiness? The constant assumption of the hedonists is, that pleasure and happiness are the same. But can this be maintained? It is true that there is a coloring of feeling in happiness and that happiness in its fulness gives pleasure. But there is a larger content in happiness than that given by the sentient life. Happiness means the well-being of the whole man, and not simply of the feeling man. The truth of this fact was realized by Plato and Aristotle. While they both gave some place to pleasure, they found in happiness (*eudaimonia*) the satisfaction for the complete man. The serious thought of man on the moral life never rested with contentment in pleasure except when man followed the mere incitement of the natural life. Epicurus realized not only that man could not attain pleasure without pain, but he also saw that calmness and the undisturbed life of control were necessary. This was virtually the surrender of the power of mere pleasure to create happiness. Whenever any man wrote down his creed of life, through which he thought to attain success and to solve the mystery of happiness with any fair analysis of life, and without being under the necessity of defending an ethical theory, he arrived at a statement which meant more than the gratification of pleasure. The well-known ideal of Robert Louis Stevenson substantiates this common experience. "To be honest, to be kind—to earn a little and to spend a little less,

—to make upon the whole a family happier for his presence, to renounce when that shall be necessary and not to be embittered, to keep a few friends, but these without capitulation,—and above all, on the same grim condition, to keep friends with himself—here is a task for all that a man has of fortitude and delicacy.”

The claim is made that man, when he really analyzes himself, is always in pursuit of pleasure. Is this the fact? We may make pleasure an end in life and subordinate all else to it; but must we make it the good by our very constitution and nature? What we really seek in most cases is the attainment of an object. We expect it to be a satisfaction whether for the relative purpose we have in mind, or for the fulness of our life. Life offers us tasks and we either accept or reject them. Some pursuit is ours and whatever it may be it must not be essentially pleasure. We may seek learning or position, wealth or power, helpfulness toward men and service for God. In all these searchings it is not pleasures in themselves that we desire. And even if we desired them does the good render pleasure inevitably? Are there not sufferings of the good and just which they take upon themselves in seeking righteousness? Some of the highest results of the good must be reached through surrender of the pleasant by self-sacrifice. The right life does not inevitably produce pleasure. Society will often abuse and reject the just, and treat them as unjust. It seems almost like a prophecy when Plato says: “They will say that in such a situation the just man will be scourged,

racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified; and thus learn that it is best to resolve not to be, but to seem just." ²⁷

Another fact about pleasure is, that it constantly seeks a higher tension. Bentham rightly emphasized the intensity, the fruitfulness, the duration of pleasure as necessary elements. The senses when indulged in, and the feelings and emotions sought for themselves, always lead to a greater demand. It lies in the nature of mere pleasure to seek an increase. And even men who know the higher joys select the lower if they promise more tingling of the nerves. Dewey, although he will not admit that love of pleasures is in itself demoralizing, must confess: "But pleasure has often become identified with special thrills, excitations, ticklings of sense, stirrings of appetite for the express purpose of enjoying immediate stimulation irrespective of results." ²⁸ It is this tendency which grows on man when he chooses pleasure. He sinks to a low level, and the freedom which pleasure promises him is a deception. The free life is never one controlled by any sort of pleasure as the good. Pleasure will dominate and enslave, and not liberate men, when it becomes the object of life. Freedom is only found in pleasure, when pleasure is an accompaniment of a happy life, and not when it is desired as the solution of liberty.

Individual or social? What do we think of this contrast? Must the individual exclude the

²⁷ Republic Book II, 361 E.

²⁸ Ibid. p. 158.

social, or must the social submerge the individual? Both are facts of life, and both must be accounted for. If this is true, then every ethical theory of the good must be tested by the question: "How does it conciliate the individual and social rights?" The outlook upon life with pleasure as an end is fundamentally individualistic. As an individual I must seek and enjoy pleasure. No one else can enjoy for me. The sentient life is necessarily subjective. If pleasure is the end I must have pleasure. There is nothing in the nature of pleasure which regards others. It is essentially selfish. And thus men interpret it practically. They are only willing, from the angle of pleasure to share pleasure if there is no detracting from their individual enjoyment. It is not possible from the consideration of pleasure as such to surrender and sacrifice. The joy of these acts only comes as we give up pleasure as the primal aim of life. The greatest good of the greatest number does not logically follow from the choice of pleasure. The altruistic is not included in the egoistic. Benevolence is no legitimate child of pleasure. The difficulty with the hedonists is that they constantly shift the meaning of pleasure and include under it many things which do not rightly belong to it.

It is self-evident that the world cannot exist in the conflict of individual pleasure against individual pleasure. Much evil is being created by this attitude. But if pleasure be fully socialized it means the giving up of some individual pleasure, and then we cannot with justice demand pleasure as the end of the indi-

vidual life. But is the common life satisfied with pleasure as the end? It is through reason that we seek the happiness of the greatest number. When Spencer places the altruistic sentiment alongside of the egoistic he is correct. Both function in human life. But is the altruistic sentiment the outcome of pleasure? Altruism rests upon the instinct of sympathy, if with some psychologists we admit sympathy to be a mere instinct. But whatever our decision, is sympathy as it acts for the common good, useful because it is essentially a pleasure? We cannot affirm this, even if sympathy may be accompanied or followed by pleasurable feeling growing out of the nobility of its direction. Society may be fused to a degree by feeling but the spirit of the crowd is not made moral by the feeling of pleasure. Some of the cruelties of the mob spirit are pleasure. There is more danger in pleasure for the social complex than for the individual. The enslavement of the crowd through its choice is very severe and leads to destruction. Make pleasure in its sentient nature the end of society and society will lose civilization.

The end, the ideal, the good, the right and pleasure. Can any moral theory be accepted if it fails in meeting the inherent demands of the great ethical ideas? To raise this question is really to answer it. How does hedonism measure up to the end, the ideal, the good and the right? The end and aim of the ethical implies no mere description of the natural functioning of man. But pleasure never rises above the unfoldment of what men do as purely natural

beings when they lack in moral development. The ideal is not that which is but that which ought to be brought about. The ideal is to transform the actual. It is just this feature which makes ethics a normative science. But hedonism dethrones ethics from its place, and endeavors to deny the value if not the actuality of the ideal. When we merely portray the actions of pleasure we do not show what man may and ought to pursue. He follows pleasure without an ideal. Pleasure he shares with the animal world, and it does not belong to ideal existence as an end.

The good is the ideal to be fulfilled. If it is to remain the good it must claim to be the highest good (*summum bonum*). Now it is clear that hedonism can never give us a highest good. In its nature it is quantitative and can only promise a maximum amount of pleasure. Its good is relative. Even when quality is added, as by Mill, the quality simply modifies the quantity, and does not change the defect of the purely relative character of the good. Life in much of its experience is relative. But to accept this relativity as final, and to lower the good to the readily attainable, takes away the worth of the good. The balance of possible pleasures in the individual and common life is a compromise which cannot be escaped from. But will the good be the highest upon a compromise? The hedonistic proportionalism is an enemy to the ethical power of the ideal of the good.

What do the hedonists make of the right? They cannot find a firm standard and law of

the right. Their terminology only allows for the lesser wrong. No motive is right or wrong in itself, for only the consequences count. Law can only mean the statement of the average. There can be no incorporation of the good into a real right. Right is a flowing term. Thus the way in which men learn through error is made the right, as it obtains in society from time to time. It is this hedonism of the right which made the economic life of the world so unreliable in its moral aspect. The biologism of the evolutionary moralist can not help us. It has no room for the right. Development, selection, adaptation is all that it knows. As far as this theory expresses present moral conditions, and to the degree that it has helped to make them, it finds its own punishment in the loss of the sense of a right to which men must bow to be free. We seek deliverance through gratification of pleasure and desire, and find only anarchy and revolution in society as the result. Hedonism has aided in suppressing the strong sense of right without which neither the individual nor society can have a vital liberty worth while.

Duty and pleasure. How can we explain duty which is obligation if we accept hedonism? This question has troubled the hedonists. According to their conception duty can only be explained on the natural foundation of the impetus of pleasure. But pleasure simply occurs, but duty is asked for. It implies an *ought*. When the law "thou shalt" or "thou shalt not" is made our own in duty we have more than a mere "is." The psychological

aspect of duty can explain it in part as far as it touches feeling, though even here it cannot tell why the feeling is imperative. Psychological hedonism does not give us a full description of what happens when we follow duty. Above all it is not ethical. Hobhouse has clearly indicated the failure of Mill, when he says: "Mill held to the sense of Moral Obligation as a real psychological force, but whether it had a rational justification was not so easy for him, on his principles, to determine. The sense of obligation he held to be built up by educative processes and the laws of Association on the basis of a substratum of sympathy or Social feeling which he took to be natural. Given sufficient strength in these feelings and forces, there is at any rate no contradiction involved in the supposition that the altruistic action which Mill wishes to explain might become more pleasurable and the violation of its rules a source of greater pain to a man than any selfish consideration. Social and 'unselfish' action becomes psychologically possible on Mill's view, but whether it becomes rationally imperative is another question. On Mill's account all action is at bottom founded on desire. The stronger desire, and that is for Mill the most intensely realized anticipation of pleasure, must prevail. If a man already finds his greatest pleasure in promoting the general happiness no question of obligation arises. But if he feels nothing of the kind, or if he halts between two decisions, in what sense can

we tell him that he 'ought' to decide for one course rather than the other.''²⁹

The hedonists of the modern type found it necessary to introduce external sanctions after the leadership of Bentham. But why do we need any external forces if there is a purely natural sequence in life which ends either in pleasure or pain? The external sanctions cannot however readily be accounted moral. To become moral they must be internally accepted. Therefore the ultimate sanction is of necessity internal. But are the external sanctions the real causes of the internal feeling of obligation? It is an unproved assumption that the physical, the social, and even the religious sanctions create the peculiar sense of moral obligation. After all there is the ineradicable feeling of its immediacy which has never been solved by any proposal of the external.

Another problem is raised by the idea of Spencer that the inner coerciveness of duty is a passing phase of life. It will, in his opinion, give way to a moral life that needs no duty, when conduct has arrived at the highest stage of balance between egoism and altruism. Then there will be no necessity for men to be told their duty or to feel and know it. Duty will have become almost unconscious habit. But is it possible at any time for duty to pass away as long as moral progress takes place? It is true that when duties are encased in virtues they do not seem so compelling as in the formative stage of virtues. Nevertheless virtues

²⁹ Ibid. p. 197.

need to be re-vivified again and again by the sense of duty. As we grow in the moral life we recognize more duties and it is only thus that we develop new virtues. Will moral progress ever cease? Men may hope this but we have not yet arrived within any hailing distance of this hope. There is a rise and a fall in individual and social moral life, and the line is not directly upward. Furthermore will the inner law ever cease, even when it becomes a delight? If the highest duty is love will it not always come to us with its "thou shalt?"

Virtue and hedonism. As virtue is habit, cannot the motive of pleasure very naturally form virtue? Mill claims that hedonism "maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself."⁸⁰ But he must admit that, after all, utilitarian moralists believe that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue. In fact with pleasure as the aim and ideal how can virtue be disinterested logically, no matter what Mill may claim? The habit of virtue, according to the hedonists, is a purely natural production brought about by the chain of causes and effects tending to pleasure. Virtue cannot have its real content because it is not the habit of the good and right. The loss of a real highest good has impaired the meaning and value of virtue.

When the advocates of pleasure come to denominate virtues they always stress prudence. From the days of Epicurus to Sidg-

⁸⁰ Ibid. Chapter IV, p. 54.

wick this is the great virtue of hedonism. And there is a consistency in this emphasis upon prudence. In obtaining the greatest sum of pleasure we must use a wise and careful discrimination in casting up our accounts for and against. We may be stupid, foolish, careless, intellectually deficient in finding pleasure, but our fault is nothing greater. Prudence is a low type of virtue of the calculating order which seeks to live along the line of least resistance. Sidgwick desires to derive a sort of benevolence in our social relations. Consistently this benevolence can be naught else but a prudent attitude in view of society. Justice is to serve as the balance between prudence and benevolence. But such justice is only high policy and shrewd diplomacy. It cannot have in it the strength of eternal right. Thus hedonism again fails, where it has the greatest psychological chance, in giving us any adequate foundation for virtue.

The philosophy of hedonism. What is the ruling philosophy that underlies all the different types of hedonism? Apparently its immediate character is that of psychologism. Its world is that of the feelings and senses of man. But the psychologism is not of the idealistic but of the naturalistic kind. Even in the case of Mill there exists a phenomenalism that has no real place for cause, and the life of the mind in itself. Materialism is generally connected with hedonism. Epicureanism pointed the real way. After the high idealism of Plato and the realistic idealism of Aristotle it revamped the old materialism. Despite his many moral

maxims Epicurus believed in a world of all-controlling matter. He had no hope of immortality of the soul for which Plato had contended. Bentham is at heart a materialist. The material side of English economic life was taken up into the thinking of its hedonistic moralists. With the coming of philosophy of a purely material evolution a new support was furnished to hedonism. Spencer may seem idealistic when he borrows from Hamilton and Mansel the attitude of agnosticism. But his agnosticism is after all different. It favors a self-developing universe, in which there is a procession from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous through the dissipation of energy and the integration of matter. Life is only the adjustment of the inner to the outer. Psychology is in essence biology, and that of a material sort. All of these positions of the great leaders in hedonism demonstrate that it can only have a naturalistic and materialistic philosophy as its real basis. Pleasure as pleasure can fit in with no really ideal world but only with one that lives on the level of sense, and has nature and matter as its finality.

Christianity and hedonism. Is there any need to ask for the relation of Christianity to hedonism if its philosophy is materialistic? Does this not settle the question? It is true that Christian moral teaching warns against what it calls "the world." A part of this "world" is the life of pleasure. The lust of the eyes and the lust of flesh is condemned.³¹ Man

³¹ I John II: 16.

is not to seek the things that perish with the using of them. His world is not merely economic and biological. But while Christianity warns men against the power and sufficiency of life as pleasure, it is not drab and gloomy. As far as pleasure is not evil it is not rejected. Christ does not condemn the joys connected with normal life. He goes to a wedding.³² His enemies call him a wine-bibber.³³ The picture of His stay with His disciples is that of the bridegroom.³⁴ The mere laws that forbid in Judaism Christ does not accept. He has come to give freedom to man, and therefore the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath.³⁵ Restriction has no value in itself according to the teaching of Jesus and of His immediate followers. To the extent that pleasure belongs to life Christianity does not destroy it. Only when it assumes the first and controlling place, and is entranced by the present as the final life is it opposed. A sane and fair Christianity offers the full life, in which all minor joys are summed up into the high and lasting happiness of a life in Christ. Such a life is the fulfillment of the best desires and the guarantee and gift of a real and vital liberty.

³² John II.

³³ Matt. XI: 19.

³⁴ Matt. IX: 15

³⁵ Mark II: 27.

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CHAPTER VIII

FREEDOM THROUGH REASON

What does reason promise? Is there in reason the essential element which will answer to the ethical demand? It is through reason that we as human beings are differentiated from the rest of creation. The life of sensation and feeling ties us up with the animal world below us. As sentient beings we cannot assert our peculiar place as men. Since morals are distinctively a human sphere of action they cannot exist without reason. The logic of reason, which alone makes any group of facts a science, is needed if our ethical life is to receive a scientific treatment. No theory of morals is at all possible except through reason. As soon as we become conscious of our responsibility we must think and use reason. The unthinking life will never become moralized. The fact is that we make so little progress in the ethical life because we give so little thoughtful attention to it. If hedonism found it necessary to demand that reason be regulative, shall not reason be our ideal? When we rightly employ reason we come to the solid basis of things, which must appeal to every human being as far as reason prevails. There is a unifying, steadying and stabilizing power in reason. It gives power and permanence to life. When we

search carefully and thoroughly into facts to find the real reason back of them, we are looking for the immutable and finally explanatory. Reason as it enters the moral life endeavors to obtain the unvarying and eternal, the fixed and everlasting laws of right in the world of change and flux. It lifts us into the pure ideals of all virtues, and makes duty glorious because it tends to give it its constant value and its unchangeable worth.

The ancient advocates of reason. If we abstract the Eastern development of India where reason submerged desire in the absoluteness of reason as being, we find that the Western impulse toward reason in morals came from Socrates. His purpose was to lead men to virtue through helping them to think clearly. By aiding men to find the consistent and definite concept of the good in its various relations Socrates labored to make the Greeks virtuous, and to overcome the destructive individualism of the Sophists who had no definite standards of right. His principle was, that no man erred willingly, but only through the lack of right knowledge. Plato developed the world of ideas in the interest of the good. For him the highest virtue was wisdom, which dwelt in the head. Justice was the balancing virtue but not the highest individually. Aristotle, with his conception of the active reason, which came to man from without like some peculiar divine gift, naturally exalted the intellectual virtues above all others. The moral supremacy of reason was the special Greek vision. Reason was the Greek way of salvation.

This quality of the Greek character found its strongest expression in the school of the Cynics. They held that man became master of himself, independent of circumstances and self-sufficient through reason alone. Wisdom is happiness. It dwells within and is shown in the singleless of virtue. Pleasure leads to a life of folly and makes man a slave of mere accidents and of fickle fortune. The wise man has overcome these attacks of pleasure, and lives in that which is the essential good of man, namely reason. For him there is no evil with the one virtue of wisdom. All men without reason are slaves. The man of reason, like a king, despises the people of passion. It is this attitude of pride and superiority which has given rise to our modern use of cynicism. The Cynic cannot attain to the perfect life of passionless reason without reducing all wants to the minimum. Through hard labor he must climb to the heaven of peace by self-denial. Thus there will come a calmness of mind and life that pierces through all human illusions, is strong by its indifference to all changing experiences, and has conquered death itself. This confident assurance made the Cynics extravagant and reckless over against the customs of society. They glorified nature itself as reason, and rejected the ways of politeness and even decency, in the interest of the immediate demands of nature. The protest against the artificialities and luxuries of society led them to actions that far exceeded the dreams of Rousseau in his day when he demanded a return to nature. The life conformable to nature received a

deeper and saner interpretation through the Stoics. The fundamental tenets of this school were first stated by Zeno. Of him Diogenes Laertius says: "Zeno was the first writer who, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, said that the chief good was confessedly to live according to nature; which is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point."¹ "For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature; on which account the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to one's own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding; and that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things."² The Roman followers of Zeno, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, also begin with the stressing of reason as fundamental in the world. Epictetus not only makes reason supreme in man, but also essential in God. He says: "God is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What then is the essence of God,—flesh. By no means. An estate? Fame? By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right reason? Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the essence of the good."³ Therefore the chief concern of a wise and good man is reason and

¹ *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Book VII, LIII.

² *Ibid.* Book VII, LIII.

³ *Discourses*, Book II, Chapter VIII.

his own reason. It is this submission to reason which developed two qualities. First the conception that, since we are a part of the whole of nature governed by reason, we can experience nothing but our destiny. Marcus Aurelius says: "Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it."⁴ In like manner, Seneca, whatever the inconsistencies of his life, accepts the universe and strives toward a calm life. The second result is an element of severity toward ourselves. We must consider all things external as things indifferent and valueless as long as we attain the control of reason with its denials of the life of sense. The Stoics were not mere individualists. Because the life of every one was merged into the world-reason, all men were destined for the city of the world. But this city was a supreme city of reason on high in which eternal law lived. All cities and governments could but follow the eternal pattern of everlasting reason. This ideal of world citizenship in the ideal city turned the optimism of the Stoics into a certain melancholy. Man was to become apathetic in view of the insignificance of all temporal and transitory things. No one has characterized this spirit better than Walter Pater. "I find that all things are now as they were in the days of our buried ancestors, all things sordid in their elements, trite by long usage, and yet ephemeral. How ridiculous, then, how like a countryman in town, is he who

⁴ *Meditations*, Book X, 5.

wonders at aught! Doth the sameness, the repetition of the public shows, weary thee? Even so doth that likeness of events make the spectacle of the world a vapid one. And so must it be with thee to the end. For the wheel of the world hath ever the same motion, upward and downward, from generation to generation. When, then, shall time give place to eternity?"⁵ "To cease from action—the ending of thine effort to think and to do—there is no evil in that.... Thou climbest into the ship, thou hast made thy voyage and touched the shore; go forth now! Be it into some other life; the divine breath is everywhere, even there. Be it into forgetfulness forever; at least thou wilt rest from the beating of sensible images upon thee, from the passions which pluck thee this way and that, like an unfeeling toy, from those long marches of the intellect, from thy toilsome ministry to the flesh."⁶

Modern intuitionism. What is meant by intuitionism, and what is its claim for reason? The intuitionists in morals are those thinkers who hold that man has in himself the fundamental principles of the moral life. These can be found by looking within ourselves and eliciting the elements of morality through reflection and reason. Among the earliest English representatives of intuition is Samuel Clarke. In his "Discourse upon Natural Religion" he asserts that there are "eternal and unalterable relations, respects, or proportions of things, with their consequent agreements or disagree-

⁵ Marius the Epicurean, I, p. 205.

⁶ Ibid. I, p. 206.

ments, fitnesses or unfitnesses.”⁷ “And now, that the same reason of things, with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to act in constant conformity to the eternal rules of justice, equity, goodness, and truth, ought also constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, is very evident.”⁸ “All rational creatures ought to take care that their wills and actions are governed by the eternal rule of right and equity.”⁹ It was supposed that this rule could be found by man and was clear and definite. The advocates of the rule of common sense in philosophy followed the deistic attitude of Clarke. Richard Price says: “It’s a very necessary previous observation, that our ideas of right and wrong are simple ideas, and must therefore be ascribed to some power of immediate perception in the human mind.”¹⁰ The mind has a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong. “It is undeniable, that many of our ideas are derived from our intuition of truth, or the discernment of the natures of things by the understanding. This therefore may be the source of our moral ideas.”¹¹ If we follow this source we shall arrive at the conclusion, that “morality is eternal and immutable.”¹² Morals are as unchangeably fixed and as eternally true in their given laws as a triangle

⁷ I. I, 2.

⁸ Ibid. I, 3.

⁹ Ibid. I, 3.

¹⁰ A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Chapter I.

¹¹ Ibid. Chapter I.

¹² Ibid. Chapter I.

or circle is what it is unchangeably and eternally. Thomas Reid argues for a moral sense which he compares to our external senses. The external senses give us the first principles of the material world. "The truths immediately testified by our moral faculty, are the first principles of all moral reasoning, from which all our knowledge of our duty must be deduced. By moral reasoning, I understand all reasoning that is brought to prove that such conduct is right, and deserving of moral approbation; or that it is wrong; or that it is indifferent, and, in itself, neither morally good or ill."¹³ All of the intuitionists of this type believed that somehow man had the ten commandments written within him. They assumed that the interpretations of the moral law of their times were immutable. Inner reflection was called upon as witness without the consideration of the prior education which the mind had received.

The great classical opponent of all innate ideas was John Locke. When he comes to treat of the problem of innate moral ideas he says: "Concerning practical principles, that they come short of an universal reception; and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as 'What is, is,' or to be so manifest a truth as this, 'That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.' Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impressions of the mind is stronger

¹³ Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay III, Chapter VI.

against these moral principles than the other.”¹⁴ He denies that there is historical proof that faith and justice are owned by all men as moral principles. Moral rules are not self-evident but need a proof. “Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate principles, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand a reason; which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-evident; which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it approbation.”¹⁵ Locke indicated the essential weakness of the intuitionist position. After a careful analysis of the contents of our moral life we cannot hold that moral principles are born in us, and that we need only, in the manner of Socrates, develop our native knowledge. But the truth of the contention of intuition is the effort to explain why morals come to us with the formal power of their permanence. No matter how we are educated by experience, conscience, right, duty, the good appeal not only through their a posteriori content, but also through their a priori character. The peculiar force and influence of moral ideas is not explicable through the external sources which furnish their material. We have capabilities of moral development that are not created by what enters into us. As soon as anything is accepted as just or true it has an impulsive force which other experience does

¹⁴ An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book I, Chapter II; Vol. I, p. 64—Ed. Fraser.

¹⁵ Ibid. Book I, Chapter II, 4 Vol. I, p. 68—Ed. Fraser.

not have. Our interpretation of the just and true may be wrong, but as long as we think any action to be just or true we cannot escape its hold upon us.

Kant and his successors. What has been the value and the idea of the German development of philosophical morals from Kant, through Fichte to Hegel? We must reckon with this influence to understand moral rationalism. Kant began with an emphasis upon the good will. But the good will is the rational will. When we pass from the fundamental *Metaphysic of Morality* to the *Critique of Practical Reason* we see that the outcome of the metaphysics of morals is to subordinate the will to universal reason. This appears in man as a rational being. The sense and obligation of the moral imperative grow out of the real, noumenal life of man as contrasted with the life of sense and externality that subjects man in the phenomenal world to necessity. Man feels and ascertains through practical reason that he is greater than the knowledge of science. Man thus exists as an end in himself, and not merely as a means. This principle is elemental. “Its foundation is this, *that rational nature exists as an end in itself*. Man necessarily conceives of his own existence in this way, and so far this is a *subjective* principle of human action. But in this way also every other rational being conceives of his own existence, and for the very same reason; hence the principle is also *objective*, and from it, as the highest practical ground, all laws of the will must be capable of being derived. The practical imperative will therefore be this: *Act so as to*

use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means."¹⁶ With this principle in view we must determine our action in accordance with the idea of certain laws. These laws become embodied in the categorical imperative which may be stated thus: "*Act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only, which you can at the same time will to be a universal law.*"¹⁷ "The universality of the law which governs the succession of events, is what we mean by *nature*, in the most general sense, that is, the existence of things, in so far as their existence is determined in conformity with universal laws. The universal imperative of duty might therefore be put in this way: "*Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature.*"¹⁸ The imperative derives its strength from the universal reason. Kant in asserting the realism of will as fundamentally in unison with a rational universe of mind is no mere individualist of reason. In contradiction to the Critique of Pure Reason with its categories of mind as found in the individual, the practical reason is the universal reason which determines the peculiar constitution of human nature.

Fichte, the apostle of German national freedom, was impelled by high ideals of national independence, which rested on his moral conceptions. He takes the ideas of Kant, fills them with enthusiasm, and translates the intellect

¹⁶ The Metaphysic of Morality, Section II.

¹⁷ Ibid. Section II.

¹⁸ Ibid. Section II.

into the terms of an absolute logic of power to freedom. There is an impulsion in man to do certain things utterly independent of external purposes. This impulsion is man's moral nature as surely as he is a rational being. The ultimate ground of the moral nature is when man finds himself as willing. This finding leads man to the real ego, which is the original and objective actuality. The Ego as absolute is actual self-determining of itself through itself. It is not personality but similar to moral world-order; and it must abstract all foreign and minor elements in willing through individuals. The outcome will be absolute intelligence. "The contemplating intelligence posits the above described tendency to absolute activity as *itself*, or as identical with itself. The intelligence of the absoluteness of real activity thus becomes the true essence of the intelligence, and is brought under the authority of the conception, whereby alone it first becomes true *freedom*: absoluteness of the absoluteness, absolute power to make itself absolute. Through the consciousness of its absoluteness the Ego tears itself loose from itself, and posits itself as independent."¹⁹ When we lose ourselves in this rare atmosphere of the absolute Ego we are on the peak of the intellect as in itself. We have not climbed as high into abstraction as Plotinus, who rises from mind to mere being in itself; but we are nevertheless above and beyond all determinateness. The universal Absolute is freedom and life.

¹⁹ The Science of Ethics, Chapter II, Genetical Description of the Consciousness of our Original Being.

Hegel also starts out in his moral reflections with positing freedom through intelligence. He thinks that freedom belongs to will as weight to bodies. But this freedom as practical begins with the I itself. It goes beyond the I into the indeterminateness. The will is the intellect in its movement, as the possibility of abstraction from every aspect in which the I finds itself or has set itself up. Then it must return upon itself. "The I is, first of all, as such pure activity, the universal which is by itself. Next this universal determines itself, and so far is no longer by itself, but establishes itself as another, and ceases to be universal. The third step is that the will, while in this limitation, i. e., in this other, is by itself. While it limits itself, it yet remains with itself, and does not lose its hold of the universal. This is, then, the concrete conception of freedom, while the other two elements have been thoroughly abstract and one-sided."²⁰ This abstract will existing for itself is personality. Personality possesses abstract right. It is the absolute free being of pure self-conscious isolation. "The moral standpoint is the standpoint of the will—in its existence for itself, an existence which is infinite."²¹ The ethical system is the idea of freedom developed in a present world. It is thus that the absolute reaches down into life, and takes it up into the absolute will as reason. The passing to and from from absolute to concrete never rests until the opposition is resolved by taking all that is immediate and personal

²⁰ *Philosophy of Right*, Introd. 7, Addition.

²¹ *Ibid.* Second Part, par. 105.

into the Unique and Absolute Individuality, which is God as thought itself in Action.

Can reason reject feeling? Is the claim of reason as the really ethical to the exclusion of feeling justified? We realized that the life of the senses, feelings and emotions was not sufficient; but shall we reach the solution of the striving after freedom through reason? The rationalist disparages the life of sensibility altogether. He would reduce morals to the movement and power of mere concepts, and satisfy us with the essence of bloodless categories. But the elimination of all that is sentient and belongs to feeling makes an unreal life. Is man a creature of reason alone? The fulness of life, its liberty and joy demand more than reason. The action toward which life always tends is not the outcome of the intellect alone; it has back of it the force of feeling and the impetus of emotion. The senses in themselves cannot be indicated to be evil. Consequently any theory which does away with them is defective attractive as it may seem through its exalted ideals.

The failure of hedonism was its manifoldness in pleasure and its lack of a real unity for the ethical aim. Rationalism has the unity but it has been obtained at the loss of the manifold; all particulars in life are overlooked. A universal to be true to its idea must really embrace the particulars. The complex must be summed up into a simplicity that does not deny the complex. Rationalism is too simple for the realness of life. It is formal but cannot connect the material with its formal logical scheme.

The logic of reason has absorbed the concreteness of life. Classification through the idea has forgotten what is to be classified. The content of the life of feeling is needed to make rationalism worth while. As Kant said: "Concepts without percepts are blind."

Can reason without feeling give us the balance between the individual and social? On the one hand rationalism exalts the individual mind. Kant finds the end in every individual. No one is to be used as a means. But when this right of the individual is to be universalized the demand is made that we recognize all other individuals as ends in themselves. On this basis society is simply an addition of individuals. There is no room for humanity through the multiplication of the individual alone. No explanation is given how we can pass to the recognition of others. Furthermore no group and no social forms can have an ethic on the basis of rational individualism. After all are men fused by reason? Are the social unities produced by reflection and by rational considerations? It is a fact that we may pause and give arguments for social unities, but the real forces are no utilitarian considerations. Great sentiments, and ruling feelings carry men upon the social stream. The ideas of society may be realized by the leaders, and men rejoice to hear the social impulses explained to them, but in actuality the ideas and reasons do not make the social complex. We do not argue ourselves from the individual into the social. We are in the social relationships before we find ourselves

as individuals. This fact is contrary to rational individualism.

On the other hand rationalism has a universalism in which the individual is lost. Nature as a rational whole, as conceived of by the Cynics and the Stoics, makes us only parts of the total. The absolute Ego of Fichte, the all-embracing I of Hegel, leave no adequate place for real personality. With the suppression of the separate ego liberty is eliminated. The reputed freedom of the allness is no freedom for the part. We are slaves of universal reason. It may live through us and in us but we are really no concrete existences unless we are related to the total. Thus the universalism of reason destroys the individual, as the individualistic rationalism fails in conceiving the universal. Kant gravitates between both and can build no bridge between them.

Reason and asceticism. Is life to be repression and not expression? Do surrender and sacrifice form the great and final good? Are we only good as we give up our life? Rationalism if consistent must stand for sacrifice, repression and abandonment in life. Its ideal is neither control nor limitation of the sentient, but its complete prohibition. The most consistent and logical asceticism is found in the Orient in the religions of India. They can give no solution of a good life, and no hope of salvation, except as man destroys every want and desire. By contemplation men are urged to enter into the impassive life of absolute reason and being. They are bidden to mortify every wish and every feeling and emotion. The

Western asceticism has not gone to this extreme limit. The activistic spirit of the West has not allowed men in great numbers to follow the passive attitude of the resigned and calm East. There have been some Western ascetics, like Madam Guyau, who have become Quietists. For them life was all stillness and cessation. But the power of Western asceticism was partial abandonment of the life of sense and feeling. It sought not complete suppression, but simply great restraint from the beating of images upon the eye, from the intrusion of sounds upon the ear, and from the invasion of odors upon the nose. Feelings and emotions were crowded back. But is even the moderate sacrifice final? The meaning of sacrifice is the saving of life. It is no end in itself. Repression is worthy of man and good when expression leads to the loss of the greater and fuller life. But freedom from the possible enslavement of sense and feeling ought not to be purchased by the loss of all sentience. This is to seek freedom through destruction. It is the way of despair. But perhaps the milder asceticism of the Puritan is valuable. We need the call of the Puritan, especially in our age, which has gone astray in indulgence. Puritanism is largely a castigation for excess. Often, if the castigation is too severe it leads to new excess. But prohibition of sentience may at times be temporarily necessary; it may be the only way of restraint where sense and appetite cause individual and common evil in society: but prohibition increasingly stressed in life is punishment and imprisonment. The life of moral

freedom is not finally furthered, either through self-imposed laws, or restrictions imposed upon men by society. Asceticism denies that the bodily life can ever be made moral. For it only mind is good, and all matter is evil. The Hindu looks upon the body as the great obstacle and hindrance to be gotten rid of. Plato, with all his Greek appreciation of harmony and beauty, lives only in the world of ideas. His interest is in the immortality of the soul alone. The body is the prison-house of the soul in which it is kept captive for a time. The soul is eternal, the body the passing tenement. It is this attitude of asceticism which has had a double deleterious effect. First, it has always condemned the body, and stood in the way of that bodily care and consideration of health, which constitutes a part of human happiness. If the body is a miserable thing why should we give it any attention. Let it die as soon as possible in filth or through disease! The ascetic does not believe that cleanliness is next to godliness. Such a sentiment is of the evil one; dirt and destruction of the body are essential to saintship. Second, the condemnation of the bodily life by the ascetic has led to the disregard of the sacredness of the natural life. Therefore men have dealt with the body and its demands, as far as rationalism ruled, in a spirit of abandon. The urge of the body was present and it was followed without moral ideals controlling. The condemnation of the body did not produce its sanctification but the reaction of indulgence. Thus rationalism brought about its very opposite.

Does reason give us the highest good and the right? To what extent can rationalism answer the claim of the *summum bonum*? Is its idealism adequate? Whither does its conception of right and law lead? The rationalists have always held that in distinction from the hedonists they had solved the problem of the highest good. But what is the highest good? It is reason in its abstraction and universalism. There is the framework of the good but nothing appears within the frame. The ideal is the ideal and reaches up into the universal and absolute. Reason becomes more and more abstract as it rises. The process inherent in its contentless trend toward the inconceivable and formless is like a series approaching zero. No better statement of this tendency has been given than by Plotinus. He says: "Intellect, however, is able to see either things prior to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things affected by itself. And the things indeed contained in itself, are pure; but those prior to itself are purer and more simple; or rather this must be asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that which is prior to it, is not intellect, but something more excellent. For intellect is a *certain* one among the number of beings; but that it not a *certain* one, but is prior to everything. Nor is it being; for being has, as it were, the form of *the one*. But that is formless, and is even without intelligible form."²² Thus intellect arrives at mere colorless unity. Where this exists there can be no right nor wrong, no good nor bad. This fact in rational-

²² Enneades, On the Good, or the One. XV, III.

ism has been thoroughly worked out by Bradley in his non-contradiction as the absolute.²³ We are caught in our own logic and are not free.

The rationalists speak of the right as right and of the absolute law. The Cynic and Stoic ideal is to live according to the right, which is the law of nature. But where do we find the law of nature with its contents? The Cynics were consistent when they fell into indulgence of the body as against the artificialities of their time. They followed the laws of bodily life. But these could not be the laws of reason. Therefore the Stoics with their praise of apathy thought the law of right was the absolute reason of the universe. What is this reason? If we observe the order and purpose of the universe we find only natural laws. There is an end but in the mere process and development of the universe apart from man there are no traces of morals or freedom. All that we can find of a moral order exists in the history of man and in his apprehension of the power that makes for righteousness. But this moral order is frequently violated. It does not have the absoluteness which rationalism claims. Rationalism can never discover the real final good or law. Its processes end in the fog of the invisible mountain peaks. All that it can do is to insist on the formal necessity of right and law, and then point beyond itself to religion which by faith sees the invisible. The apex of rationalism is only doubt and agnosticism. The aeroplanes it sends out disappear and do not return.

²³ Appearance and Reality, Book II, Chapter XVII, XXV.

But it is valuable in stressing the ideal, the highest good, the right, the law, although it cannot lead into the promised land.

Duty and reason. Is it not the distinguishing advantage of rationalism that it furnishes a noble interpretation of duty? Has not the emphasis upon the obligation of the right in eternal principles given the necessary impetus to moral life? When we discussed duty²⁴ it appeared that Kant in the true spirit of the rationalist stressed the priority of duty. But duty cannot be maintained merely as duty and as good in itself without showing how this goodness enters into the full life of various duties. Duty for duty's sake is a noble aspiration, and strengthens the moral fibre. But in its abstractness it is simply a formula. It is like a tautology, as A is equal to A. Kant endeavored to make duty realistic by advising men to choose that as a maxim, which can be universally implied. We are e. g. to speak the truth because truthfulness is useful and necessary for all, and can become a general law. This escape from the bare theoretical description of duty is however no credit to the high aspirations of reason. It is simply utilitarianism in another guise. The considerations of use derived from a sort of common sense reflection are to give content to abstract duty. A shallow rationalism, derived not from high principles of reason, but from a knowledge of what obtains among men and what is found generally, marks the effort of Kant. The import of making that our maxim which can

²⁴ Cf. above, p. 106 ff.

become universal is not passing from universal reason to the particular, but using the particular and concrete and interpreting it as a universal without showing the cogency of the principles of reason. And such reflection is not usual with men when duty functions. It is only the philosopher thinking upon duty, who would argue thus when he sees man merely as a thinking being. This attitude destroys the categorical imperative of duty on which Kant dwells. If we find the maxims of duty by calm deliberation then the imperative quality is gone, and the categorical has become a hypothetical. Thus when the rationalist desires to make his conception of duty workable he contradicts the universal power of duty which is the cornerstone of his system.

Another defect of the rationalistic idea of duty is the over-emphasis of duty in its compelling force. When the men who defend reason as alone sufficient in moral life remain within the circle of their concepts they exalt duty almost into the place of a compulsory influence. Reason is portrayed as functioning with such logicity and cogency that man must follow. The practical reason is raised into an absolute law for action. It almost seems as though man had no power to be unreasonable in action as he often is. This tendency is due to the neglect of the other factors in human life beside reason. The preachments of duty are a fine tonic for the ethical life if they stimulate us to action which is reasonable. But the urgency of duty must not be so explained, as to destroy our sense of freedom with its responsibility.

How does reason explain virtue? Is it not true that the rationalists have a high valuation of virtue in itself? Do they not put it upon an absolute basis? Because they stress virtue for its own sake they make it appear very strong. " 'Tis certain indeed, that virtue and vice are eternally and necessarily different, and that the one truly deserves to be chosen for its own sake, and the other ought by all means to be avoided, though a man was sure for his own particular, neither to gain nor lose anything by the practice of either.' " ²⁵ This choice of virtue for itself without considering consequences is understandable as a protest against the hedonists, for whom there is nothing good nor bad except through consequences of pleasure or pain. But the error of the rationalist in this protest is, that virtue and vice do have consequences. And if man chooses a virtue as the embodiment of the good he has a purpose in mind. Virtue is not so arbitrarily dissociable from the ideal. The ideal is not only the motive at the beginning of action, but also the purpose at the end. Of course we are not to be calculators of results through prudence as the hedonist thinks, but on the other hand we do count the value of virtue in reference to the consequences of the good.

The same error that characterized the hedonists in restricting themselves largely to prudence as the virtue, also marks the rationalists in making wisdom the one virtue. The Stoics only admitted one virtue and altogether missed the understanding of the varying and different virtues. It is true that in all virtues there is

²⁵ Clarke, Discourse upon Natural Religion, I, 7.

an element of wisdom. We cannot be just, truthful, pure, etc., no matter what motives make us thus, without also being wise in these virtues. Nevertheless all the virtues cannot be derived from wisdom. Their rationality is not that feature which really makes them virtues. The limitation of virtue to wisdom indicates that reason alone is not adequate to explain the nature of virtue and the existence of virtues.

Through the Greek influence the intellectual in virtue has been exaggerated. Plato made wisdom paramount. Aristotle put the intellectual side of life above the purely ethical. As God is thought in action, man rises above the ordinary virtues, like courage, temperance, friendship, etc. through pure mind. Now this attitude, even though not carried to this extreme, produces aristocratic pride. The good in morals are the best in society, and morals are aristocratic. But the aristocracy of the ethical life is not the superiority of intellect. The more intelligent are not the salt of the earth because of their mind. The intelligentsia of an age are not the same as the moral idealists of the age. Those who consider themselves wise because of the intellect alone despise the rest. The small group of intellectuals often live for themselves; and their boastful self-estimation entangles them in an overestimate of their worth that enslaves. There is no liberation through intellect alone. The aristocracy of the intellectuals, when not used in helpful service, becomes undemocratic. Therefore the intellectualists not only miss their own freedom, by confusing a certain sciep-

ticism with freedom of thought, but they endanger the common liberty of society. While the freedom of society needs leadership of high thought and moral purpose, thought alone will not create such leadership. There is frequently an aloofness from the democratic movement of the age on the part of intellectuals. When they do participate they are likely to gravitate into radicalism, which confuses liberty with revolution, and is always stronger in destructive criticism than in helpful, constructive criticism. The mind of man without heart and will will never give us the utopia. Those who live the academic life must be especially careful not to seek truth in the intellect alone. The realities of life must speak to us if we are to approach the problem of liberty.

The philosophy of rationalism. What is the underlying philosophy of the rationalists? Whither does their view of the world lead? There is a strong attractiveness about the rationalist position. It is idealism, and satisfies the strivings of those who look for high things. The intellect seems the best in man, and has so much in history to confirm its value for mankind. But we must not confuse the idealistic in life with the idealism of the rationalist. When the good is made purely reason it lowers the worth of all the rest of life. Idealism makes a promise which it cannot keep. It offers us our full self-fulfillment and holds out to us the hope of vital liberty. When we begin to live the life of reason in ourselves we do find that knowledge makes free as far as it leads us into the truth. But we cannot advocate reason

without following its logic, and logic is inevitable. It does not consider the freshness and fulness of life but only demands consistency. It carries us forward to the bitter end if we follow. This inherent logic of reason will not permit us on the foundation of reason alone to remain within ourselves. The tendency of reason is toward the universal and absolute. We cannot be Stoics and not submit to world-reason. Kant, his categories, and his apprehension of the ego, contain in germ the position of Fichte and of Hegel. Such is the process of reason that takes us captive. The final outcome is the absolutism of reason. Through it we are led to an Absolute of impersonal nature and an existence in which the distinctions of good and bad are lost. We become enslaved through the absolutism of the idea in a world of mind without a personal God, a society in which individuals are submerged as mere parts, and a state that is completely sovereign as the expression of reason. Intellect has thus given us empty apples of Sodom. Its boasted freedom has become a slavery. Idealism of the intellect alone is a deception. It claims to rescue us from materialism and then makes us doubly slaves of the absolute.

Christianity and reason. Is Christianity fundamentally favorable to reason? Does its inherent spirit have a direction toward reason? It is evident that as a religion it cannot be a mere philosophy unless it abandons a part of its truth. The supernatural in any religion is superrational in the philosophic sense. And Christianity is not without its mystic super-

naturalism. But we approach more closely to the problem when we ask: "What are the teachings of Christianity as to restraint and repression in life?" Is it fundamentally ascetic? The attitude toward pleasure, which it does not completely reject, is a partial answer.²⁶ Nevertheless we must consider certain truths that stress surrender. The straight gate and the narrow way are made the way of life.²⁷ He that saveth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it.²⁸ The very desires of life must be given up. "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: for it is better for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell."²⁹ Paul, following this attitude of Christ's teaching, strives to bring his body into subjection. He thinks it is advisable not to marry, but finally it is better for those who cannot contain themselves to marry than to burn.³⁰ Christianity forbids the love of the world. But all of these negative commands for life are in the interest of a larger life. They are not rationalistic in the real sense. The aim is to save the spiritual life but not because it is rational. The life of the spirit must not be lost for the sake of the whole

²⁶ Cf. above, p. 142.

²⁷ Matthew VII: 13.

²⁸ Cf. Mark VIII: 35.

²⁹ Matthew V: 29 ff.

³⁰ I Corinthians VII: 9.

man. Therefore certain desires must be suppressed if they imperil the complete life and the final liberty of man.

Original Christianity despite these warnings is not essentially ascetic. This appears clearly in the Christian attitude toward the body. The body is not evil in itself. In later post-apostolic Christianity Platonic influences and oriental ideas helped to bring about the undervaluation of the body, and caused asceticism. But in the early days the body was held to be the temple of the Holy Spirit.³¹ It was to be sanctified and not eliminated. The soul was not the total man. But God was to keep us body, soul and spirit. The hope of the future was not a spirit life without the body. The new body of the hereafter was to be a spiritual body different from this mortal body. It was to be changed into glory and immortality.³² But the desire was not to be without a body and to be unclothed and naked in spirit. A new body was to be given to man. The old body was sown into the ground to be raised in newness of life. The old temple and tabernacle of the soul would be broken down, but God would give a new temple and a new tabernacle³³ of life in the glorified body which was to be. Such hopes as these are not rationalistic asceticism. Man was never to be mere spirit, but in all eternity body and spirit. Consequently the teachings of Christianity in their pure form are not spiritual in the sense of reason and

³¹ I Corinthians III: 16 ff.

³² I Corinthians XV: 43, 44.

³³ 2 Corinthians V: 1.

mind, to the detriment of the body. There is no oriental undervaluation of the reality of all life. The ideal is a liberated body free from present enchainments of sickness and death, connected with a liberated spirit. Thus man would enter into the full liberty of a child of God.

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CHAPTER IX

FREEDOM THROUGH PERSONALITY

What of the will? It is evident, after our effort to find freedom either through pleasure or reason, that both fail. What is the deepest cause of their inadequacy in addition to the criticisms passed upon them? The answer that readily suggests itself is, that both fall short of their claim because they make the will secondary. In hedonism the will almost disappears. It is attached to the chain of causes and effects that terminate in pleasure or pain. In rationalism will is called good for the sake of its rationality. Even Kant cannot really give the will its place in morals despite his high estimate of the reality in will. This is due to the fact, that will is after all in its essence practical reason. And yet ethics deals with will and action as fundamental in character and conduct. There can be no ideal of ethical life without a free will. Freedom is the beginning and goal.¹ Does this not indicate that if we would approach the problem of freedom aright, and begin to find freedom, we must start out with the will and coordinate it with all of our functionings that affect character and conduct?

How then do our deliberations and choices,

¹ Cf. above, p. 28 ff.

our motives and determinations, our decisions and actions, eventuate for the moral life of freedom? What comes from character to conduct through will and action, and what returns to character from conduct and its action? Whenever we will and act in certain directions we form a unity of action. This is the outcome of prior decisions and actions crystallized into character. But in turn what we do either confirms the unity of direction as it proceeds from our character, or disturbs and reshapes it, and starts a new line of direction. Through motives from within, as desires, wants, instincts, dispositions, habits, and through conduct from without we form and organize a certain determinateness of life. But this determinateness is the result of our choices freely made and if rightly made leads to liberty of life. If we pause to examine how determinateness occurs and how it organizes our life we shall be assured that we are dealing with immediate realities. I am appealed to, e. g. to make a contribution to some good cause of charity or education. The direction of my action will be to respond if there have preceded other actions of generous giving. My answer to the present appeal will strengthen the past and existing determinateness. If I have not responded in the past, but shut up my heart to every request of generosity I will either not give, or if new, strong motives enter in, I may change my former course of action and begin a different line of determinateness. This same procedure appears when I am tempted to do wrong. Under a trying situation it seems

easier to tell an untruth than to adhere to the truth. My free decision is in unity with previous attitudes and actions either for or against the truth. Thus through volition I am always acting out past volitions, confirming them anew, or reversing former positions and actions. A conflict arises in my mind as to two courses of action, neither of which are in themselves wrong. How shall the conflict be settled? I am, e. g. in a quandary whether I shall use my vacation for pure recreation, or for some work which is excluded by my ordinary daily tasks. The determination will be for work or pure recreation according to the ruling direction of my will. While I may weigh the pro and contra of the advantage of rest as necessary, or the value of work as joy and profit, after all the decision will mostly be in accord with the controlling purposes which have made past actions and formed prior character. The living study of this functioning of will as determinateness, but as our determinateness, is the elemental and fundamental fact for finding the ideal of moral action and ethical life.

Will and personality. While we begin with the will and its actions, we cannot stop with it. In the analysis of character and conduct with their decisions and directions we must not forget that volitions and actions are not the whole of life. How do they coordinate with ideas, feelings and emotions? And what term shall we choose to designate the totality of character and conduct in their actual, concrete functioning? Whatever we determine to say or do can

have no meaning without the content of some ideas or the presence of some reasons. Volition in itself is impossible without knowledge. This knowledge is often not the abstract reason or logic which the rationalists have in mind. It is the direct and living knowledge growing out of experience. When it becomes formulated into certain principles and subject to certain laws it furnishes the intellectual material of our character and conduct. Conduct can never be really ethical only because it is highly evolved, or very complex, or largely differentiated. The ultimate difference between all sub-human action and human action as moral conduct lies in the fact of man's knowing what he does and assuming responsibility for what he does. To make action the exclusive fact and dissociating it from reason leads into mere energy and destroys freedom. Action to be moral action must come from within and must always have ideas and ideals animating it.

The conjunction of knowledge with character and conduct is not yet the whole of life. Knowledge in mind and in action is not possible without the life of the senses. They must be regarded not only as the source of external experience, but also as giving a certain tone and color to all experience. Our life is either heightened or lowered, elevated or depressed, expanded or contracted, pleasurable or painful in the raw material of experience. The nature of experience in its sense-coloring enters intimately into our character and conduct. But no less than the sentient life is the life of

feeling and emotion. Moral action is no cold, impassionate procedure of conduct through knowledge. It is warm and human with many a feeling. The impetus of feeling is never absent. Corresponding to the tone of the senses from without is the tone of feeling within. Approval or disapproval of actions, satisfaction or reproof of what we have said or done, within us, always have some color of feeling. No consideration of ethical life is just without allowing for the large place of feeling which is the constant undercurrent of action. Similarly there are emotions of joy or sorrow, happiness or distress, and many others, constantly present. The portrayal of human life and character in drama and novel gains its hold upon us because it unfolds the living emotion in the lives of men. It is real while the academic description which loses sight of emotion gives us only the dry and dead bones of action and character.

What shall we call the unity of determinations with ideas and feelings, emotions and sensations? The most usable term is that of *personality*. But we must clearly have in mind that we employ this term with no notion of a fixed substance. It is not the usual definition of personality which we mean, namely, the unity of self-consciousness and self-determination. This current notion begins with the fact of mere human awareness and consciousness and fuses it with the will. There is no room for the life of sentience, feeling and emotion. The whole concept smells of the oil of the study. It is abstract and unreal. What we call personality in its immediate sense is

the unity of determinateness in action, with knowledge, and with all of feeling. Our endeavor is to designate a sum of concrete phenomena of moral action in their living connectedness and unity. But we must further define and differentiate this meaning of personality.

Personality and individuality. What is the real difference between personality and individuality? Are they not different points of view of regarding the individual? In common usage individuality and personality are often made to cover the same idea, without even allowing for the different shades in their designations. The current philosophic definition which places the accent in the unity of consciousness and determination upon the self in defining personality aids the prevalent loose usage in reference to personality and individuality. A closer analysis will justify a definite differentiation. What is an individual? An individual is a single being in distinction from the group. It is the one as separate from the many, the single existence as distinct from the type. There is no merely generic in all nature, but the generic exists along with the individual. In classifying specimens of rock in geology we find certain forms of crystallization. But the general feature of the geometrical form in a rock specimen has also peculiar variations. There is no mere existence of the purely generic through which we unify and group separate specimens as coming under a general class. A flower or a plant belongs not only to a class, but also shows individual features. An American

Beauty rose, e. g. has those common qualities and characteristics through which we recognize and place it as an American Beauty rose. But still one rose is no mere mechanical copy of another. Rose differs from rose, and rose-bush varies from rose-bush. The generic and typical does not destroy the individual. This fact is still more marked in the animal world. We can clearly and distinctly note the species, but a closer study of any one animal shows us that one differs from the other in the same species. Two Holstein cows are not absolutely the same. There are variations despite a common stock and a common heredity. Common traits appear in the same breed of dogs, and yet e. g. one shepherd dog is not like another even if both come from the same male and female. When we come to man there is a still more marked individuality. The common instincts, such e. g. as acquisitiveness, combating, fear, etc.; the general dispositions, as e. g. rivalry, domination, conformity; the generic temperaments, bright or gloomy, joyous or depressed, active or passive; the usual feelings and emotions;—in short all of the marked general human characteristics of mind—are so combined and varied from one man to another as to constitute an individual with separateness of quality. The common features of race and nation do not eliminate individuality. The higher the development of man the more outstanding is the individuality. But withal it remains a given fact. Each individual with differing capacities and powers has both the possibility and the limitation of his individu-

ality. We cannot pass beyond our imparted talents; we can only cultivate them more or less. But there is no ethical value in individuality as such. An individual has qualities that may be made good or may tend to evil. What we are as individuals does not of itself make us just, true, righteous. Every individual disposition has its handicaps. Often the greater the individual the greater the disadvantages that accompany the advantages. Great individuals like great mountains often cast large shadows. Consequently it is entirely wrong when education posits as its end the developing of the individual. Individualism is not in itself moral freedom. To live out our lives with what is in them is not to be good. Liberty is not guaranteed by merely becoming what is in us as possibility and capacity.

There is a usage of personality which does not altogether disregard its difference from individuality. The statement is sometimes made about those, who impress themselves upon others through leadership of some sort, that they possess personality. What is meant by this characterization? Two individuals may have equal talents. The equality of talents of the intellect will not make two men equally leaders. There may be in one more strength of sympathetic feeling and more emotional imagination. These added to intellect make him stronger. But finally the quality which is absolutely necessary to constitute some one a personality with power to attract and lead is will. All other advantageous qualities of mind, and all favorable physical features, will not

compensate for the absence of a determinateness of will. A weak will, a wavering volition, will not draw and control others. But while this conception of personality approaches the truth, it is still deficient. It makes personality a natural gift, a given unity, a fixed possession.

The vital idea of personality is a unity of determinations with ideas and feelings that is not given by nature. It is shaped and created in man by the direction of his choices. Personality is the outcome of what men through action make their real determinateness of will, resting upon ideas, and warm with feeling. Its real meaning implies the free unfolding of ideals in conduct as they proceed from character. But character is no mere existence, but a living, active force for action and a result of choice and action. Thus personality is a moral product of freedom and the content of freedom. When the choices and actions are directed toward the wrong there is the result of a fixed character and certain determinate actions. But we cannot justly call this making of an evil determinateness of life a good, moral personality. In other words, personality must include more than the result of the psychological process of determination, idea, and feeling in unity. It has a value, and this value is the good. A real personality in the moral sense is a good personality. An evil personality does not really exist in the moral meaning which we attach to personality. The idea of personality and its power for freedom is lost through evil choices. The same psychological functionings are not the same

morally. Personality is the expression of the good in freedom.²

Does personality answer the social demand?

One of the defects of both pleasure and reason was their impossibility of furnishing a real basis for the inter-relation of individual and social life. Can the ideal of personality offer a solution? What is designated personalism in modern philosophy would seem to negative this question. It is not as extreme as individualism³ in its accent of the single being as everything, but nevertheless it cannot in most of its presentations very readily pass beyond the individual without difficulty.⁴ This is due to its conception of personality as given, and its failure to see in it as far as man is concerned a creative and developing unity. It is of course evident that choices, determinations, ideas, feelings, fusing into oneness, do occur within the individual mind and make the individual personality. Personality does not deny individuality, but functions in and through it. But it finds further expression in the determinateness making for personality in social relations and forms.

How personality leads from individuality to the social complex has been outlined by H. Scott Holland in "Property and Personality" (Property, its Rights and Duties by Various Writers, p. 197):

² Brightman, The use of the word "Personalism;" The Personalist, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 24 ff.

³ Cf. Warner Fite, Individualism.

⁴ This is the defect in all philosophic statements up to the present time. It started with Boethius who claimed that "person is the individual subsistence of a rational nature". (Persona est Naturae rationalis individua substantia.)

“Individuality,⁵ then, is really representative, is corporate, is social, by the very principle of its like. It can only be understood as the unit of a society. And this only leads us deeper down into the root-conception of personality which finds expression in personality. Personality lies in the relation of person to person. A personality is what it is only by virtue of its power to transcend itself and to enter into the life of another. It lives by interpenetration, by intercourse, by communion. Its power of life is love. There is no such thing as a solitary, isolated person. A self-contained personality is a contradiction in terms. What we mean by personality is a capacity for intercourse, a capacity for retaining self-identity by and through identification with others—a capacity for friendship, for communion, for fellowship. Hence the true logic of personality compels us to discover the man’s personal worth in the inherent necessity of a society in which it is realized. Society is, simply, the expression of the social inter-communion of spirit with spirit which constitutes what we mean by personality. Fellowship and Individuality are correlative terms.”

Some of the choices and actions of man, together with his ideas and feelings, are not individual. They are the expression of the social connection of an individual. This means more than the fact that most individual choices and acts have a social direction, and that apparently individual virtues are after all social relationships. In the mind of the indi-

⁵ Individuality ought not to be identified with personality.

vidual there exists a social determinateness, although this must not be interpreted as giving authority to morals. If I act as a member of a social group, e. g. a director of a corporation or a committee-man of a labor union, my decisions, actions, feelings, ideas are the group expression. The group acts through me and I represent the group mind. Thus my actions as social help to make or unmake the personality of the group. This is apparent not merely in the free forms of association in society, but especially in the social forms of family, church and state. When an attack is made upon my sister I do not oppose it merely as an individual, but largely as a member of a family. The family acts through me. Out of this family relation of some actions grew the early practice of blood-revenge. And the family feeling was the concomitant of the tribal feeling of unity of blood. The physical fact found an outlet and an interpretation in the moral actions by which men accepted and asserted the social blood relationship. These actions coming forth from the individual are not individual but social in idea, feeling and act. When I confess a truth as member of a church, or cooperate in its great undertakings, what the church believes or does lives in and through me. The state has its history and its life, and at certain times this tradition of history and life calls for certain actions from me. I simply act out the social implications of the state. I think and act as a member of the state to which I belong and in which I was born and reared. All such actions are a part of a larger social personality.

It would not be possible for the social to find expression through individual lives unless there was a unity of determinations, ideas and feelings which constitute the social personality. This is no fiction, but is just as real as the creative formation of personality in the individual. Mind is more than connection with a single body. The social complex as well as nature shows its presence. The same psychological functionings of choice and action live in the group. In our days when the family is suffering through economic conditions, and through moral disregard, we forget that a real family has its life and character. It is made by the common actions and ideals that influence and make the spirit of a family. A church has its peculiar genius and is constantly making men spiritually, as it is being made through the church-choices, actions, ideals and emotions. It therefore possesses all the essential elements of personality. A state has its living unity of action in consistency with its past determinations. Like the family and the church it has a personality. All of these social forms possess personality in reality when they function toward the good, and develop liberty.

Personality and the ideal. No matter how much pains we may take to make clear what is meant by personality in ethics, the question still remains: "How does it satisfy the great ethical concepts?" Is it more adequate than either pleasure or reason? The ideal which is to meet the end and purpose of freedom in the moral sense must be the highest good. There dare be no mere maximum or an empty abstrac-

tion. Personality in its determinations and choices at one with ideas and feelings tends to freedom. But this freedom is not the mere formal freedom. It fulfills the hope of individual and common life and secures happiness. The whole man is satisfied in his moral aspirations when he grows more and more to be a personality as the liberty of action in the good develops. When social choices produce the balance of happiness through a liberty, that is not desire nor power, but a full and good life, then the social personality meets the ideal. But in what concrete way can such personality strive toward the ideal and find the highest good?

Personality must be enkindled through personality. No impersonal power or end can bring the satisfaction of happiness in liberty. We are constantly brought nearer to the good when we possess the example and the direct influence of the good as it comes to us through some other, better personality. In our actual life all the rules and all the laws are not really effective. The awakening and stimulating power toward the good is exercised through our contact with a real, growing personality. The touch of a strong, just, happy, free personality upon our lives shapes the ideal in us. We then begin to strive to become in our way and out of our choices, not mere imitators, but creators of freedom and happiness for our lives. But in addition to those living personalities that effect us, we possess the lives of outstanding personalities in history. Not the great conquerors, but the great saints of all times, whether they be called such or not, raise us beyond the limi-

tations of our day. Directly or indirectly the influence of truly great lives still function in mankind. Just as personality in individual life is thus developed through other personalities, so also in social life there exist, beside the forces of evil, the influences of the groups and social forms, which are meeting their purpose of happiness in liberty, in such a manner as to make them attractive. While there is no absolute or abstract perfection anywhere there are the more free and the more good social groups and forms, that stand out beyond others. The traditions of the past do not actually give us a golden age, but they show us in each age conditions and actions in society that call for emulation. The moral continuity in history is never absolutely broken. The moral order keeps on just because of the influence of personality in social forms and in the groupings and associations of society.

But the upward curve toward freedom is not complete with the best that personality, individual and social, can give us both in the past and the present. There is an urge in personality which drives the ethical beyond and above itself. Where can we find the absolute good that makes the relative good of all human personality? Ethics has never given the answer, but religion has. We shall find the highest good as ideal and power in God.⁶ But this God cannot be an absentee creator. He dare not be made an IT, a whole, a universe as totality. The only God, through whom ethics

⁶ Christ held that God alone was absolutely good. Matthew XIX: 17.

can find the highest good of personality, must be personality with all its freedom in infinite perfection as an active reality. The God who is personality can also not be a mathematical unit. In Him there would be no force for good through the conception of mere unity. Where can we find the kind of God who will answer the individual and social demand of personality? History testifies that this highest good was brought to the world through Christianity. Its God always deals with men either as Father, or Son, or as Spirit. The unity comes to us religiously and morally in personal form. In God's life there is also the unity of more than individual life. There is an inner relationship.⁷ Chesterton has expressed this fact in a telling way, when he said: "There is society in God." God is the answer when thus conceived for individual and common life. Less than such a God we cannot have if the summum bonum is to mean anything. But the interpretation and concreteness of God comes to us through Christ. He is the living personality that was and is among men. He says: "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."⁸

Right, duty and personality. The ideal must be translated into the standard of right. This standard as law must be accepted by duty as obligation. But how is personality to be related to right and duty? The law of right, if freedom is the ideal, must be the law of liberty. Where do we find the law of liberty? In the early

⁷ Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 394. Cf. also Beckwith, *The Idea of God*, p. 273 ff.

⁸ John XIV: 9.

Christian Church James⁹ identified this law, as the royal law, with the law of love. When we connect with this the highest Christian conception of God as Love, we shall readily correlate right with the summum bonum. God the personality lives His life within the Godhead and out toward man and society as Love. He that lives in love lives in God, as God is love.¹⁰ Thus the highest good has the law of love, as the law of liberty, in its very nature and being.¹¹ The right can be nothing else than love, and the law as the ideal of perfection can be nothing else than love, if the highest good is God as Love. Here is an unfailing, living and concrete connection which takes right and law from the sphere of the abstract and impersonal, and puts it into the sphere of the real and actual. Personality in God thus sets the ideal as the actual standard and demand for all personality.

But how does duty, as it appears in separate duties, find its fulfillment in Love? Duty, which regarded as the mere ought becomes harsh and severe, is freed and made joyous if we are to owe naught else than love. There is no other way of going beyond ourselves and fulfilling our duty, while we remain really free and become enlarged in our life, than if we live in and for others through love. Love is the greatest socializing motive. It does the right and does not feel its burden. The individual develops under it and finds the most free kind of

⁹ James I: 25; II: 8.

¹⁰ I John IV: 16.

¹¹ Browning, the poet of optimism, is also the poet of love. He sings: "But love is victory the prize itself."

happiness. Social complexes can best be strong and free within themselves through love. With love as a motive they will properly coordinate with all society.

There are three spheres of love as duty. The commandment which bids us love our neighbor as ourselves, allows the right kind of self-love. This is different from selfishness, and the assertion of mere self-preservation. Joseph Butler thought that he could solve this problem by making cool and reasonable self-love a second principle beside conscience. He says: "If passion prevails over self-love, the consequent action is unnatural; but if self-love prevails over passion, the action is natural. It is manifest that self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without violating that nature; but the former cannot. So that, if we will act conformably to man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern."¹² The notion of Butler is defective, because he identifies the moral self-love with reason, and because he stresses self-interest that begets prudence too largely. The real self-love, as duty, has the ideal of the developing personality in the self, and unfolds duties out of the consideration of the highest good, but not in a merely natural way through the care of the self.

The second sphere of duty as love is toward our neighbor. This includes all duties which touch other lives in their essence. All men are regarded as personalities with their rights and privileges, not for the reason that another position is impossible; and because we cannot live

¹² Sermons, II, par. 16.

among men if we do not do so. This would be a life of compulsion under the pressure of society. The joyous way is the inner identification of ourselves with our duties through the spirit of love. Duties accepted and assumed in this spirit leave us inwardly free. The law of "Thou shall love" is a yoke as long as it is unpersonalized and a demand which we pass by or resist. But the ideal of the right in love coming from the highest good is freedom when translated into living action. This same duty is the highest formulation that can be given to all social groups and forms and associations in their common purposes and deeds.

The third sphere of love, as duties toward God, is generally omitted in the usual ethics. But if God is the summum bonum, it naturally follows that the acceptance of Him as ideal and end, and the entering upon right as His expression of love, relates us to God. We cannot but have duties and try to fulfill them toward Him, unless we cancel the highest good and the ideal. To love God with our utmost power is only the motive of reaction toward His personality by our personality. The duties toward God are only hard if He is not to us what He wants to be, viz; the liberating personality in whom is the source, the joy and the happiness of our life. This attitude is no mysticism but the moral relationship of our personality toward that of God.

Personality and virtue. What possibilities for the proper interpretation of virtue are there in the fact of personality? As personality is being constantly formed by our determinations,

these naturally fuse into certain stable habits. When the content of the habits answers to the demands of the good, and habits are the crystallization of the right, and the formed actions of duty, we have virtue in its reality. The whole manner of the development of personality tends towards virtue. In the manifold relations of actual life there must be many virtues, all of them expressing the good in habit. The richness and fulness of the life of freedom through personality offers the opportunity for the variety and manifoldness of virtues.

Can personality meet the demands for a unity in this differentiation of virtue? The hedonists had a unity in prudence, but it did not essentially express the deepest nature of virtue, and was insufficient as the explanation of the source of the inner nature of virtue. The rationalists adopted wisdom as the one virtue. Wisdom was higher than prudence, but it also was not the real inner power, nor vital source of the virtues. The ideal of personality is the translation of love as duty into love as virtue. It does not claim that this is the only virtue as the Stoics supposed wisdom to be. But the contention in favor of the personalistic view is, that love can explain the inmost character of virtue and furnish us with an adequate and vital motive for every virtue. Love is ideal in its rationality, effective in its emotion, purposeful in its action. If we take some leading virtues we shall see how love actuates the different virtues. Justice seems far removed from love. But can justice reach its highest perfection without love? The highest justice as a cold

proposition of rendering to every one the right which is due, can become the greatest injustice. The Romans knew this when they said: "Summum jus, summa injuria." It is through the conception of love functioning in justice that the end sought is best attained. Justice without love is without equity, and becomes hard, unbending, and severe to the degree of destroying liberty. Truth does not seem to need love. And yet truth may, like justice, defeat its very end without love. All that is so, is not the same as the virtue of truthfulness. Truthfulness needs the spirit of love to make it a liberating power. No virtue can be named which will not be the more virtue through love as its inner vision, motive, and purpose. Consequently our ideal of personality has the best solution for concrete virtues and habits, whose deepest nature is love.

The historical approach to personality. While personality has been expanded in our discussion beyond its common usage, is it an entirely new proposal? Are there no historic antecedents to lead up to it? Are there no thinkers and philosophers that rest their outlook upon life on some sort of personalism? Long before the idea of personality in its individualistic form gained currency it was upon the threshold of Western thought. Plato sought the solution of moral life through harmony. He strove to balance temperance, courage and wisdom through justice. The idea of the absolute good was to dwell relatively in the whole man. But justice led him to demand the state. And the social was necessary for the completion of justice

through which the harmony of virtues became assured. There is an effort to gain a totality which Plato could not secure, because his highest good was impersonal. Because Plato divided man up, he could not secure adequate unity through the loose connection of virtues in the ideal of harmony. Aristotle saw in the ethical life the functioning of the whole man. He found the real estimate of will. The bridge between the individual and social was constructed upon the conception that ethics was a part of politics, because man was naturally a political animal. But Aristotle failed, as had Plato, not only because he did not find the whole of man through his theory of the middle road, but also, and that mainly, because he widened the gap between the ethical and the intellectual. Aristotle was searching for real personality and could not find it. The first strong impulse came through Christianity. In the modern world Leibniz with his theory of monads sought to solve the problem, but drifted into individualism. A strong appreciation is found in Kant, when he says: "The idea of personality that awakens our veneration, places before our eyes the exaltation of our nature in accordance with its destiny. At the same time it shows us the deficiency of the fitness of our action in view of it, and consequently overthrows self-opinionateness. These facts are naturally and easily observable by the most common human reason."¹³

It is to be regretted that Kant did not develop the idea of personality in its social bearing, but

¹³ Critique of Practical Reason, Part III, par. 27.

this could hardly be expected in his individualistic age. In Goethe's *Faust* we find the struggle of man to find himself through knowledge, love, and power. But the personality, which was for Goethe the end of all human ways, became a mere individualistic cultural attainment. Thus the moral content was lost. Personalism was not without its advocates in later thought. Lotze saw its worth. Bowne was its advocate for many years, and in the University of Southern California personalism has found lodgment.¹⁴ In ethics it has been advocated in its individual form by Charles Gray Shaw and by Henry Wright. The eudaemonism of James Seth is also personalistic. It has been at the background of various other modern positions, and only needs fuller elaboration than has been accorded by a whole group of modern philosophers.¹⁵

Personality and Christianity. What is the attitude of Christianity toward this ideal of personality? Is it favorable or unfavorable? The teaching of Christ came into a world with social divisions. The Greek notion was that of Plato, that society in its best form demanded three classes, the philosophers to govern, the warriors to fight, and, as the lowest class, the laborers to provide food and shelter. The non-Greek world was that of the barbarians. The Romans were either freemen or slaves. The Jewish leaders regarded the Gentile world as beyond the pale, and the common people of the

¹⁴ Cf. The Journal "The Personalist."

¹⁵ Cf. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 284; Hastings, *Cyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. IX, p. 773.

country were looked down upon by Pharisee and Sadducee. The whole mode of appreciation was through classes and by race or nation. Christ taught the supremacy, first of all, of the soul as personality. He said: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"¹⁶ Man as man was rescued from the social enslavement of ancient society. This step was necessary as the beginning of the rescue of personality.

But Christ did not merely save the personality of the individual from the social bondage, but He also gave content to personality through His own life and teaching. He was the incarnate ideal bringing God, the highest good, into concrete and actual human life. From Him came the final interpretation of right character and its influence upon men through the power of His own personality. But He did not stop with this individual power for liberty.

Christ is the representative of mankind. The universal lives in Him, and He is the second Adam, the beginner of a new, spiritual mankind.¹⁷ This socially universal import of Christ gives a genuine value to the moral purpose in His life. The core of freedom was for Him the life in the Father. The highest good was His reality morally. The way to liberty in His life was the way of obedience. His sacrifice became a power for the ethical life, because He showed men that the content of goodness was freedom in God and in God's ways. In the ethical liberation of men the great hindrance was sin.

¹⁶ Mark VIII: 36.

¹⁷ Romans V: 14 ff.

“Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.”¹⁸ From this bondage man must be freed. The way of freedom through Christ is to die to sin.¹⁹ The reverse is the resurrection. A new life must arise²⁰ which is given through the “Son that makes us free.”²¹ The possibility to overcome evil and to grow in righteousness, as permanent life of liberty, has come to the world in Christ. All men can thus attain the character and conduct that is essentially the liberty of the children of God.

Christ, not only thus affects the growth of freedom through new individual personalities, but He also has, as one of His main ideals, the Kingdom of God. While the Kingdom of God may be individually appropriated,²² it is the social ideal of Christ. The Kingdom of God is the society in which the will of God is done. As this will is good and seeks man’s freedom, it is no arbitrary imposition of law, but only an invitation to liberty. And wherever this will enters society it creates the real personality. Vital content is given to social forms and to the associations of men in the ideal of God’s will, the will of the highest good of love. If we take a single instance we shall see how society could become morally personalized through the Kingdom, by means of the unity of the will of God for our freedom. Society places a large emphasis upon the economic need. It makes it the first and controlling interest, and around it

¹⁸ John VIII: 34.

¹⁹ Romans VIII: 10.

²⁰ Romans VIII: 11; VI: 4.

²¹ John VIII: 36.

²² Matthew XIII: 44, 45, 46.

cluster contentions of classes and wars of nations. But when Christ met the economic temptation, as Messiah of His people, He said: "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."²³ The people were not allowed by Him to make Him king because they were filled with bread.²⁴ The economic national temptation did not allure Him. He was no divider of goods²⁵ and no adjuster of material economic conflict. Men were bidden to depart from the prevailing practice of asking: "What shall we eat or What shall we drink? or wherewithal shall we be clothed?"²⁶ The first interest was to be that of the Kingdom of God, and the power of His righteousness²⁷ upon earth. In the parable of the laborers in the vineyard²⁸ there is, beside the spiritual lesson, an economic condition which utterly contradicts the thought of haggling for wages. The men who trust the lord of the vineyard are best off. The bargainers, the seekers after their own returns, lose. But the situation is possible because the lord of the vineyard is good. Business is done not upon the basis of suspicion and outwitting one another, but upon the foundation of the trustworthiness of a good master. The moral implication is a state of society such as we do not have but which would come about in the economic order by the freedom of the ideal of

²³ Matthew IV: 4.

²⁴ John VI: 13, 26.

²⁵ Luke XII: 13 ff.

²⁶ Matthew VI: 31.

²⁷ Matthew VI: 33.

²⁸ Matthew XX: 1 ff.

the Kingdom of God. This ideal would be the personality of economic society found in God's will. It is true that this sort of ethics is not the description of what human nature and conduct is, but what it ought to be and can be if the ideal of personality in its fulness be adopted. Ethics is a normative science²⁹ and must not lose itself in the slough of the present. To depress it to psychology is to make it naturalistic.³⁰ To remain ethics it must be personalistic. Consequently our final definition of ethics is the *science of character and conduct, whose end is the freedom of love through personality.*

²⁹ Cf. above p. 4.

³⁰ This is the fundamental error in such ethics as that of Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*.

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PART III—THE FUNCTIONING OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER X

THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE

Virtues or duties. Approaching to the actual functioning of freedom, and to some of its practical questions, the problem confronts us, whether the point of view shall be that of virtues or duties? Which of the two best express the ideal of personality? In a certain sense they are in the unity of the whole ethical life. Duties must become virtues, and virtues are duties formed into habit.¹ But the accent upon duties even in practical ethics favors the position of the rationalists, and is apt to give a legal and unfree aspect of the moral life. Because we have adopted the conception of the ideal as the best, it is in keeping with our conception to regard the ethical development from the angle of the incorporation of the ideal of freedom through personality. The virtues are the habits through which the good comes to men, and it forms the stable ways in which freedom functions.

Many efforts have been made to properly

¹ Cf. above p. 113.

classify the different virtues, but no effort has been really successful. No scheme has included all possible virtues. The best method is to adopt such a plan as brings to view the leading attitudes and problems in individual and social life. Under this procedure the great virtues will be discussed. Because after all life is a unity no absolute line of demarcation can be drawn. The virtues of individual life will reach over into the common life. The virtues in which freedom in love goes out toward others in the basic social virtues demands the consideration of the individual starting point. The virtues of the social forms have also an individual bearing. When we treat of purity, temperance, courage as individualistic virtues we cannot but see that they affect others also. Truthfulness is a virtue in relation to others, but it also has an individual meaning in the ethical life. Justice is the outstanding virtue of the state, but it is likewise an other-regarding virtue from man to man. Consequently as we study the undivided life of freedom, and its outgoings in love, and the social life we shall see some virtues in different light as freedom applies differently in individual and social life.

Is the ethical life a pure development? A fundamental question in individual and common moral life is, whether this life unfolds in an unhampered, natural manner? Do we pass from freedom to freedom in love? The prevalence of the ideas of evolution has led many to look upon the growth of the moral life as a mere problem of how conduct in relation to society became more differentiated and more

complex. But the development of freedom is not a simple upward curve with no depression. It is rather a rise and a fall with some upward tendency. Moral life like all life is a conflict. The world of sense and of things that appeal to sense needs some limitation. Things cannot be followed implicitly and without question. There must be control, as will appear especially in the virtue of temperance. While repression must not be final it is in part essential. Not all that physical life offers can be accepted without qualification. But the problem lies deeper than the mere restriction of the sentient life. There is a tendency of man not to follow the good, but to choose the evil. In the whole life there is a doubleness. Opposed to the striving upward are forces that would drag us down. These are not merely due to our sentient and bodily life. The animal nature is not the only source that may lead us wrong. There are mental wrongs and vices, like pride, prejudice, selfish ambition, etc., that can not be ascribed to the physical life.

The Christian explanation is that man is prone to sin, the transgression of the law of liberty, through selfishness. This is not the soul clinging merely to earth;² it is the soul gone wrong in itself. For this cause Christ has a moral value for us through His death. Paul notes a great contrast between "the flesh" and "the spirit." The flesh is not the animal nature as such. It is all, both physical and mental, that stands opposed to the life of the spirit. The contrast is not metaphysical but

² Goethe held to this naturalistic view.

religious and moral. It is a great oversight in the usual philosophical ethics, when this fact is passed by. We cannot understand the positive and constructive part of ethical life, if we disregard the overcoming of the evil. Even when our moral development is strongly directed toward the good its maintenance always necessitates the suppression of wrong and evil.

The power of a cause. Can the individual life thrive if it remains within itself? Does its liberty mean a life given only to its own care, comfort and interest? To live only for oneself and within oneself is not to live a real life. Even our own development is thwarted if we do not look beyond ourselves. No single life is self-sufficient. Its sources will dry up unless they flow out beyond the self. To live in the self alone is to die. This truth, observable in the physical world and in nature, is doubly true in the ethical life. It is Christ who has stressed this truth for all times, when He said: "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it, but whosoever shall lose his life—the same shall save it."³

The individual life needs attachment not only to other lives, but above all to some great cause. We must lose ourselves in the effort to establish some ideal which is larger than we. Liberty comes through the enlargement of life in a great cause. We may work for some philanthropy; we may give ourselves to establishing liberty for the oppressed of any sort; we may dwell upon some moral reform; we may live for some religious task;—in all of these

³ Mark 8: 35.

possible causes we grow ourselves. Liberating others, and being absorbed in a vital idealism, we become more free ourselves.

These freely chosen attachments develop in us the virtue of *loyalty*. Royce thought that he could make all moral life the outgrowth of loyalty.⁴ But he overstated the case and in his Hegelian universalism lost other values. Nevertheless loyalty is valuable as the free choice by which we bind ourselves to be true and faithful to a chosen cause, institution or friend.⁵ It is a bondage only when our loyalty neglects to observe justice and truth in a cause. If I defend the interest of wrongly limited labor, as I suppose, and then use every sort of means fair or unfair, and approve of every action just or unjust, as long as labor is helped, I am surrendering justice and liberty. Such an attitude makes a good cause bad. My loyalties must be morally justifiable. The same is true if my loyalty is given to an institution or a friend. If my loyalty to my college, which I have chosen, leads me to overlook what is defective in it, and to defend even its wrong actions, I enslave myself and morally degrade myself. My loyalty should help me to remedy the evil, but not to stand by and destroy the value of loyalty through criticism. The church to which I belong may take a wrong course. It is not right for me to say, "My church right or wrong," as some men do with their country. It is my church to aid in making it right if it be wrong. But the remedy

⁴ Cf. *Philosophy of Loyalty*.

⁵ Loyalty may also extend to ideals, like, e. g., truth.

does not lie in denying the loyalty by idle and destructive criticism. My friendship for someone ought to move me to cover up the faults of my friend and help him to overcome them; but not to glorify them as virtues.

The virtue of loyalty needs as a counterbalance the virtue of *tolerance*. Tolerance is an individual as well as a social virtue. It allows to others the same right and choice of loyalties as I claim for myself. The heart of tolerance is the willingness to permit others to have attachments to causes and to truths that differ from my own. It is not indifference to my convictions or loyalty, or surrender of any position to which I adhere, but the granting of liberty of conviction and loyalty to all men. Tolerance must not be accepted merely as a sad but necessary condition in society, which in our judgment would be better if all men believed and did as we do. Through it liberty must be preserved for all in their opinions, attachments and convictions. Intolerance exists in all the spheres of life where men would enforce loyalty to secure uniformity, rather than to allow differences for the sake of freedom.

Freedom and vocation. How can freedom and an orderly course of life in a vocation be combined? If freedom meant ever new and disconnected choices, if it implied a series of unrelated, arbitrary decisions, then the ordered course of life in a vocation would be out of the question. But the real liberty of man morally is only found in a regulated life with its acceptance of one great unitary purpose, to which

man knows and feels himself called. There may exist a number of minor occupations in a life that forms its avocations as a diversion from the main aim of the vocation. But the avocations dare not crowd out the vocation. Only where we find ourselves in a place of work and endeavor, freely chosen, can we unfold our life and grow in every direction. Without this development there can be no unfolding of personality within us. The way of freedom is the way of the vocation that we make our own.

But is the mere selection of a place to fill in the world sufficient? Must we not inquire into the moral character of a vocation, and try to work out its ethical obligations? Freedom cannot exist where personality suffers either through immoral or unmoral practices and conditions in a vocation. It is self-evident that all kinds of activity which are considered criminal, or which violate the law of liberty in society, are no vocations in the true sense. Every one must also examine the manner in which a vocation is carried on. The best callings can be prostituted by wrong purposes and actions. There is no greater danger to the moral life than the constant and subtle power of the perversion of the standards of justice, truth, honesty, etc., through legally unpunishable but nevertheless ethically destructive actions. There can be no genuine ethical life under such conditions. A single transgression, however great, is often far less evil than a whole life of questionable vocational practices.

But are there not differences in vocations, not of a social kind, but of a moral? While

many occupations can be carried on honestly according to general maxims, there are some which offer moral difficulties in themselves. When our country had not yet passed the Volstead Act the selling of spirituous liquors was not an occupation that could be altogether defended. The dealer in liquor might have been careful and straightforward in his business; but still was he not catering to a want, that even under limitations, produced much evil, and led men to unfree habits of indulgence dangerous to themselves and to society? There are a number of occupations dealing with the amusement of men that need moral examination. While not all people can find recreation and be amused by high, intellectual pleasures of literature and art, but need less cultivated amusements of the senses, it is still true, that there are thousands spending lives that cater to what is merely sentient to the downward level of the sensual, the degrading and impure in certain types of vaudeville, music and dances. All taste and morals are lowered for the individual and society through the abuse of giving a life to such indiscriminate practices of entertainment as invalidate the liberty in the pure, noble and good.

But there are other vocations rightly so-called that have not yet been moralized. Many practices that are traditional in some kinds of business cannot stand the test of a vital moral standard. As an example we can direct attention to all of the occupations that center upon money, securities, investments, and find a focus in the great exchanges of stock or produce.

Unnatural values are created by speculation, corners in products are established, stocks are depressed with the purpose of gaining control of a corporation, and other similar practices are indulged in, which are unmoralized actions not rejected by those in the business. It is an interesting historical fact, which ought to make us thoughtful, that some of the great thinkers and leaders of the world have questioned the right of taking interest. Aristotle contended that money was non-productive and only a medium of exchange. Luther held that there was injustice in taking interest according to the New Testament. He saw an inequality in the risk assumed by the borrower alone. Ruskin and Morris with their ideals of a better social order rejected interest. Perhaps some of the arguments of these thinkers are not tenable, but they indicate, what is felt very acutely today; namely, that the whole practice in dealing with money is largely unmoralized, and needs real moral standards to make it a vocation that is truly ethical.

In the problem of the vocation the question may be asked, whether all occupations, that are not inherently objectionable, cannot be improved by the professional outlook? Is not the profession the highest type of vocation in the moral sense? Says Tawney⁶ who thinks that industry should be turned into a profession, "A Profession may be defined most simply as a trade which is organized, incompletely, no doubt, but genuinely, for the performance of function. It is not simply a collection of indi-

⁶ The Acquisitive Society, p. 92.

viduals who get a living for themselves by the same kind of work. Nor is it merely a group which is organized exclusively for the economic protection of its members, though that is normally among its purposes. It is a body of men who carry on their work in accordance with rules designed to enforce certain standards both for the better protection of its members and for the better service of the public." These ends rest upon an ethical foundation. It is not merely the technical knowledge required in a profession, the free use of the intellect, and the individual independence, that make a profession, but above all the moral motive. The three well-known professions illustrate this fact. The interest of law, rightly conceived and practiced, is to uphold justice; the aim of medicine is to use every means to make the physical life sound and to save it; the purpose of the ministry is to aid in making men good through the power of religion. These professions were the first to frame codes of ethics to maintain the standard of their profession, and to keep it regulated by moral and humanitarian ends.⁷ All the occupations of men must seek this attitude. Other groups like engineers, newspaper men, etc. are coming to frame codes. We must raise all kinds of work to a real moral value by making it a profession in spirit and attitude.

What shall guide us in the choice of a profession or a vocation in life? Many persons choose their permanent labor in the world in a

⁷ Cf. James Mickel Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, p. 225 ff.

very careless manner. They do not bring to bear upon it any moral considerations. We ought not to be led into a vocation simply through family traditions, although the continuity of some great work has been assured in the world where men have followed the vocation of their fathers. Nevertheless the traditional aspect dare not be controlling if real liberty that makes a man's vocation his own moral choice is to be upheld. Gain and income are totally unmoral motives and may become immoral in the determination of our life's work. We ought to begin with as careful a testing of our capacities as is possible through modern and scientific means. Then some value must be given to the disinterested advice of parents, teachers, and elders. But the real end of the choice is given in the Christian idea. According to this, men ought to seek that vocation in which their own highest self-fulfillment is joined to the best service they can render to mankind. The good is personal and common liberty in love. And then finally the religious conception finds its apex in the ideal of seeking the glory of God in all of the work and the tasks of our life. With this as the final directive the moral fulfillment of a vocation reaches its height.

Work and freedom. The choice of a vocation leads to the moral side of work. Does human labor conduce to moral development and freedom, or is it a burdensome necessity that we cannot escape from? In labor and by work we may suffer and feel restrained unless we use it joyfully, as the opportunity through

which we can express ourselves. Wherever work is accepted as the chance for the functioning of all that is in us it is liberating. We master and overcome the things about us in labor and make them serviceable for mankind. We conquer the forces of nature and make ourselves more free in a world of laws. Our life goes out when we touch human lives to help them to greater liberty. If we do spend ourselves in our tasks we do not lose ourselves, but gain control over our own powers. For this reason work is moral and idleness immoral. But we can make work oppressive and enslaving so that it loses its power to moralize us. When men labor to such an extreme that their work becomes their master, driving them to ever more intense exertion and filling them with cares and worries, they abuse work. Work needs play to keep it sound. For this reason play is a moral factor for the health of work, and the maintenance of man's liberty in his labor.

There are three groups of men who fail in moralizing work. The first consists of those who want to labor hard and successfully and severely for a short period, in order that they may obtain means to spend the rest of their lives in the enjoyment of idleness and pleasure. It is not well-deserved rest after long years that they intend to have; but they seek to throw off work in middle life, because they have accepted it as a necessary evil to be cast aside as soon as possible. The second group are willing to bow under the yoke of labor all their lives, and endure its hardships, so that their

children may not be compelled to labor. With a wrong conception of what they owe their posterity, they enslave themselves, and create for their children conditions which are not really liberating, but lead into many temptations and into much evil. The third group, which is the largest, attempts to escape from the tasks of life by seeking returns through the games of chance without labor. There is, it is true, a risk and a dealing in uncertain futures in many occupations in life. But these chances are incident to work and do not displace it. But gambling is immoral, not because in the long run men lose and fail in it, but for the reason that it fastens itself on human life like an unquenchable desire. Men lose the power over themselves and become thoroughly unreasonable, destroying their lives through indulgence in the fascination of chance. Whatever is temporarily gained through gambling has an immoral effect, because the money obtained is not moralized through the self-expression of man in labor.

What should be the end of work? The common notion too often followed is, that the purpose of work is to secure money. As far as money is necessary for living it is just to look to it. But when it is pursued for the sake of itself, or for power, it demoralizes men. The increase of returns hoped for in itself produces attachment to wealth as such. Among the most severe warnings of Christ are those against the insidious influence of wealth as Mammon.⁸ The end of work is for the sake

⁸ Matthew VI: 24.

of life, and secondarily for the sake of living.

What right has the individual to his earnings? Are they absolute? All that any one honestly secures as the result of work possesses the character of his personality. Property is the right of a man to his own. It expresses a certain security and a certain economic freedom, through which the individual and his immediate family have the opportunity of an enlarged life. Individual property became important when men began to have more rights as separate from their tribe. In the modern world individual possessions meant freedom as against the mediaeval tenure of land. Early individualism in property was liberating. But are the conditions the same in the present industrial world? Is the sacredness of private property final? There has been an increasing conviction that unrestrained individualism has worked to the loss of the liberty of many men through the increase of the power of a few. The reason why all sorts of socialistic ideas have gained a hearing, is the evil which has attended the use of property in great amounts by mere individualists of property. The attacks have been partly just and partly unjust. "But, however varying in emphasis and method, the general note of what may conveniently be called the Socialist criticism of property is what the word Socialism itself implies. Its essence is the statement that the economic evils of society are primarily due to the unregulated operation, under modern conditions of industrial organization, of the institution of

private property.”⁹ This claim is overstated. But its truth is the abuse of individual rights in property. Excessive individualism is forcing socialism upon the world, and with it a restriction of what man has a right to have and hold in the interest of his liberty of life. The common liberty has been injured and society is seeking redress. It must not be forgotten that the safety of property and its title rest upon the will of society. The Christian ideal is against the absolute right of property. All men are considered stewards of what God has given them. He is the owner finally and not men. They are only the administrators and must give account of what has been entrusted to them. Men are to use what they have for the common good and for the praise of God. This is no defense of individualism in the use of property. It may be individually owned for a time, but it ought to be used socially.

The virtues which are connected with work are accuracy, care, patience, purposefulness. We ought to use what we obtain with *thrift*, which is the proper care of our own without waste, and with frugality. The latter is opposed to a luxurious life. The virtue of *generosity* as a fundamental attitude becomes *liberality* in distributing of our own. It is largess in giving. The virtue which ought to be the proper response to generous giving is *gratitude*.

The bodily life. What are the moral problems that are related to our bodily life? Because we do not reject the physical as in itself

⁹ Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 53.

evil we must endeavor to meet the question how the physical life, which in itself is neutral, can be moralized. All the functionings of our body have laws that make for health and well-being. Our first positive group of virtues must be those, like cleanliness, purity, etc. They can only rest upon a right knowledge and understanding of what our body is and means for us. We should train ourselves in those habits of right, sane care of the body, which enable us best to use it and control it, instead of being hemmed in and limited by it, because we have disregarded and abused it. The full development of the body through proper culture and exercise is not merely a physical necessity, it ought to be a virtue. The neglect of the body is as bad as its abuse. No interest in the growth of our mind can excuse ethically the overlooking of our bodily life. But the overtraining of the body, and the emphasis upon the kind of exercise, especially through athletics, that makes the body suffer without cause, is an aberration of a right attitude toward the physical.

The positive value of the body demands as the first great virtue the attitude of control and restraint embodied in *temperance*. Temperance means moderation and limitation in food and drink. This is its primal definition. The desire for food to remain healthy, and to answer the demands of hunger, needs the habit of control. When men simply follow the suggestions of appetite which is often unnaturally developed, without reason and consideration, they become creatures of their stomach. Then

they gorge themselves with a dozen different kinds of food, that tickle the palate and satisfy abnormal taste, so that they may experience the feeling of comfortable distention.¹⁰ They live to eat instead of eating to live. Temperance is the virtue that overcomes such an abuse of food.

When we approach the *problem of drink*, which is really the problem of drinking intoxicating liquors, temperance is not attained by mere moderation. The terrible results of alcoholism, its disorganizing effects upon men, its power to undermine all self-control and liberty, its result of making men silly and irresponsible, its destructive consequences upon society—all of these and many other evil consequences should lead a rational being like man to interpret temperance in drink as prohibition. Even the moderate users suffer, and encourage those who destroy themselves and their homes through drink. The unnatural desire of today for drink, helped by the nervous strain of the age, is threatening to overthrow all order and law for mere gratification of unregulated thirst. The Christian attitude is the willingness to abstain if any one suffers through our apparent liberty.¹¹ The claim that the right to drink is individual liberty, degrades liberty to the privilege of indulging desire, no matter what the results. Such a conception of liberty is in essence moral anarchism, and leads to individual and social dissolution if consistently applied.

¹⁰ Cf. Hyde, *The College Man and the College Woman*, p. 68 ff.

¹¹ *Romans XIV: 14 ff.*

But temperance has a wider application than the question of food and drink. The problem of drink leads to the examination of the use of *stimulants* in human life. What ought to be our habits in reference to tea, coffee, tobacco, etc.? Whenever mild stimulants are physically beneficial, or at least not distinctly harmful, they may be used. But we ought to be willing to subject every habit that we are about to form to a fair test, and not merely follow the crowd. Some habits are positively destructive. Among these is the use of drugs and narcotics, which break down life completely for the sake of a brief intoxication of dreams and sense delights. The use of tobacco should be far more limited especially in the years of growth, and in many lives ought to be avoided altogether. The wrong consists in so forming a habit in the use of stimulants that we are under their dominance. Any one who cannot resist a stimulant, and has lost control over it, has surrendered his freedom to his desire. The essential evil in using any stimulant is our subjection to habit. If we cannot at any time give up a stimulant we are unfree.

In the usual restricted sense temperance does not apply to the control of *individual sex-life*, but in a wider application the morals of sex belong to it. With it are connected the related virtues of purity, modesty, and shame. *Purity* is the attitude of mind which controls thoughts, words and acts, so that they are clean. It makes sex a sacred trust of nature given to us, but not an opportunity for indulgent imagination and passion. *Modesty* may be restraint

of our whole demeanor in life, but it is specifically the control of dress and manners in the direction of the privacy of our sex-life, and the avoidance of everything that leads to the seductiveness and allurements of sex.¹² *Shame* can be a reaction of guilt after we have committed the sexually immodest and wrong act. But it can also be a preventative virtue through which we recognize the protection of the physical. Animals have no shame. Shame is the testimony of the rise of human, rational nature above the animal world.¹³ But we can turn all of these virtues into vices by simply abandoning ourselves to the fact of sex without governing it. Then we are liable to sink below the animal because we dwell with prurient delight upon the desires of sex, and allow them to hold our mind and life captive.

Before marriage temperance in sex means abstention from all sex-relation. There is a very erroneous opinion secretly handed on, and sometimes encouraged by physicians, that sex-hunger like all hunger ought to have its legitimate satisfaction. This position is strengthened today by the theories of Freud, which identify sex with the subconscious. Repression of sex is almost made a danger directly or indirectly through this theory. In order to prevent the spread of sexual disease there has been public recommendation of preventative medicine. While the intention of such a governmental measure is honest, the result is to increase

¹² The moral problem of the dance is whether it arouses passion. Its dangers are very much multiplied in the dance hall with its promiscuous crowd.

¹³ Cf. Solovyof, *The Justification of the Good*, p. 26 ff.

indulgence in sex gratification. The whole subject of sex has been too prominent in discussion. It is right that the wrong ideas so often handed on in the secret and frequently vile communications from youth to youth should be met. But the way is that of legitimate, wise and tactful education, and not indiscriminate publication. A former age may have been prudish, but we are too brutally frank. Thus we injure the finer virtues, and destroy the protection which culture has erected in the interest of purity. We make the sacredness of sex an interesting subject.

The other great virtue which begins in the bodily life is *courage*. Courage is not the unreasoning braving of danger, and the unthinking assumption of risk of life. It knows the danger and the risk and is willing to incur it for the sake of the good. Simply to throw oneself in the way of danger and to gamble with one's life is foolhardiness. But the legitimate undergoing of danger with a resolute will is courage. There are gradations of courage. It began to be estimated, first of all, in the unsettled, primitive conditions and in war. But this kind of courage ought to pass away. The glorification of courage in war still receives too much praise as though it were the best type. A higher kind of courage is that displayed by discoverers, who incur great risks in the interest of science and for humanity. But the relative value of risk in relation to the good must be considered. Peary and Shackleton displayed as much courage in their efforts in polar expeditions, as did Livingstone and Stanley in entering the jungles

of Africa. But the latter had a higher moral motive and result. The saving of an endangered life by a quick, impulsive act of courage is very noble. But even greater is the quiet, sustained effort to help men, whether by dangerous experiment in the laboratory, or by attendance upon cases that involve great risk, and all similar instances. There is no applause to be gained, and no heroic light about such actions. Courage can go beyond bodily risk when it becomes moral courage, which fearlessly stands for truth, and seeks no glamor of approval.

The mental life. Is there any need to speak and treat of the moralizing of the mind? Is not the relation far removed from the temptations of the body? If rationalism were the solution of the moral problem, then to be reasonable would mean to be good. But the two are not synonymous.¹⁴ All the operations of our mind must be fused into the freedom of personality. The virtue through which we grasp ourselves in our moral worth and dignity is the virtue of honor. *Honor* is the right self-estimation by which we do the noble and good acts, and do not dare to soil ourselves with anything unworthy of our character. It must be valued as the protection of our free character, and ought never degenerate into pride. *Pride*, mostly attended by boastfulness, is to glory in ourselves; but our honor is not so much our merit and glory as a precious possession and trust to be jealously guarded and preserved. It ought always to be counterbalanced by *humility*. In the ancient world *humility* was regarded as

¹⁴ Cf. above, Chapter VIII.

weakness and meanness. Aristotle praises the high-minded man,¹⁵ who carries himself with a conscious sense of his dignity and with a just pride. But Christianity has taught us, that in view of the greatness and illimitableness of truth, and because of our imperfection even when we are at our best, we need to remain conscious of our short-comings, failures and defects. Humility is not the destruction of right self-confidence and just self-assurance, but the opposite to pride with its untrue and exaggerated estimate of the self. Diffidence is not synonymous with humility. The humble mind knows its worth, but as it has an infinite ideal of truth and goodness it realizes its own place. The mind in search of science must be careful, accurate, honest and sincere. Honesty and sincerity in seeking the truth, and in directing our purposes are as essential as honor and humility. Their lack destroys the opportunity of learning more and more of the truth through the attitude of open-mindedness. And as truth makes us free, it follows that whatever hinders the truth hinders our freedom, and whatever allows the approach of truth and new truth aids our liberty.

The life of the mind can also be moralized by a right *appreciation of art*. The truly beautiful favors the increase of the good. Aristotle held that the beautiful had a purifying power. Through the beautiful Plato reached up to the idea of the absolutely beautiful. Art can cleanse us, if it is pure in intent and execu-

¹⁵ Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, 3, p. 213 ff.

tion. The sense of the beautiful does lift us up to God. There is a marvelous power for good in the enjoyment of the glory and beauty of nature. In its presence we become calm and free when we look up to the shining stars, or look out upon the colors of sunrise and sunset. The green fields and towering hills, the fragrance and varied color of the flowers, the many-colored plumage of the birds and their songs, the wonderful arches of the trees, the brightness of the day and the shadows of the night,—all these and many other phenomena of nature are rich in power to uplift and liberate. When man uses art he can awaken all that is good, or he can prostitute art to evil. There has been a tendency in modern art to degenerate into a realism that dwells in the mean and ugly. It often glorifies the passion of sex as right in its vile naturalism. Art must be delivered from this trend to be really good. Not all that exists can be the subject of art, if art is to liberate man and to aid in unfolding his character.

The power over life. If we assume that we are free is not our life in our control? We can sustain and keep it, and we can ruin it. Do we possess the right to end it when we please? Is suicide morally justifiable? We must of course exclude all those cases of suicide which are caused by disease. It is necessary to examine with care into the responsibility of those who commit suicide. But where the indications are, that suicide has been deliberate, what shall be our estimate? Hume¹⁶ argued that we have

¹⁶ Essay "Of Suicide."

the liberty to take our lives because it is in our power. As God has not restrained us physically from taking our own life, thus thinks Hume, He virtually allows us to take it if we see fit to do so. Therefore we have no binding command from God. If we become useless to our relatives and friends we relieve them by our suicide, continues Hume. Finally he contends, that if we no longer have the desire to live, and if our lives seem to be of no value we can end them. But this whole argument confuses the formal liberty with the moral right. We owe our lives to God, and destruction is the abandonment of the entrusted good. We may be a burden to our own, but part of life consists in bearing each others' burdens, so that the spirit of love may increase under trial. We may see no use of an active kind in our life, but suffering often perfects men, and leads them to a noble freedom of soul. The manner in which we bear ills in a spirit of patience and cheerfulness, instead of attempting to escape from them, is an incitement to others. Sufferers can be a great moral asset in the development of the finer and kindlier qualities of life. It is a terrible thing when an evil life ends in suicide. The motives are cowardice and despair. When men are unwilling to take upon themselves the punishment of their evil deeds, they cannot be rescued through a spirit of repentance. If they commit suicide they may get away from visible punishment, but religion holds that there is no real escape. The atheistic attitude alone can counsel suicide.

The question sometimes arises whether there are not peculiar conditions that justify us in ending our life? If a young woman is attacked and is liable to be outraged shall she, if it be possible, take her life to save her purity? There is no moral guilt in anything to which one is forced. Therefore the young woman in such a case ought to struggle and seek to save her life. Of course awful conditions may temporarily craze the mind, and then despair leads to death. Was Themistocles justified in killing himself rather than harming his country by betraying it to the Persians? Can we exonerate Frederick the Great, because in the Seven Years' War he always carried poison with him, which he intended to take, if the enemy at any time should capture him? All of these attitudes caused by war are not justifiable. They endeavor to change the fortunes of war by an act that seems patriotic, but is cowardly and deceptive. War destroys morals and glorifies deception; consequently men have been willing to condone and even praise such acts under the perverted moral standards of war. But a real morality cannot excuse them even if it can understand them.

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CHAPTER XI

BASIC SOCIAL VIRTUES

The kindly virtues. If we begin to look over the whole range of virtues which affect our relations to each other, with what group shall we open? It is clear that the law of liberty being love, the virtues which most directly express it as establishing freedom, ought to be fundamental. The unity of love is differentiated into various forms and is found in different habits of the good. Of these *kindness* marks a disposition and attitude through which we deal with men in a spirit of winning love. Kindness is the virtue that regards all others as objects of quiet and considerate affection. It seeks to smooth the rough ways of life and to bind men together in the little exasperations of life. Through it words and deeds take on the character of helpfulness by creating the atmosphere in which love can live. If manners are to be genuine and honest they must be moved by kindness. Because life is lived from day to day in the single, and often apparently small, words and deeds we need the habit of kindness to transfigure and make it large and free. Closely connected with kindness is *gentleness*. Gentleness is opposed to wrath and quick anger. It is the disposition in which under provocation we do not lose our temper, but deal

in all situations with men as those to whom we owe a soft answer and a kindly act. Through it we accustom ourselves to allay threatening storms and to prevent outbreaks of passion that result in hatred. Gentleness is the great preventative virtue in human intercourse, and it keeps life sweet and free. Kindness and gentleness were not unknown and unrecognized in the ancient world. But with the advent of Christianity two other virtues arose which belong to the same group as kindness and gentleness. The first virtue is *meekness*. The opposite of meekness is forcefulness which overcomes and subdues. The meek mind would rather resign all rights than to obtain them by suppression and force. It wins its way by apparent withdrawal from conflicts between men. No one will be pushed to the wall through it, because it will not use strength to fight down others. It is not too proud to fight but it is too good and gentle. Silently and quietly it wins men. Christ promises that the meek shall finally rule the earth.¹ Meekness when genuine is not an assumed inferiority, nor a pretensive humility, but rather an expression of the love that bears and hopes all things. Connected with it as the second outstanding virtue is the attitude of *non-resistance*. This is meekness that suffers and does not strike back. It denies that combativeness is necessary among men. To overcome the evil it turns the left cheek when the right has been smitten. Such action is not the outcome of weakness and cowardice but of self-controlled strength and courage. The real

¹ Matthew V: 5.

virtue of non-resistance is the habit of not returning evil for evil, but to suffer it. The suffering, when retaliation is possible, is borne to win the opponent, and to establish the good among men even if it must be at a loss and with pain.

All of these virtues have been severely attacked by the modern philosopher Nietzsche. In the interest of power and physical prowess the philosopher of the superman rejects all those qualities which are contrary to struggle and force. He thinks that the weak have given men in Christianity a self-protective morality of the decadent. Life is energy and power. Nietzsche has boldly expressed the modern temper of force and power of man as against man. He argues for a realistic world of contest and fight. But whither has this kind of a world led us? What have been the results of the practice of force in economic life, in political problems, and in international relations? A world and a society torn apart by bitterness and hatred. The stronger always stands ready to overcome and defeat the strong. Battle is followed by battle, strike succeeds strike, and the end is not in view. The use of force is making a miserable and sad world which is destroying itself physically, economically and politically. The virtues of kindness, gentleness, meekness, non-resistance have been called impracticable. They are so in the present world of force. But the present world of force is demonstrating that it cannot liberate but only destroy society.² Is force

² Cf. Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*.

really practicable because men practice force? As the results show that force is not succeeding, ethics recommends to men to become reasonable and adopt the kindly attitude, which is only unreasonable in a world controlled by evil passions.

The actualities of life and our common experience lead us to the recognition of the fact, that we often fail to reach the ideal. It is true that in many things we all offend. Love expresses itself in certain healing virtues that do not condone the wrong, but seek to win men for the right. There are particularly two attitudes of love toward the wrong, mercifulness and the forgiving spirit. *Mercy* seeks to stoop down in gentle graciousness to those on evil ways who have done the wicked deeds. It does not come with any air of superiority, nor does it exhibit a patronizing spirit. Entering with sympathy upon the difficulties and temptations of a life mercy strives to effect a change which mere requital and harsh justice cannot bring.³ In opposition to the uncompromising attitude of relentless condemnation and judgment it seeks betterment of men and society through the effort to cure and help those who have gone wrong. Mercy is forgiving. *Forgiveness* is the virtue through which the general disposition of mercy enters upon the individual faults and sins. According to Christ there can be no end⁴ to our willingness to forgive if we are not to forfeit divine mercy. But forgiveness is not

³ Cf. Portia's description of mercy in Shylock.

⁴ Cf. Matthew XVIII: 21 ff.

merely the temporary expression of release over against one that has done us wrong. It deals with individual acts but all its separate cases of forgiving are the outcome of a willingness to do so. The memory of a wrong cannot be effaced, but it dare not be nursed and harbored. There are certain conditions that enter into forgiveness and mercy. Forgiveness can do positive harm if it becomes a quick and unquestioning cancellation of wrong. An illustration of this error is found in the attitude of parents who are so sentimental about their children that, in their ready condoning of a child's sin, they strengthen the child in the wrong because the forgiveness is so easy. There must be clear evidence that the wrong is recognized, repented of, and rejected in the will, if forgiveness is to be bestowed upon a wrongdoer. As far as possible the assurance must be obtained that forgiveness is sought not to escape the consequences of a deed, but out of a real sense of the evil in a deed. A second condition in forgiving others, is that their wrong affects us alone. If the sin goes beyond us and has disturbed the moral order widely we have no right to forgive individually a wrong that must be righted in the common life. When a wave of criminality sweeps over a land I may be disposed very mercifully toward some one, who has committed a crime against me. Nevertheless I dare not for the common good hide such a deed. Common liberty and order demand that such a wrong shall be punished. If the criminal is really repentant he is willing to undergo the punishment, and to get into a new attitude of

life by having satisfied the moral rectification in society. Forgiveness must never degenerate into sentimental disregard of the wrong, but it should only counteract a spirit of hate and revenge. Its end is to heal men and society and to re-establish right and justice.

One of the constant questions in the application of love to life is that of *charity*. There is a very old and persistent notion that charity is identical with giving alms. Men supposed that the bestowing of alms not only helped the needy one, but also laid up merit for the giver. Because of the idea of merit, no matter what the effect of the charity, it became harmful rather than helpful. After the conception of thoughtful and organized charity was given to the world by Chalmers a new era began. We have learnt that the giving of aid is the least that can be done. The right purpose of charity is to try to make it unnecessary by overcoming its causes. There must be careful knowledge to avoid creating pauperism, and encouraging vagabondage and trampdom. But the whole problem is not solved by the organized method which is necessary for society. Into it must enter the direct interest and care of the poor, needy and neglected, by individual work. We cannot delegate charity simply to organization. Often the greatest benefit, namely, the personal touch, is lost in the official machinery of charity. The poor resent being treated like cases. If charity is to liberate it must come from a motive to develop character. The sphere of charity covers all the good that can be done wherever good is needed by any one in distress. There

is a danger in our day of making charity a substitute for justice. Men of great riches organize it as a business. While such work meets some of the great needs of the world it ought not to become a sport of wealth, or close our eyes to the examination of the sources of wealth and their moral justification because wealth has become charitable.

In the ancient world *friendship* was given a large place in ethics. Aristotle devotes more space to it than to any other virtue. Under it he includes love and its various manifestations. Friendship was the great social virtue. Since Christianity taught us to put the emphasis upon love friendship has taken a secondary place. It is not extended so much to attitudes between groups, as to the relation between individuals. But it is still of high moralizing value. The foundation of friendship must rest upon honesty and sincerity between friends, and a common purpose in life. Some worthwhile cause or ideal must unite real friends. The mere social attraction is inadequate. Friendship requires difference of individuality, but not too great a disparity. Friends must find in each other complementary qualities. The social standing and rank does not debar friendship especially among the young, when friendships that last are most often formed. Nevertheless there cannot be too great a social cleft between friends. With the better estimation of woman friendship can exist between those of different sex, although it has been most helpful between those of the same sex. A friend stands for a friend, defends him, speaks well of him, and without

any selfish purpose aids him in his moral unfolding. The best types of a tender and fine friendship are found in the stories of Jonathan and David, and of Damon and Pythias.

In the modern world there has arisen an organized form of friendship in *fraternities*. If men unite for some beneficial and social end, and use their being together for the satisfaction of mutual helpfulness or sociability, there is a moral aid to be derived. But whenever a common association encourages modes of initiation and enjoins secrecy by oath in imitation of the ceremonies for adolescents in the lower tribes it perpetuates unnecessary lower social attitudes that do not advance modern life morally. Wherever the sociability behind closed doors becomes immoral, or wherever association becomes a destructive political or a persecuting agency, all moral right of existence has been forfeited. The life of fraternities is inimical to democracy when it develops snobbishness or separatism among larger groups. It is equally a prostitution of the right purpose of a fraternity, if it exalts philanthropism to take the place of religion, or develops a certain kind of indefinite, universalistic faith that acts as a substitute for historic religion. Those that make fraternities a religion deceive themselves, and do not find the satisfaction, either in mysticism or ethics, which a real world-religion offers. Christianity with its claim for finality cannot legitimately suffer any inferior substitute, that fails in making Christ all-controlling and does not ask for love without restriction.

Truth and freedom. What makes truth so

important in the moral life? Wherefore is it basic? If we stop but a moment to consider what truth does we shall readily find an answer. Any kind of real truth has in it a power of deliverance from ignorance and error. Ignorance and error keep man from freedom. Truth as overcoming them bears within itself the power to free men. Christ has well stressed this in relation to spiritual truth, when He says: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."⁵ But the freeing energy of

⁵ John VIII: 32.

truth is apparent in every kind of truth, scientific, literary, artistic, social, moral, and religious. For this reason society needs truth to live together rightly and freely. Truth begets the confidence between men without which they cannot lead a common life. Our words and actions are the forces that either bind us together or rend us asunder. We can be united in an assured and reliable social life only where truth obtains. Without it no business, no commerce, and no industry can thrive. It lies at the foundation of all intercourse in work or social life. The destruction of truth, therefore, affects not merely our own lives, but also the possibility of a trustworthy common, human life.

The virtue which is most intimately connected with truth is *wisdom*. Wisdom is truth in solution. The great mistake of the rationalists is to make wisdom purely intellectual. Its knowledge is the living and practical knowledge that needs both emotion and volition besides intellect. The amount of knowledge of a tech-

nical sort does not insure wisdom. There are a great many learned fools who miss the substance of life. Wisdom is the full, rounded virtue in which the truth of the living moral relations of man, and his spiritual import, is preserved. It is more than calculating prudence. What is right in *prudence* receives a higher worth in wisdom, which has a strong aggressive motive, and is not hampered by the timidity and time-serving attitude of prudential considerations. *Tactfulness* is a child of wisdom, as well as sound, moral common sense. But both of these receive a depth and impetus through wisdom, which they do not possess of themselves.

The way of truth is not at all times simple and easy. There arise conflicts in conditions and situations which put us to the test, as to *whether truth is always possible*. If, e. g., I am put in trust of certain securities, and this fact becoming known to a burglar, I am confronted with a pistol, and asked to reveal the whereabouts of the securities, what shall I do? Is it best to tell the truth and betray my trust, or shall I mislead the burglar, and save my life and the securities? A more frequent case is that which occurs in the life of a physician, when a very sick person asks about the chances of recovery. Shall the doctor tell the truth and possibly shock the patient if the chances are poor, or shall a wrong but cheerful statement be made if necessary at the expense of truth? The first case is typical of situations in which evil creates a conflict of duties. It is well to remember that a burglar has no right to

demand the truth from any one when he seeks to commit a crime. But even in such a condition where we do not owe the truth it is not right to lie because it is the easiest escape. Of course the preservation of our life is incumbent upon us, and as an attack compels a defense the most effective defense is allowable. In the second instance, that of the physician, it is often possible to tell no direct untruth and still to keep the patient cheerful and hopeful. The past character of a man will determine his ability to meet such problems in consistency with the truth. The general rule is to keep to the truth always, and so to school ourselves as to meet even the exigencies of conflict with the least loss of truth. The manner in which many people help themselves in a dilemma shows that they lack the finer sense of truth, and find many occasions for lying, because they fear to tell the truth, and use frequent, inexcusable lies under the specious plea of necessity.

The direct opposite of the truth is a *lie*, which may be defined as an intentional untruth with the purpose to deceive. We may make statements that do not correspond with facts. If such statements grow out of ignorance and are unintentional, we are not at fault though they are not the truth. Only then do words and acts become a lie when we know the truth, and withhold or pervert it with a purpose. Often we tell a partial truth when we know the whole, or we stress certain features to the neglect of others. We apply to sober fact the inventive power that makes a good story. All of these attitudes are *misrepresentations*, even though

they are not complete reversals of the truth. More harm is done generally by half-truths than by whole lies. It is the same spirit of lying through which *we judge others*, and stress their faults to the damage of their character. Truth seeks in love to find the good in all men. Unfair criticism of others, and harsh judgment rise from milder gossip to the severe form of totally wrong slander. Almost as frequent as the lie of the misrepresentation of others, is the modern abuse of the oath. *Perjury* has ceased to be regarded as a great sin. Men take an oath very lightly, and do not consider its tremendous import upon human society. Its establishment was to guarantee the full truth when important issues involving life or property were at stake. Much injustice has been done through perjury. The deepest reason why it has become so common is that men have lost the religious sense, and do not fear the God of all truth.

There is a relation between truth and *current propaganda* that calls for moral consideration. When men assert their convictions, whether in matters of social and political or of religious import, they have a right to proclaim and labor for the spread of their views. But such defense of ideals is different from modern propaganda that is found in many quarters. The free proclamation of truth, out of which follows the freedom of speech and utterance, seeks to have the truth prevail in the conflict of opinions. But propaganda wants the side for which it stands to succeed. It is based on party spirit, and is not willing to hear the truth

of other men. Partisan in origin and desirous of power it works for the triumph of its own position and not for the sake of pure truth. Some of the advocates of free speech want liberty simply to propagate doctrines for the destruction of society. Whole groups are only fed the pabulum of their party, and are made zealots that help toward the destruction of tolerance. Even the *public press* often fails to aid the truth. It has become in many instances the mouthpiece of a propaganda. But where this is not so directly the case the very conception of what is news tends to injure the full truth. The object of an American newspaper is to satisfy the taste of the public for some interesting and exciting news. From the lesser curiosity to the highest sensationalism the purpose is to serve the public by writing a telling story. Facts are not assembled and sifted as they would be by an impartial historian, but the high lights and the dramatic incidents are told often out of all relation to all the facts in their actual connection. News in the daily press possess the character of the novel and drama while they purport to be the relation of facts. This situation makes it almost impossible for the public, because of its perverted taste, to receive and know the truth when it is most necessary to know it. The press is largely in the hands of powerful interests and serves them and their political and social interests. This adds to the loss of truth and it makes the press even more the servant of propaganda, and not the organ of free public opinion and the servant of truth in its full character.

Another conflict arises between truth and *prejudice*. All men have and hold certain pre-suppositions. No one is entirely free from fixed and controlling ideas and ideals which color all the positions taken. Every one has some philosophy of life.⁶ But while all of us are thus men of certain views it is essential that we remain open to other views. We may have certain opinions but we must not become opinionated. Prejudice closes our minds to other positions than our own. It is a perversion of the right to our own convictions and ideas. The fact of the rule of prejudice has aided in dividing society. Too many are men of a slogan, and the slogan makes unfree. The constant aim of true education ought to be to deliver us from the spirit of prejudice, through which without adequate knowledge we are pre-judging others and their ideas, beliefs and attitudes.

Truth has a very important bearing upon *freedom of thought* and research.⁷ If truth be hampered it often cannot be found. There must be the guarantee of real liberty to enable the finding of new truth. It is a common human experience that the pathfinders of truth are often persecuted and rejected and yet only by true liberty can the progress of knowledge be advanced. Freedom to think and search must not, however, be identified with so-called free thought. Free thought is the attitude of a group of men who deny theism, and are inimical to all religious positions, because they do

⁶ Hibben, *A Defense of Prejudice*.

⁷ Cf. John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty*.

not understand its psychology and history. But genuine freedom must come gradually in the course of education. If there is no proper preparation the result is confusion and doubt. The best method for the freedom of thought is criticism, which seeks not merely to remove the unestablished, but also to make sure and clear the real facts, and to defend the proper inferences through constructive effort.

Justice and freedom. What is the relation of justice to the ethical problem? What does it mean for liberty? Justice is the virtue that renders to every one what rightly belongs to him. It also holds the balance between all, and properly correlates individuals and groups in society. Without it men cannot live and do their work freely. It is the protection of just liberty, and preserves it from becoming either anarchistic or restricted. Aristotle distinguished between punitive justice and distributive justice. The former is the problem of the state. The latter is the striving after the right allotment to each and all of their proper deserts and rights. Justice is not possible on a dead level of equality; it rather demands equability. Because proportionality is essential to justice, it can only fulfill its aim when it is not absolute, but includes equity and the fair consideration of each separate case and instance with all its details and limits. When thus applied it is the inner cement of human society and makes it fundamentally moral.

What is the relation of justice to *righteousness*? Righteousness is the virtue that embodies right and lives for it. It is more con-

prehensive and lies deeper than justice. The ideal of righteousness leads to the execution of justice. There is a religious attitude in it, and it has regard to our relation to God as well as men. It belongs to the nature of God Himself. When men are desirous of it they seek the power not ourselves that make for righteousness. For this reason Christ calls those blessed, who hunger and thirst after righteousness.⁸ Justice will receive its strongest impetus where righteousness with all that it implies becomes the ideal, that is more and more incarnate in our longing and habit.

If justice is to become a real power there must be a *real knowledge* of men about each other. Nothing hinders justice so much as the lack of proper understanding of the position and need of different men and of the varying groups of society. With right understanding there must be combined the power of imagination by which we can place ourselves in the position of others. The mere dry light of knowledge is not sufficient, and men often lack in understanding each other just because there is a want of imagination. Imagination will be easy where sympathy is present as a living motive. But the problem of justice requires a wider range than from man to man. It must become general and universal. To do this justice must grow out of and be sustained by public opinion.⁹ Whatever men think and feel about common issues creates *public opinion*. It is the idea and conception of the average mind,

⁸ Matthew V: 6.

⁹ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*.

no matter whether it be voiced on the platform or through the press. Public opinion if rightly informed desires what is just. While the voice of the people is not invariably the voice of God, there is a strong impress of the moral order among men, which calls for justice. But public opinion must be kept sound and sane. There are constant efforts by all kinds of jingoists and wild propagandists to stir up the crowd feeling unjustly and to arouse the mob spirit. The real necessity is a continuous training of the common mind about the affairs that concern it in a spirit of impartiality and fairness. The organs of public opinion must become educative rather than impulsive in their efforts.

One of the great hindrances of justice is the manner in which men *interpret* it in *their own interest*. There is a readiness to demand justice as soon as the act of justice renders my own to me. The angle from which we often look at justice is that of individual gain, benefit or protection. This makes justice selfish while its aim is to seek what belongs to all rather than what merely belongs to me. There ought to be a common sense and desire that justice be meted out to all who do wrong, and that it bless all who do right. It may happen that full justice will impose a hardship on me, limit me, and control me in my desires and wishes. If I seek and pursue justice I will gladly allow this limitation, for it guarantees the general right and liberty. The satisfaction of justice only for myself will finally so contract and injure common justice so that in the end I will

lose the advantages of justice for myself. Justice for me cannot be maintained unless justice for all be conserved.

The necessity of justice for all is unrealized today in the *conflict between groups* and their interests especially in the economic issues. Millions of men are deprived of what is due them through a conception of justice, which separate industrial groups contend for as their right. The controlling leaders of industry can only apparently understand, e. g., the excesses of collective bargaining, the evils of the closed shop, etc. They see and know their responsibility toward their corporation and their stockholders. Their sense for order is strong against those who destroy property and cruelly take lives in a strike. But there seems to be no appreciation of what the opposing group conceives to be justice. Still less is the public considered with its claims of justice. The laboring group is only led to know of all the misdeeds of capital, and never of its virtues. It looks upon all who employ it as grasping and unjust. The attitude is to be that of watching, and fighting as soon as there is a loss of what seems just in the eyes of those who desire large wages, without considering the whole status of business. Capital is accused of being intrenched in government, and of using military power to suppress the laborer. There is mostly injustice to be warded off through organized power. Class consciousness is fostered to the extreme. All that labor demands is just, all that capital wants is unjust. This attitude of warfare creates deception and in-

creases injustice. The common liberty of men is impaired. The remedy is the cultivation of a sense of justice beyond selfish interests. If this cannot be accomplished society will destroy itself despite all industrial progress. There must be a removal of all those leaders in industry and labor who live by agitation, in order that real agreements in justice can be made between men on the basis of mutual willingness to understand each other and to work together, rather than to claim a victory in their conduct of warfare of class against class.

A difficulty is encountered by justice because of the power of *nationality*. There has been so strong a development of national feeling in the last centuries as to crowd back the common ideal of humanity. Nationalism has enlarged the rights of the single nation, and cultivated the attachment to the national language and customs in a manner that exaggerates the place and claim of the single nation. Suspicions and jealousies are kept alive between nation and nation. The children of a nation are taught history in such a way as to exalt one's own nation, to describe its actions as always right, and to show the evil in the nation that is the enemy. Nationalism encroaches even upon religion and narrows down its universal, human outlook and sympathy to the interest of one tongue and nation. This is a survival that ought to have no place in the modern world.

Still more powerful against broad justice is the consciousness and *feeling* of *race*. The racial forces are mighty undercurrents in life that often carry along men against their better

judgment. Racial prejudice is hindering the common understanding and liberty of mankind. There are two outstanding examples of racial feeling. The first is the anti-Semitic movement. In a spirit of unjust discrimination all the faults and none of the good qualities of the Jew are stressed. Because of successful qualities in competition, bold and aggressive methods of business, pushing attitudes in social intercourse that mark the lower classes, there is deep-seated antipathy and sometimes a strong opposition to the Jew. Sins that are common are attributed to him alone, and he is made the scapegoat. Past history is ransacked to demonstrate his wrong actions. All modern radical movements are traced to him because he has powerful intellectuals. There is no attempt to understand and to do justice. The second case is purely American. It is our attitude toward the Negro. With all the growing attempts to repair the wrong of past slavery there is still a failure to render full and adequate justice. While it is clear that there can never be a racial intermingling of white and black there can be larger opportunity and privilege for the Negro. But whenever this is given there is a reaction. A similar prejudice is constantly fostered toward the yellow races.¹⁰ Racial distinctions are exaggerated. Christianity claims that God made of one blood all nations and peoples.¹¹ It would have no distinction in the great finalities of life.

An important problem is the *relation* of jus-

¹⁰ Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*.

¹¹ Acts XVII: 26.

tice to law as enacted positively by the state. If the law is to serve justice it ought to be the expression of the moral conviction of a people. At no time will the positive law measure up to the ideal standard. When men endeavor to make and enforce a law which does not have the common sentiment and opinion back of it the law is not kept. The result is the lowering of respect for law and the increase of injustice. A strong minority ought never to force a law upon a majority. But on the other hand the morally more thoughtful and advanced minority must lead the more sluggish majority. Ethics cannot lower its demand to meet the defects of existing laws. To assure the real liberty it dare not abate any of its ideal attitudes.

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CHAPTER XII

THE FAMILY

What is the value of the family? Among all of the social forms of personality none is more fundamental than the family. It is basic to all society and fundamental to its moral well-being. Today it is being admitted by students of early society that there is no evidence to prove, that the family did not always exist. It is the primitive form of society. Before industry passed through the great modern revolution, caused by the invention of machinery, the family was a large centre of industrial activity. While this is no longer the case, it is still necessary that the habits for industry and all occupations in life must receive their beginnings in the home. The most essential qualities in all work, as e. g.: carefulness, cleanliness, accuracy, thoroughness, etc., are best formed in the family. Without the family the fruits and results of civilization would not have been handed on. Through it civilization must be transferred from generation to generation. "It must be remembered that civilization consists in part of material things and in part of ideas, attitudes, customs, and so on. The latter set of phenomena make up by far the larger part of civilization. Now, even material

things, as part of culture, are not passed along automatically: their uses must be explained, the implied techniques learned. As to spiritual culture, including language itself, there is no way for it to be passed on, in a society without writing, except through verbal explanation and teachings and the direct observation by the learner of what is being said and done. It is evident that a large part of what the individual receives in this way, especially during the highly important formative years of early childhood, is brought to him through the medium of the family."¹ The culture of man always carries with it in the customs and ideas certain moral conceptions. For these the family is the early school. Connected with the moral training of the family is the religious attitude. From the earliest time the home was also the place of religious teaching and culture. In many religions there were special gods of the home and hearth. Religion in the family consisted not only in ceremonies and practices, but also in certain moral rules and maxims. No world religion, least of all Christianity, has abolished the religion in the home as necessary both for religious life and for moral culture.

The spirit of the family. What is the essential spirit in the personality of the family? What is to be its peculiar contribution for individual and social life? The *family* is the *institution of love*. In it there is the place for the unfolding, first of all, of the kindly virtues. The affection, that ought to dwell in the family

¹ Alexander A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 239.

as the essential attitude between all its members, is the milieu in which kindness, gentleness, forbearance, etc. can develop. But these virtues as expressions of love can lead to the other virtues. The spirit of love, for which the foundation must be laid in the home, can be made the controlling disposition only through the early habits of childhood. There are certain very elemental qualities that mark the family, and condition its influence upon the life of freedom.

The family life is one in which society touches us or ought to touch us with the least restraints. It is true that the first virtue of child-life is *obedience*. But its meaning is control and guidance into moral liberty. While its reasons are not always apparent to the child it tends toward freedom. Through it men are led into the habits of the moral order. Where obedience has been lacking, or where cruelty has destroyed its loving justice, an individualism develops that cannot give moral freedom. Obedience justly growing in love is the easiest way and the most free way of leading human life into the world of moral relations. In no other social form than the family is the same liberty and its right control possible in the same spirit of affection.

The family life is one of close intimacy. In the family we cannot but become familiar with each other. The familiarity reveals us to each other. Nowhere can one so truly find what a man is as in his own family. This fact necessarily demands that we must have the best sort of character. If family intimacy breeds con-

tempt for each other it shows great moral deficiencies. Consequently mutual regard and respect, that must make familiarity good, ought to be present and rest upon genuine ethical honor. A good family life puts us on our mettle to be what we claim. Therefore the virtues of sincerity, honesty, truthfulness are needed. We cannot hide our real selves in the family. If any one leads a double life beyond the family the very foundations of the home are undermined. Straightforwardness, openness with each other, confidences without secrecy, can alone maintain the free, loving spirit of the home.

The life of the home is one as between equals in the relation of husband and wife, and between brothers and sisters. The relationship of man and wife ought to be one of admiring, justly estimating regard, and intimate fellowship of genuine affection and love. The closeness of the two guiding lives in the home must be one of association in liberty. Individual development and common life ought to interpenetrate in such a manner as to make the free individual and the free family in love. The children, in relation to their parents in obedience, ought to be taken up more and more into companionship by their parents, provided this privilege is not abused and turned into familiarity without respect. This danger can be avoided where the parents have a character that of itself inspires honor and respect. The life of brothers and sisters as they grow up together makes possible mutual consideration. It teaches us that we are not alone in the world,

and that liberty must be the right of every one. Natural selfishness that wants all and is not willing to share cannot exist in the home. It must be overcome by the spirit of love as liberty. Thus the family becomes the first school of justice, fairness and considerateness. In the same manner children cannot live together without truthfulness. The necessity of truth toward each other, and toward the parents, can be borne in upon their lives. Thus all the basic social virtues find their starting point in the family. In it they can be formed and made habits under the most helpful and favorable circumstances at a time when habits are capable of being moulded.

Courtship and engagement. What ought to be the relation of the sexes to each other in the days of courtship and engagement? How can these days of approach and the finding of one's mate be made ethical? Courtship and engagement are so largely controlled by the customs of an age that young people often simply follow the custom, and give little thought to the moral implications in making a choice that will affect their whole future. Formerly courtship and engagement were controlled in large measure by the parents. There was constant surveillance. The defect of this custom was the difficulty of young people really learning to know each other. It forbade the free association through which characters might test each other without interference. The present attitude is one of the utmost liberty. Restraint has been removed, but at the same time advice, guidance, and the experienced wisdom of the

elders are rejected. Is the present liberty real freedom, or has it cast aside what is valuable in parental advice, care and guidance? Are happier results following under the uncontrolled modern method of courtship and engagement? The liberty which the sexes today possess has been hurt by the loss in many cases of the restraint, modesty, and refinement usual in polite intercourse. Respect for each other is often broken down by undue familiarity, and through the permission of privileges that should only be granted after marriage. Engagements in this day of uncontrolled liberty are dealt with in many cases as not binding. They ought to be the plighting of a troth not to be broken except under the most unusual and compelling circumstances. But the easy and thoughtless manner in which engagements are often made results in their underestimation. On the other hand an engagement is valued in some of our country districts as almost equal to marriage. In fact undue privileges are taken, and physical intimacies and intercourse are allowed to the detriment of the real meaning of marriage. Such liberties are not liberty, but uncontrolled and premature surrender to mere passion. They do not make for mutual respect and honor.

Marriage. In what manner shall marriage be interpreted? What is its function and place? There are three conceptions about the estate of marriage. The first is the biological which considers marriage to be the mating of male and female. It stresses all of the physical facts in marriage, and demands that the best

eugenic relations be obtained before and during marriage, in order to insure the maintenance and improvement of the human race biologically. The second view is that of the attainment of individual happiness. According to it we are to find in marriage the satisfaction of the romance of life in the ideality and poetry of love. It dwells upon the need of loving companionship and its elevating power. The third position is the social. With a regard for and consideration of what marriage means for society, its continuance and welfare, it asks that we make marriage socially effective and serviceable. There is some truth in all of these three views. We cannot escape valuing the social import of marriage. It is bound up with the whole social complex and its life. But social considerations are not the only ones to be weighed. The theory of individual happiness has its right. We ought never to lose the liberty of individual life. As far as marriage heightens the development of individual life and adds to its joy it deserves its place. But finally the first and fundamental meaning of marriage is the union of man and wife for the perpetuation of mankind. The moral problem is to make this purpose serviceable to real personality, individual and social. In the bonds of marriage there should be the proper, just and sane rendering of the marital due. (*Debitum conjugale*). For the sake of the creative joy of continuing life, and for the experience of fatherhood and motherhood, man and wife should not withhold from one another physically. But usually the denial of intercourse,

and the straining of the marital tie through cold abstention, is not the great danger. There is rather a temptation to indulge in passion for its own sentient satisfaction. There may be a loss of the end of marriage because of mere sensual gratification. Through such abuse marriage is degraded to legalized indulgence in animal passion as such. This appears clearly when efforts are made to avoid the birth of children, which is the biological and moral justification for physical contact. Formerly America was notorious for its many abortions. To-day there is the escape of birth-control. Birth-control has its worth for the state to the degree, that the increase of the criminal class, and the handing down of really inheritable disease, make it necessary. But it is becoming so widely known through inconsiderate propaganda, that men and women are taught to indulge in mere animal passion without risking the birth of children both in marriage and outside of marriage. Consequently it is morally dangerous and degrading, as it shows the way to the sensual for indulgence without responsibility.

The whole physical side of marriage needs the intellectual, moral and spiritual fellowship to keep man and wife human beings. While marriage is no Platonic friendship, there must be the agreement and congeniality of two characters to avoid their being sunk into animality. It is for this reason that monogamy is essential, as the only form that can maintain the moral freedom. The practice of polyandry of the lower tribes has passed away among civilized

people. But polygamy has sought a revival in the form of plural marriages. The plural marriage even under the most favorable conditions encourages man to uncontrolled passion, and puts woman necessarily in an inferior place, by destroying the intimacy of moral life between one man and one woman. It has been historically established that only in the union between one man and one woman can moral freedom be maintained.

The Christian teaching about marriage begins with the recognition that man and woman are to become one flesh,² and endorses the Old Testament idea. Paul in view of the temptations at Corinth advises that it is better to marry than to burn.³ Personally he prefers to remain unmarried for the sake of his work. But Christianity, protecting woman as the weaker vessel, does not stop with the admission of the biological side of marriage. It presents the ideal of the love of Christ and the Church toward each other, as typifying the relation of man and wife.⁴ As the Church looks up to Christ so the wife is to look up to her husband. There is no demand of submission to mere domination, but only the request of reliance upon the husband, and obedience in love to his guidance. The husband is to "love his wife as Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it." The greater duty of love is incumbent upon the husband, for he is to love to the giving of himself for his wife. This is the moral reversal of the physical condition in marriage, in which

² Mark X: 7, 8.

³ I Corinthians VII: 9.

⁴ Ephesians V: 24 ff.

the wife gives herself, and bears the heavy physical burdens. It is this ideality which lifts the marriage up into the highest moral and spiritual sphere.

Divorce. Under what conditions can marriage be severed? The tremendous and threatening increase of divorces in America makes this a very serious problem. Ethics is not primarily concerned with the kind of legislation that should be passed to restrict divorces. It is troubled about the fact that marriage is entered into lightly and unadvisedly, carelessly and inconsiderately. The ease of divorce is depreciated because of the moral injury inflicted by it, and the evil effect upon the children of the home. It is self-evident that the best legislation will not cure the low moral valuation of the binding power of marriage until there is an advance in the general moral consciousness about divorce. The proposal seriously made to overcome the risks of marriage through trial-marriages cannot be entertained. Such trial-marriages will lead to indulgence, and will lack the moral force and obligation that is needed to make marriage morally effective. The causes for which divorce is allowable have been, according to Christian ideals, adultery⁵ and cruel dissension.⁶ The latter is supposed to have adultery in view. Therefore the only cause valid in Christian ideals is adultery. Perhaps there might be added conditions of cruelty and persecution that break down life. But incompatibility of temper and similar causes today allowed among

⁵ Matthew XIX: 9.

⁶ I Corinthians VII: 15.

us are insufficient. A wrong conception of individual liberty has destroyed the real liberty of the common life in marriage. Where hard burdens must be borne the very submission in a patient spirit helps us to rise above them. Liberty must often be attained not by escape from difficulties but through an inner conquest of them. Divorce should only be sought when conditions in marriage make the moral life really impossible. No mere considerations of ease, comfort, and individual pleasure are ethical reasons to justify divorce.

The evil of prostitution. What must be the ethical judgment about the sin of prostitution? There can be no condoning of prostitution whether engaged in by the unmarried or married. As far as the man is concerned it makes him a slave of passion, and increases his animality. All indulgence outside of the married estate is destructive of the dignity and liberty of the moral life. But the greatest wrong of prostitution is the degradation to which it brings woman. For her the selling of her body to gratify the lust of the unrestrained male means the abandonment of her life as moral. She sacrifices her whole character and becomes a sensual piece of flesh. Man accepts her no longer as a personality but only a convenience for his passion. The wrong standards of society allow the man to escape. There is a double standard which condemns woman, puts all the disgrace upon her, and permits man to remain seemingly and outwardly respectable although he is the aggressor. For this reason there can be no acceptance of any proposal to

legalize prostitution. Wherever it has been tried it only offered an excuse for an evil that can legitimately have no excuse. Even under the taboo prostitution is an awful sin; to legalize it would be a new invitation to men, who are responsible for its existence and continuance. Free love offers an escape from prostitution, but morally it is only a safer type of prostitution.

The single life. What is the moral justification of the single life? Under what conditions can it be lived morally? There are those who ought never to marry on account of physical reasons. Where any one clearly knows this hindrance, and still marries, entailing misery and sickness upon life to be born, there is guilt and wrong in marriage. Some individuals are under special and peculiar limiting conditions, imposed upon them through the care of their immediate family, who justly refrain from marriage, because they could not fulfill their prior duties that no one else can assume. A great mission and call in life may so fill the mind and heart of an individual that marriage is not thought of. Christ spoke of men who were eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.⁷ Paul did not marry because he thought that he could better fulfill his mission, and care for the cause of the Lord in single life.⁸ Men and women can still devote themselves to such labor of mercy or religion and not marry. But the celibate life must not be made a rule for any office or class. It should be the free choice of individuals who can remain

⁷ Matthew XIX: 12.

⁸ I Corinthians VII: 7.

unmarried, and be pure in the suppression of passion.

But there are many who remain single for reasons that are not morally defensible. When men and women abstain from marriage because they want to live with certain economic comforts, and possess the luxuries of life, they have no adequate excuse. The love of ease, and individual gratification through the soft things of life, are demoralizing. If a wrong intellectualism, or a selfish conception of liberty, turns men away from the married estate, the results are not liberating. The man or woman who deliberately avoids marriage to remain free, will find that in later life the risks of great physical and mental disturbances are incurred. The character is liable to become self-centred and unhappy; the outlook upon life mean and small; oddities of conduct will appear that contract life into unsatisfying habits. The way of escape for those who have lacked a chance for marriage is to give themselves to the care of some relatives, or to find their freedom in the work of some noble cause.

The freedom of woman. What should be the right and freedom of woman in the light of our modern advance? The answer to this question depends upon settling the problem as to the real mission of woman. There are two opposite attitudes that combat each other. The first is the position, that woman is destined only for the home, that her function is to be the homemaker. In the execution of this destiny, some demand of woman, that she should assume the work of the home with all its little cares and

narrowing minutiae. The women who lead this sort of life make themselves slaves and drudges. Different homes will of course grant different possibilities according to the economic liberty which they allow. But in no case should the home with all its labor interfere with the intellectual and moral growth of woman. The truth of the home-making mission of woman will be lost if woman assumes the bulk of the burdens of the family life. Connected with the home as the ideal for woman is the duty of motherhood. It is this obligation which largely justifies the attachment of woman to the home. Motherhood is a fundamental privilege and also an elemental burden of woman. It ought not to be evaded for any selfish reason, for through it woman fulfills a noble service. But the duty of motherhood does not include the whole responsibility for the education of the child. This must be shared in by the father if the moral training of the child is to be strong as well as gentle.

In direct opposition to woman as destined exclusively for the home is the conception of her full freedom to a vocation. The preparation for a useful life in a freely chosen occupation is demanded in modern life because woman does not know whether she shall be called to a home and to motherhood. But a woman's vocation ought not to rest merely upon her equality with man. It ought to satisfy her peculiar physical and mental ability and limitation. Formerly the limitation of woman was over-emphasized, but the modern success of woman in many different callings has established her large rights. On the other hand there has

arisen a type of woman who, untrue to her best nature, has pressed into occupations that have impaired her womanliness. We need a more balanced conception than exists through the reaction of emancipation against the former denial of the rights of woman. The radical advocates ought to remember that the Nora of Ibsen's *Doll's House* is not the last word. A woman cannot be a plaything of man; but does this justify escape from the home and neglect of it for the sake of a vocation? A thoughtful sequel to Nora is Rosalie in Hutchinson's "*This Freedom*." Rosalie reaps the sad consequences of the modern emancipated woman in the aberrations of her children.

What is the early Christian position in reference to woman? Christ does not choose any woman among the twelve, but He deals with woman in utter freedom, as we see, e. g., in the woman that is a sinner,⁹ and in the Samaritan woman at the well.¹⁰ Women minister unto Him, and He first shows Himself to women after the resurrection. His tenderest friendships is with Mary of Bethany. In the early Church women prophesy.¹¹ Paul believes that in Christ there is neither male nor female.¹² But he advocates the limitation of woman in the public worship, and wants her to keep silent and ask any questions that may be in her mind of her husband at home.¹³ Woman is to have her head covered in the public assemblies. While the

⁹ Luke VII: 37 ff.

¹⁰ John IV: 1 ff.

¹¹ I Corinthians XI: 5; Acts XXI: 9.

¹² Gal. III: 28.

¹³ I Corinthians XIV: 34, 35.

man is nothing without the woman, nor the woman without the man in the Lord, still the man is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the man. The glory of the man is Christ, the glory of woman is man.¹⁴ This limitation of woman was intended for Corinth where women were rather too free and bold. A social gradation which puts woman below man is implied, but this differentiation does not affect the equality of soul. It only touches the outer customs of the church and leads Paul to a principle of the headship of man.

The right of the child. What is the legitimate place of the child? How shall its moral freedom be regarded? There has been great progress in the proper appreciation of the child and of child-life in our days. We have begun to apply the ideal of Christ¹⁵ in definite manner; and we are learning to understand Paul, when, with all admonition to the child to be obedient, he counsels parents not to be cruel, and not to provoke their children to wrath.¹⁶ The day of harsh and undue severity toward the child has passed except where there is backwardness of moral status. The child is being studied to understand its real nature and mind. Everything is being done in home and school to give the child the best conditions of health and the best opportunities of education. It is only the greed of selfish economic interest in industry that is holding to child-labor because it is cheap. The pressure of the law must still be used against the moral delinquency of profiteering manufacturers.

¹⁴ Cf. I Corinthians XI.

¹⁵ Matthew XIX: 14.

¹⁶ Ephesians VI: 4.

But perhaps, with all the care now given the child and with all the liberty that is allowed, the real freedom of the child that will make it a personality has not been attained. Parents have become indulgent to the extreme, and long before the child knows what best to choose it is permitted to have its own way. Over against the excessive discipline of a former age we have scarcely any discipline at all. Thus the child becomes selfish and fails to understand common rights of liberty. To gain the attention of the child in education we have almost turned the school into a playground. From the Montessori school upward the child is supposed by some innate tact to discover itself, and to be capable as a born democrat to govern itself without any interference by elders. Interest is the charm, the open sesame of education. Duty has been relegated to the scrap-heap. The result is a life that cannot meet the real issues and will fail in the test of experience because it has not learnt the control of freedom and its law of love. The child has to be chastened so gently that it does not know that it is being punished. All corporal punishment is tabooed, and yet sweet reasonableness is not producing saints. Self-willed ideas of desire take the place of moral freedom; and we have youth, often drunk with the intoxication of its unrestrained rights and liberty, that has lost its moral background. The modern liberty of the child will destroy vital liberty unless we return to some sense and practice of the truth, that it is good for youth to bear its yoke. Control in freedom is only learnt when the child is controlled to freedom.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE CHURCH

Why treat of the church? What necessity is there for considering the church in a general ethic? Does the usual text-book on morals do so? There is no discussion at all in most books on ethics about the church. But this is a real oversight. Wherever there is religion there is some organization of it. Durkheim says correctly: "Never was there a religion without a church." Religion particularly among the lower tribes is social. Individual religion is a later development, and it has never crowded out the social form. In any fairly full study of social ethics the church can no more be omitted than the family and the state.

As religion has a bearing upon morals¹ its social form must raise some ethical questions. As far as the church develops man ethically it must receive attention in any moral estimate of man. Freedom of character, which leads it to function for the good, lies within the task of the church. An effort must be made to evaluate the church ethically. What is its service for morals? To what degree does it meet the ideal? These practical questions about

¹ Cf. above Chapter II.

the present worth and work of the church lead us to search for its fundamental ethical place. Our problem today is to find the fundamental moral issues of the Christian church.

The church and truth. Why do we associate the church, first of all, with truth? The *church* is the *institution of truth*. As the family is the the moral centre for the kindly virtues, so the church is the centre for truth. But we must define what is meant by truth. There is truth ascertained and found by man as he searches and discovers the usual, natural facts about the universe and himself. But there is also truth that is concerned with spiritual and moral realities. Man has always accepted such truth in religion as a gift and bestowal. Consequently all religion claims revelation of spiritual truth. This truth aims to satisfy man's soul. It is not truth for the intellect as such, not for the emotions and volitions in themselves, for it serves neither science nor art as an end. The truth of religion is the final, ultimate necessity for man's spirit and spiritual life. In Christianity Christ asks to be accepted as the way of religion and the reality of life because He is the truth.² The religious satisfaction in truth is to be obtained in Christ, *the* personality, the fulfillment of religion and the motive of freedom in ethics.

In striving to know the moral service of religious truth we are led to admit its supernaturalism. If the truth of religion abandons its supernaturalism, with its peculiar authoritative claim, it becomes speculation, and its

² John XIV: 6.

systematic efforts are only philosophy. It is the belief in the divine character of the truth of religion which differentiates it from other truth, and therefore gives it a peculiar power for the moral life. Real, vital religious truth is the enemy of superstition. What low forms of religion held and did, and what magic practiced and in part handed on from age to age, constitute the remnants of traditional belief and practice which we call superstition. Superstition is in conflict with the growth of knowledge, and, despite the appearance of order, has in reality a disordered, disjointed world governed by the arbitrary caprice of a distorted supernaturalism. Rationalism has never liberated men in the mass from superstition. Some times even the most intelligent men hold to strange superstitions contradicting their general rationality. The spirit of man longs for some divine tokens, and will often seek them in the strangest quarters and in the most illogical way. The escape from superstition and the ethical freedom in religious truth is best guaranteed through a supernaturalism that does not deny or destroy the just results and fair inferences of the searching mind of man.

The church must have progressive truth to preserve a just supernaturalism. As mankind passes from age to age the treasure of truth which the church possesses must be re-interpreted again and again. It must satisfy the changing mental outlook of men, and their temper and mood in different times. Even the common people have a different state of mind in the various periods of history. If the reli-

gious truth of the church is to avoid becoming superstition it cannot assume a final statement of the faith in the forms of thought or culture of any past age. A church, which rejects all that is modern, because it has clothed its conceptions in the garments of the scientific and philosophic terms that have been outlived, serves ignorance and obstructs the free progress of truth. Nothing serves so much to create the impression that religion needs ignorance, as the attitude that will not rethink its faith in each age, but simply lives on inherited, undigested ideas that are memorized and repeated. There must be a continuous readjustment by the church of its supernaturalism to progress, not by destroying the supernatural but by seeing it in a new light.

But the progressive adjustment of religious truth ought not to degenerate into radicalism. The spirit of man needs a continuity and certainty in his faith. These radicalism cannot furnish, for it has no sense of history, and wants to reconstruct the whole world anew in every age. Through it the very roots of supernaturalism are constantly being uprooted. Progress cannot identify itself with radicalism, and therefore needs the balance of a sane conservatism. Not all that is new is true, and not all that is old is wrong. There are certain permanent characteristics of man, and he possesses certain ineradicable spiritual and moral needs. To meet these a church must hold to some conservative content of truth which it cannot abandon in essence without a loss, no matter

how it brings this unchanging content to men in varying forms.

But have we not missed the whole underlying meaning of religion by stressing the relation of the church to truth? Is not religion essentially emotion? This peculiar, prevailing idea, that rests on certain inferences from primitive religion, and upon a selection of certain outstanding features in American forms of religious life, disrupts man's inner spiritual life. Its atomism fails to note that there never has been a religion without a set of beliefs and convictions. Supernaturalism is not merely for the heart but also for the head. It is active but also meditative. The truth of the church is for the whole man, and therefore it cannot be freed from intellectual elements. Religion to be lived must be understood, otherwise it becomes mere imitation or unthinking traditionalism. Men have always had some forms of belief and therefore some creeds. Creeds are as universal as religion. What we believe must clothe itself into certain ideas and be stated in certain words. The contention for a creedless religion deceives itself, for a religion without convictions and some statement of its faith, whether definitely formulated or not, is impossible psychologically, and cannot be found historically. The truth believed must, however, be believed freely, and must be freely confessed and spread. The ethical danger of a creed is not its existence, but its intolerant abuse. The effort should never be made to impose it on any one without willing acceptance after full and free conviction. The inherited creeds must be interpreted his-

torically and used as guides intelligently. They dare not be made masters of our faith, but only notable formulations of the past, which express the substance of what we are convinced of as our own belief. Whenever a church endeavors to enforce its creed, and assents to persecution of whatever kind, it destroys the free appeal of truth. Religious truth like all truth must win through its own merit and not through force or through false authority. Freedom is the very atmosphere of truth.

The nature of the church's work. What shall the church do with the truth that it holds? What is its purpose? The truth for which the church stands puts the obligation upon the church to perpetuate and to spread it. Because there is a value for freedom in spiritual truth it must be handed on through the agency of the church. The justification of the church ethically in extending itself rests upon the moral results of its truth. It is this test which Christ desires to have applied to all teachers and teaching, when He says: "By their fruits ye shall know them."³ The ethical outcome of doctrine is its defense and the strength of its appeal. The mere mystical satisfaction has its place but it is not adequate, because religious truth tends toward the conscience. A church has a moral right of existence, and a justification of its work if it holds to a definite body of truth. The better the ethical progress brought about by the work of the church, the larger its right to live. It does happen that a good faith does not produce its logical results, be-

³ Matthew VII: 20.

cause of individual sin, or through limiting and distorting national characteristics. On the contrary, a faith ethically inferior will not bring about the defects of its position, because those that hold it may be under the past influence of a better truth, or may follow a superior morality about them in a society shaped by higher standards. Whenever in history a certain side of truth seemed neglected it offered opportunity for a new group to stress the truth that was overlooked. But finally no church can adequately live through the emphasis upon a single great element of truth. There must be the balance of the whole body of truth. An excess often rights itself in history. Extreme predestination has passed away in part through its ethical defect. Exclusive emotionalism seems to have had its day because it lacked the fullest appeal to conscience.

The church may use any means to win men to its truth, but if it wants the moral results for character it must use the method most effective for ethical growth. Character is not formed by quick changes. It must grow gradually into personality through the habits of the good led by the ideal. This implies that moral progress is educative. Consequently that church will produce the best ethical advance that uses the best education for morals and religion. The child must receive the ideals and be led to know the right according to its capacity. From the age of childhood into youth, and onward, the work of the church in all its departments will be genuinely helpful for the moral unfolding, as far as it is educative. Education is not only

a specific task alongside of the other work of the church, but it ought to be the controlling spirit of all that the church does. The message of the church dare not be simply emotional, or a call to action. The basis must be instruction. Christ recognized this when He enjoined His disciples to bring in the nations by teaching them.⁴ Missionary operations will be of no final avail without impartation of truth by education. The moral demand upon the church is for thoughtful development, through the training that creates personality, in the freedom of the truth that is known and grows into the life of man.

The church must also include in its work the right expression of love. Its truth always seeks to produce love. The God of Christianity is Love, and love is the law of liberty in the Christian moral conception. The genuine spirit of love must lead the church to every kind of activity that love demands. No matter what general work may be carried on outside of the church, it ought to engage in all the spheres of rescue, prevention and true charity. Into them it should put the strength and power of its motive of love as superior in purpose and outlook. But the higher motive dare not neglect the best methods and plans of the present. High motives do not excuse deficient execution and wrong method. The church has often begun work, like charity organization, and then has allowed it to pass into the free use of society. The philanthropy of the present day has had its inspiration in the church, even if it is not

⁴ Matthew XXVIII: 20.

credited to the church. Most of those who give themselves to modern philanthropy receive their inspiration through the church. The life that makes for mercy flows out from the church, but it waters and fructifies many fields beyond the borders of the church.

The social work of the church. Is there any specific task incumbent upon the church in the great, modern questions of society? If the church has any value for man in all his attitudes it must have some social message. To make it effective in its special nature certain dangers must be avoided. First there dare not be one-sided emphasis upon the social. There is much modern sociology which thinks that man can only be dealt with as a social being. It puts such emphasis upon the mass that the individual is only a number in a group. There is truth in the social outlook. Plato could only define justice through the Republic. Aristotle made man a political animal. But man is also an individual. In the balance between the social and individual lies the solution. Personality is both individual and social. The church cannot adopt most of the philosophy of modern social thought, but it must develop the truth of the Kingdom of God to find its social task.

Second, the error of most modern social philosophy is the exclusive point of view of the external. The social problem is supposed to be the question of the economic needs of man. Their right adjustment is interpreted as the end of mankind. But man will never be helped merely from without. A new social order means a new moral order. The church that is wise

will not overlook the value of the outer. It uses it in its charity and work of mercy, where the bodily need is not overlooked. But the bodily is only the occasion to reach into the conscience and soul of man. The church will not succeed in helping society if it loses itself in the mere external tasks of social betterment.

Third, much social progress is demanded through legislation. The church will never oppose any law that makes for a better society through restraint of the forces of evil. But law cannot produce righteousness. Men must have a new conscience to do good, and not an increase of legislation. Therefore the church, working upon the conscience of man,⁵ ought never to deceive itself that it is helping society by entering the field of legislation. To make a law to produce good is the process of impatience and shortsightedness. It contradicts the facts involved in the betterment of society. A law that does not come out of a moral enlightenment only produces transgression. Life that is good comes out of a new motive.

With the avoidance of these dangers the social obligation of the church is not fulfilled. It is the business of the church to recognize that there is a social life, that this social life is very defective, and that it needs the large awakening of the social conscience. To remain aloof from the great evils of modern society is as wrong as to neglect the individual life. The

⁵ "The Church's pronouncements on social and economic questions must be such and such only as grow out of the distinctive function of the Church as a religious institution conceived primarily with motives and ideals." Wm. Adams Brown, *The Church in America*, p. 157.

duty of the church cannot be met simply through the changing of individual lives fundamental as such a mission is. Men have social relationships that must be moralized, because many of them are altogether unmoralized, or half-moralized, and simply follow traditional attitudes. In the propaganda that obscures facts in modern social contests, the church must seek to get at the real status. Then it ought boldly proclaim the moral truths involved without fear or favor. Great leaders of the church in the past have not hesitated to give voice to the claims of righteousness in the morals ills of society. Chrysostom spoke plainly against the vanity and luxury of his day. Luther did not abstain from giving his opinion on the economic evils and the disorders of the society of the sixteenth century. There are many messages of the prophets that contain permanent principles of righteousness, and need to be applied to our times by the church.

The church and its worship. Is there any moral question involved in the worship of the church, or does it belong simply to the religious problems of a church? While the first aim of worship is to lead men into communion with God, and it is therefore religious, still if the God worshipped is ethical His worship must be so also. It is implied in the saying of Christ: "God is a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and truth,"⁶ that the spiritual worship is one of truth. Because truth is a moral attitude a moral relation must be maintained in worship. The maintenance

⁶ John IV: 24.

of the ethical in worship is not finally one of form. Neither the set form nor the individualistic method are wrong in themselves. The problem is whether the fixed liturgy is abused and becomes a means of stagnant worship, merely formal, repititious and mechanical, thus injuring spiritual worship. The individualistic method may become erratic, abusive of devotion, non-beautiful, and destroy spiritual worship. The worship must aid in making man express his real attitude toward God. It must be honest, sincere, whole-hearted, leading to the genuine worship of a free man before the God who gave him liberty.

The church as an organization. What are the problems that pertain to the church as organized? Every church to do its work must have some form of organization. But the organization ought to be secondary to the prophetic message of the church. Above all, it is not morally defensible to make the question of organization one of divisive difference, unless the organization hinders the truth. But even when organization is not made primal it can become a hindrance. Too much attention may be given by the leadership of the church to the maintenance of the organization. Its glory and progress may be sought; it may be exalted without the honest self-criticism it needs, not in its ideal purpose but in its practical life and administration. Machinery can become too pronounced and powerful. The consistency of an administrative policy may be maintained to the detriment of honesty and the freedom of the church. The whole spiritual purpose of

the church is liable to be injured and obstructed where the interest in effective organization becomes controlling and occupies the minds and the talents of the leadership of the church too exclusively. There will then be a trend toward centralization beyond the necessities of the work, and the church will repeat past errors in stressing powerful organization rather than the power of its free and unhampered truth.

The church and the state. Among all the problems affecting the church none is more far-reaching, than the question, how shall the church be related to the state. In the religion of the lower tribes the medicine man, or the shaman, or the priest control the common life of the tribe. Nothing is undertaken without the sanction of the religious leaders. When religion receives its national form, either an organized priesthood rules, or the king is the centre of religious organization. The ruler is deified and the ideal of the state becomes divine. With the rise of Christianity the established religion of the state opposed the new faith and made it a forbidden religion (*religio illicita*). After the act of Constantine gave Christianity the endorsement of the state the church developed gradually into the controlling power of life. It showed its spiritual and moral power when Ambrose would not admit Theodosius to the services of the church before he had publicly repented for a cruel deed. But this moral control soon developed into power over the policy and government of the state, and become political. The outstanding historical fact demonstrating this clearly is the compulsory jour-

ney of Henry IV of Germany to Canossa at the bidding of the Pope Gregory VII. Another change took place in the days of the Reformation. The churches of the European continent came under the control of the princes of different provinces, who were called bishops in necessity as the chief members of the church. In Geneva the mind of Calvin governed the city according to strict moral laws of religion. In England Henry VIII directly reformed the church and made it the established church of England. It was only on American soil that the effort was made to have a free church and a free state. But does this freedom mean entire lack of connection? Is there no co-ordination? What are the conditions and what should they be?

In great measure the church and the state live their separate and independent lives, each fulfilling its own task. The state gives the churches legal status and protects them. The churches serve the state indirectly through the making of good character which is necessary for good citizenship. But the duty of the church does not end with its influence upon individuals in the state. It has an obligation in the interest of truth and righteousness toward the state. At all times there should go forth from its streams of influence that help in keeping the state moral, and moralizing it where it is amoral or immoral. The church ought to have a message for the ethical import of great state questions, and it ought to elevate the political situation through the stirring up of the conscience of men. Sometimes it must

enter directly into a state question when this question has a large spiritual and moral content. This was the case in the problem of slavery. It obtains in the question of prohibition, and in the modern selfish movement toward bloc-rule by small organized economic groups to the detriment and freedom of the whole people. But the church should never descend into the political arena or maintain a lobby. Its voice must be heard, but it should refrain from interfering with state action except for its own protection in critical situations.

There are two ways in which the church oversteps its rights. The first is the power brought to bear by a church through its organized strength in order to obtain state aid for its institutions. Such action is unfair to all other churches, violates equity, and makes the state the direct supporter of a church or of churches to the loss of the independence of the church. The second is the effort to perpetuate the experiment of Calvin at Geneva. It consists in the church demanding certain restrictive laws and ordinances. True it is that the state ought to protect the church in all its rights, above all in the freedom to worship unmolested. To this extent the church, e. g., can ask for Sunday laws. It can oppose the breaking down of the American Sunday, through uttering its voice on behalf of the necessity of a day of rest, and for the protection of the moral value of Sunday for the state. But when a church or group of churches demand definite prohibitory laws against certain liberties on Sunday, or strive to impose restrictions upon

amusements not considered wrong or impure in themselves, they assume control over consciences that differ. Their effort is to enforce by law their own views upon the state and all its citizens of various faiths. Such action would make one opinion of common moral rights binding and destroy the liberty of conscience.

The state may encroach upon the liberty of the church in two ways. First both the church and the state have their claim upon education. The church must have education for its truth and life, and the state for the training of its citizens. The state ought at all times respect the rights of the church, unless the schools of the church are so deficient in efficiency that they lower the common intelligence, or unless the church schools make a divided citizenry through fostering religious intolerance, or propagating anti-American sentiments of language or nationalism. The state needs the religious teaching of the church which it cannot furnish in its schools. This is being granted today against the opinion of some radical educators and sociologists, who want the state schools to teach some universal religion and morals and really establish a state-religion of mere theism. But the state is endangering the church when it allows the teaching of certain naturalistic hypotheses as facts in the lower grades of the schools before the children are ripe enough to judge. There is in fact opposition to the faith of the church whenever any sort of materialistic teaching obtains in the lower schools, the high schools, and the universities. By devel-

oping a great system, and through strong centralization, the state often injures the freedom of education. The injury generally falls upon the schools of the church. A free people need all types of schools and no great system ought at any time destroy the right of a school to its life. So great is the modern pressure of centralized education that freedom has almost ceased. The state has begun to dictate not only in the interest of efficiency, but also in details of management.

The second encroachment upon the liberty of the church is made by the state in times of war. When men are swept off their feet by the tremendous emotions that make the war-spirit, the state asks the church to keep silence. It is not to pass upon the justice of a war. On the other hand, it is expected to accept the moral justification of the war that is offered, to stir up and keep alive the morale of the people for war, to serve as an agitator, to preach hate against another nation, to exalt the national consciousness and pride, and even to be a collecting agency for war-funds. This demand asks the church to abandon its own right of judgment and its truth of love. The church should surely not oppose the state, especially in a critical time. But it is an unjustified taking away of the liberty of the church to make it a war agency while its message is to be that of the Prince of Peace.

The freedom of the church does not mean, however, that it should raise a revolution against the state. The Christian teaching enjoins submission. Christ did not permit

Himself to aid the revolutionary zealots of His day. On the contrary He advised giving Caesar what was the due of Caesar.⁷ Power was not opposed to power, although Pilate was told by Christ, that such power as Pilate had over Him was given by God.⁸ Paul advised the Christians to be obedient to the Roman rule, for it bore the sword to punish the evil-doers and protect the righteous.⁹ It was the great restraining force for law and order.¹⁰ In the whole early church men were bidden rather to suffer than to disturb the order of government. When the Christians experienced the persecuting power of the state they comforted themselves with the final triumph of God's Kingdom and Christ's rule,¹¹ but they were never advised to rebel. Their freedom of utterance was not to cease, and their right to proclaim the gospel was not to be surrendered at any cost. It was to be carried on if necessary at the risk of their lives. But no matter how the state might oppose and persecute, the church was not to take the sword, or endeavor as a church to overthrow any state evil as it might be. The fact that Christians were kings, a spiritual, royal priesthood,¹² was not to be used for political purposes. Its consequences were great through the new ferment in Christianity, but this was to work out spiritually, and not through the use of force by the church or for the church.

⁷ Matthew XXII: 21.

⁸ John XIX: 11.

⁹ Romans XIII: 1 ff.

¹⁰ II Thessalonians II: 7.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE STATE

What is the place of the state? In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was much unhistorical individualism. Through it there arose the theory, that man at the beginning was without any government. A pre-political condition of society was supposed to have existed, which men ended by making a social contract, because the war of all against all had to cease. The great advocates of this view were Hobbes and Rousseau. But the nineteenth century corrected this unhistorical opinion. It secured general acceptance for the fact, that there was always a state of some sort. No evidence can be found that groups of men were ever without some government, whether patriarchal or tribal. The state is a fundamental necessity in common life. It is as old as the family and the church, and of equal value for the social well-being of mankind. The orderliness and steadiness of external life depend upon the state.

But is the state not a limitation of liberty? Does it not impair the individual will? If a society were possible with individual wills functioning without co-ordination and unity there would be no place for the state. But in-

dividual wills clash, and, therefore, for the maintenance of common rights and liberty the state is needed. The individual will only feels limited and restrained by the state as far as it fails to recognize the common will. As soon as we know that we are not only individuals, but also social beings, we must ask for some organ that shall maintain the social life, and for some institution through which the safety of all and of each shall be guaranteed. The state is far from being a hindrance to general liberty. If it functions rightly, it supports, aids and advances the happiness and progress of a people, and makes its common life a safe and an orderly one.

What is the idea of the state? It is very important to gain a clear conception of what the state is essentially. Like the family and the church it is a real personality. But its moral unity must be found in its essential character and being. It cannot be a mere corporate personality as Rosseau thought; nor can it be personalized as an addition of individuals, or an order voted into existence by the citizens or sustained simply by their willingness.¹

The personality of the *state* makes it the *institution of justice*. It lives and is to act to uphold justice in the largest and fullest sense. This is its moral basis that gives it worth and purpose in social life. The idea of justice as the foundation of the state was first enunciated by Plato. He could not find justice as long as it was written small in human lives. It had to be written large in the state, the ideal

¹ Laski, *Authority in the Modern State*, p. 102 ff.

Republic. Because justice was the moral centre of the state "kings ought to be philosophers, and philosophers kings." Only the thinkers were adequate to solve the great problems of justice, and not the common, untrained mind. Plato was the advocate of the expert in government in order to make justice secure. We may not agree, that only the expert of a certain type can govern, but we must admit that justice is the foundation of the state, its right and its duty.

Plato opposed Thrasymachus, who held that might made right. This theory of might, the claim of the stronger, was altogether unethical. The state cannot be made and justified by might. But this extreme form of the conception of might has been abandoned. A moderate formulation of the necessity of might as essential to the state has taken its place. Paulsen conceives the state to be the unity of right, will and might. The two are placed on an equal basis. He says: "The state is the organization of a people into a sovereign unity of will, might and right."² A large place is given to will and might beside justice. James Seth³ thinks that: "The essence of the State is sovereignty, and the maintenance of the sovereign power through coercion or control." In the same manner Wilson⁴ holds that: "The essential characteristic of all government, whatever its form, is authority. There must in every instance be, on the one hand, governors, and, on the other, those who are governed.

² Ethics, Book IV, Part IV, Chapter I.

³ A Study of Ethical Principles, p. 289.

⁴ The State, II, p. 26.

And the authority of governors, directly or indirectly, rests in all cases ultimately on force." All of these definitions put power on the same level with justice. They make it an essential part of the state. The assertion of sovereignty means, that the state is the final judge of right in human affairs. Each state claims to be sovereign. When states differ in their sovereign power there is no decision but through force. Power is combined with sovereignty and becomes its defense within the state and without. Such a theory must logically make war the right of the state. The moral definition of the state must make justice all-controlling, and power only secondary. If justice demands power it is to be used as a means. But if justice can be obtained without force it is the better condition. The conception of the state which makes power and sovereignty of power essential glorifies force and endeavors to make it moral. We must escape from elevating the state into an instrument of power rather than the institution of justice and justice alone. Brute force even if carried out by the common will is never moral. To associate it with justice as on the same level is a degradation of justice. This conception has been the fruitful source of much evil in the world. It always offers a justification of any war if a state is to maintain its power and sovereignty. David Jayne Hill⁵ has uncovered the fallacy of the prevailing idea of sovereignty, when he says of modern states, with their economic desire wedded to sovereignty: "Inheriting by

⁵ The Rebuilding of Europe, p. 26.

tradition from the past alleged rights of absolute sovereignty, and equipped with military forces on land and sea, they are engaged in a struggle for supremacy which they would not for a moment permit within their own legal jurisdiction. Were a similar organization formed within their own borders, adopting as its principles of action the privileges usually claimed by sovereign states, it would be promptly and ruthlessly suppressed as a dangerous outlaw." To this pass the idea of force and sovereignty has brought the state.

The denial of force as a integral part of the idea of the state does not overthrow the authority of the state. Because the state is the institution of justice it must have and maintain authority. Authority is the consequence of justice. When it is necessary to assert the authority through force then force is justified. There is a need for a sane understanding of the authority of the state. Many men seem only ready to obey the authority of the state when it is enforced upon them against their self-will. The origin of the disregard of the authority of the state is found in a misapplication of the conception that government rests upon the consent of the governed. The common will and consent of the people does not give the state the authority which is inherent in justice. Justice is not established or disestablished by a majority vote. There is a wrong philosophy of individualism back of the idea that men by their consent vote the state into its right. In a democratic form of government, which gives the largest political liberty, men are privileged to

make known their attitude in affairs of the state. But the necessity and authority of justice in the state and through it calls for a religious foundation. There is a divine will of government for the good of man, and this constitutes the divine right of government. The rejection of the divine right of kings, which meant the handing down of divine power from God to the kings, ought not to have carried with it the secularization of the idea of the state. The functioning of the state through justice will always suffer to the degree that men see in the state only a human, historical institution, and not a necessity of the moral order founded upon the will and purpose of God. Country will never be what it ought until it is joined with God. "For God and country" is the sound basis of the sentiment of patriotism. Without the sense of justice as the will of God, and the state as a minister of justice, patriotism will degenerate into selfish ambition of nationalism, and lose its just claim upon the devotion and sacrifice of men. The state must stand for sound authority. But the problem of authority becomes, above all, the duty so to organize its character and its processes as to make it, in the widest aspect, "the servant of right and of freedom."⁶

The task of the state. How shall the administration of justice through the state be defined? What is the duty and task of the state? In executing justice the first necessity is to uphold justice among the citizens of the state. As there are always disturbers of right and

⁶ Laski, *Authority in the Modern State*, p. 121.

justice, and as the innocent must constantly be protected, the state should use the best means of protective and punitive justice. It must be an efficient and wisely just protector of common order, safety and peace. This obligation entails upon the state the punishment of those that do wrong and commit crime. What is the best theory and practice of punishment?

There are some who desire to reduce punishment to the scientific problem of disease. They want to make it purely a pathological question. But "to reduce crime to a pathological phenomenon, is to sap the very foundations of our moral judgments; merit as well as demerit, reward as well as punishment, are thereby undermined. Such a view may be scientific; it is not ethical, for it refuses to recognize the commonest moral distinctions."⁷ The pathological claim destroys freedom and virtually denies personality. Criminals themselves do not want to be treated as objects but as individuals. The rejection of the pathological idea does not, however, involve the acceptance of punishment as retribution and requital. It does not mean compensation or the satisfaction of revenge. "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" is the expression of the obsolete practice of blood-revenge. The greatness of the crime is not the measure of the kind and the amount of punishment to be meted out. The problem is that of right and justice.

It has been found that the old practice of imprisonment in the usual prison, or in the reformatory for beginners in crime, does not meet

⁷ Seth, *A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 315.

the highest ends of justice. Criminals are mostly not changed; the method of confinement, and the practices in prisons, lead to the breakdown of all self-respect and make any reformation that might lead to freedom impossible. The new methods of parole and probation for incipient offenders and for other hopeful cases, have in mind the reclamation of the wrong-doer. But they must be applied with wisdom, and endeavor to lead the one punished to a recognition of the wrong. No mere sentimentality nor pity are adequate. The moral order must be upheld, and the offending will directed to acknowledge the common will and justice.

The justice of the state does not end with the maintenance of order and the punishment of evil doers. This is the police function of the state. To stop with it is to accept the theory of *laissez-faire*. This theory does not measure up to the idea implied in justice. There is constructive justice through which the state ought to seek to so order the affairs of those under it, as to render their life as equitable as possible. Whatever advances the moral well-being in external life belongs to the state. It must have an interest in the economic problems and the opportunities of citizens. The common welfare of the people is within the range of the duties of the state.

The method through which justice concerns itself with welfare demands, that the health of the people, the prevention of disease, the proper quarantine, the care of sick and disabled, the protection of the insane, and similar

tasks, be undertaken. But the largest constructive work of the state is education. It is necessary not simply in the interest of the state but for the moral good of the people. Particularly in a democracy, where the largest possible intelligence and goodness are demanded in order that liberty may be maintained, and the common rights of the people sustained, education is the great duty of the state. It ought to fuse the people into unity, break down artificial barriers of social distinction, and produce a people with common ideals and purposes of just liberty founded upon right and justice.

The state and the nation. What is the relation of the state to nationality? Ought they to be correlated, and how can this be done in the best manner? A nation is a group of people with a common language and with certain common traditions of history and culture. When a state covers one nation the situation for progress is most advantageous. But in many states this is impossible. In Europe no strict line of demarcation can be drawn which will put just one nation in one state. The existence of different nationalities under one government creates many difficulties, because one or the other of the different nationalities does not receive its full liberty of national rights and privileges. Frequently there is unwillingness to agree and the suppressed nationality is restless and dissatisfied. What is the situation in America? Are we merely a state in the United States, or a nation?

While many nationalities are represented amongst us, the United States is nevertheless a

forming nation. We have one language as the ideal, and we possess common traditions of liberty and democracy. For this reason Americanization is a just process of education through which we aim to absorb other national elements into the final unity of our national life. The process must not be arbitrary or oppressive, for thus it will strengthen foreign nationalisms. Its spirit must be kindly and considerate, leading people of other tongues and traditions into the understanding of our distinctive life and culture. In this manner we shall advance freedom if we instruct and guide. The foundation of all education into American ideals must be moral and rest upon the vital liberty of common goodness and justice.

The absolute state. What is the meaning and claim of the absolute state? The absolute state endeavors to be the one social form with complete power. It has found advocates both among materialistic and idealistic philosophers. The great representative of the materialists was Hobbes. In the days of the Stuarts he used his idea of man's pre-political condition, as a war of all against all, to support the claim of an absolute monarchy with unlimited power to keep order and peace. This theory never gained practical hold in England, but its conception of power to remedy the disorders of society has frequently been used. When conditions are serious at any time the state must enforce justice, but there are large groups, who desire to stifle all movements toward freedom of any kind through the employment of force. Force is the cure of desperation and does not

solve any problem. Its unwarranted use only creates reaction and does not lead to greater liberty and privilege.

But the largest influence for the absolute state has been exerted through the idealists. Plato thought that in the ideal Republic man would find his full moral fulfillment. The state, which in Greek society was the city state, was to serve all ethical relationships. Plato's Republic was the Greek kingdom of God. Consequently the family was dissolved into the state. The state was conceived as the universal ethical whole beyond which there was no great unity. For its sake men were to live and realize the good. Aristotle was more realistic, but he also subsumed his ethics to his politics. The political ideal as the moral totality was the controlling one. Later Greek Philosophy in the Stoic school passed beyond Plato and Aristotle both in asserting the conscience in the individual, and in stressing the universalism of humanity. It was thus that the absolute state was historically discarded in Greek thought.

This lesson of history was lost, however, upon modern absolute idealism. It reasserted the universality of the state with its absolute power. Hegel formulated the modern theory of the all-controlling state. In it the absolute spirit found the final and all-embracing embodiment. There is a reversal to the ancient ideal of the state in the interest of a logical scheme. Hegel virtually deifies the state. He says: "The State is the self-certain absolute mind which recognizes no definite authority but its own; which acknowledges no abstract rules of

good and bad, shameful and mean, craft and deception." "It is the phenomenon of God.—The absolute government is divine, self-sanctioned and not made."⁸ Such an ideal rises far beyond what is justly implied in authority as divinely willed. In this position Hegel is not nationalistic, although his formulation has found lodgment in Treitschke's political philosophy. In England the Hegelians have the same estimate of the state. Bosanquet claims that the state is the supreme power of social life.⁹ Fortunately English political life has not followed these philosophers, but has remained under the influence of a liberal theory of the state.¹⁰

The error of the ideal of the absolute state is the impairment of the right of personality in the individual. Where the state becomes the expression of absolute thought there is no real place for the full right and liberty of the individual. The absolute state also denies the existence of social relationships outside of the state. It can have no logical place for the family. No appreciation is accorded many other possible moral contacts in free association and fellowship. But there is no liberty in the absorption of all social relations into the state particularly in modern society with its many and varying possibilities of human contact.

The absolute state is the enemy of freedom and enshrines man in the process of the move-

⁸ Hegel, *System der Sittlichkeit*, p. 32 ff: Wallace Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, p. CLXXXII. Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der Neuern Philosophie*, Vol. VIII, pp. 726, 738, 907.

⁹ *The Philosophical Theory of the State*.

¹⁰ Cf. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*.

ment of absolute thought. It destroys both individual and social liberty.

The socialistic state. What is the meaning and ideal of the socialistic state? Is it morally defensible? The socialistic state is the necessary result of the idea of a socialistic society. If society is to own and control the great resources, tools and means of production, and to possess the great lines of transportation, it needs a state through which these socially owned goods can be administered and managed. The socialistic state must not be confounded with the communistic state. In the latter not only the great articles of production are to be in the hands of the state, but virtually everything is to be nationalized. The individual will then be the pensioner of the state in all his needs. The state will prescribe his work, and allow him his portion. The communistic state is the complete abolition of all individual privilege, and it therefore takes away man's legitimate freedom. At the same time it creates an enslaved society in which there can be no natural development and no social freedom, because every initiative is strangled. The socialistic state allows liberty to a certain degree, but it also limits free initiative and competition to a great extent. There is no doubt that the concentration of production in a few hands, and the control of public utilities through individualism, have forced the state to assume an increasing supervision and regulation of private business on the large scale. This has been the outcome of the sins of individual ownership and power especially in its concentrated form.

Nevertheless if the state goes beyond the necessary restriction it enters upon the limitation of liberty. The socialistic state will become less and less soundly political, and grow into a great economic machine, which takes away from men opportunity and liberty of individual life with its rights and needs for a sound society.

The state and anarchism. What is the real meaning of anarchism? How does it affect the state? Anarchism refuses to acknowledge all power and control over the individual. It sees in the state and in any expression of a common will the destruction of natural individual rights. As a protest against despotism, and the deprivation of just individual privilege, it is explicable. When it appeared in the late Russian Empire as nihilism it was the result of harsh oppression. But as an actual theory of life it aims at the destruction of all social order. The evaluation of the individual is purely one of individual desire and wish. Liberty is made unbridled license. The actual results of anarchism would be a disordered society, a state of constant warfare between men, and the loss of real freedom.

There are variations of the extreme anarchism that also affect the state. Tolstoi with his great heart and out of a deep sense of pity denied the right of the state to punishment. The extreme measures of Russia, its cruel administration of the prison, and its banishment of men to Siberia serve to make us appreciate the protest of Tolstoi. But when he wanted a society that passed no judgment on wrong-

doers he projected an impossible society. Many people were unjustly imprisoned in Russia, but it does not follow therefore that the sinners are outside of prison and the saints within it. The mistaken idealism of Tolstoi would overthrow justice for the sake of pity.

There are two other types of theoretical anarchism. The first is the conception of naturalistic evolution, that men will evolve into such a condition of society, that all will be good, and will consequently need no government. There is no promise of such a process that will ever make the state unnecessary. The second type consists of those who believe that the development of the Kingdom of God will be such in our present order of society, that men will need no control because they are all self-controlled. The position is as utopian as the naturalistic conception of development. Only in a completely regenerate society will the state be unnecessary.

The right of revolution. Is there any moral justification of revolution? Can ethical judgment approve of the revolutionary attitude in any form? When the Reformation began, its leaders, in the interest of order, and to prevent the Reformation from becoming a revolt, advised submission to the state absolutely. They interpreted the New Testament injunction to individuals¹¹ as a general policy for citizenship. Luther was very determined in opposing the Peasant Revolt. He believed in unqualified submission. He says, referring to Christ's word of rendering to Caesar the things

¹¹ Cf. above p. 284.

that are Caesar's: "He here clearly confirms civil authority, princes, and lords, to whom men are to be obedient, whoever they may be and whatever they may be, without regard to whether they possess or use the rule righteously or unrighteously." ¹²

Calvin is equally strong in advocating unquestioning obedience to the state. Among his utterances the following is characteristic: "But let us insist at greater length in proving what does not so easily fall in with the views of men that even an individual of the worst character, one most unworthy of all honor, if invested with public authority, receives that illustrious divine power which the Lord has by His word devolved on the ministers of His justice and judgment, and that, accordingly, in so far as public obedience is concerned, he is to be held in the same honor and reverence as the best of kings." ¹³

But these positions are an overstatement of the power of the state. They exclude all possibility of changing an essentially evil government. Modern liberal ideas allow for the right of revolution. They find one of their best defenses in the arguments of Locke. He contends that "the public person vested with the power of the law, is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth—and thus he has no will, no

¹² Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit, wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei, Weimar Ed. Vol. II p. 229 ff—Cf. Waring, *The Political Theories of Martin Luther*.

¹³ *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Vol. III. "The Limits of Obedience due to Civil Rulers," p. 25.

power but that of the law.”¹⁴ The law is the standard according to which the right of the state and its government is to be measured. When the law is constantly broken the governing representatives in the state have forfeited their right to rule. If he that governs misrepresents the public will he ceases to be the ruler *de jure*. “When he quits this public representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and without will that has any right to obedience—the members owning no obedience but to the public will of the society.”¹⁵ This representative conception is in part correct if we make the law rest on essential justice, and not merely on the will of society. The governing powers of the state must have committed continuous and severe transgressions of the law, to the extent of making the common life and the individual life impossible, before the right of revolution can be morally admitted. When the state persists in injuring the ideal of the state revolution is advocated by some moralists. But shall any group of people judge the ideal, and if so, what group shall decide? There is great danger in such a notion, particularly today when ideals of the state are so conflicting and range all the way from communism to anarchism. The violation that destroys the state in essence is the only one that calls for revolution. When individual and common liberty of personality are made altogether unsafe, and the moral

¹⁴ Treatise of Civil Government, Book II, Chapter XIII.

¹⁵ Locke, *Ibid*.

order is undermined, then only can ethics allow the right of revolution. Considerations of an economic kind, or social utopias, have no moral claim for the overthrow of the existing form of the state. No matter what are the historical facts of the Revolution that started our national life, and those that made the French Revolution typical, we must keep the ethical judgment clear and unprejudiced in favor of the continuity of the state. Revolution must only be ethically defended as an extreme measure in an unremediable condition that negates the moral right of liberty in the essentials of life. Commercial advantages and industrial difficulties ought never to be used to produce a revolution. No single groups but a whole people, or its great majority, must rise on a just basis against their government, to give moral foundation to a revolution. Unfortunately oppression often so arouses a nation that the wrongs of despotism produce the evils of revolution.

The state and war. Is war a necessity for the state? Can it be morally defended? The general belief is that the state cannot surrender the use of war. The necessity of war is justified as a matter of defense. But what state admits that it has attacked. The people of all states are led to think that they are not the aggressors. Even those that actually declare the war always show to the satisfaction of their own people, that they were compelled to act as they did. In order to give war a moral excuse no people ever admit their guilt. Each state is always right because it is sovereign. And thus

war is defended as the only way to decide the counterclaims of sovereign states. To this deceptive and evasive attitude there is added the peculiar belief, that God only permits the right to win. War is explained after the manner of an ordeal, and the fact is overlooked that the strongest in soldiery and in economic resources usually win. The right may produce the might, but the success of the might is no proof of the right. It is true that God directs and overrules the affairs of men, and even the evil of war, but this governance is no demonstration that war is the means of ascertaining the will of God. Another argument presented for war, is that it develops certain virtues. Courage, willingness to sacrifice, patriotism, are claimed as fruits of war. But it is only by long tradition that the courage of war and the acclaim of heroism connected with it have been established. Courage can be expended upon constructive work, upon discovery and reclamation of parts of the world.¹⁶ It is highest in acts of rescue and in moral situations. Patriotism and the readiness to sacrifice for one's country can be developed in peace. In fact the mistaken notion, that only war calls for sacrifice has lowered the moral tone of citizens in the times of peace. Patriotism is no mere sentiment for war, but it is at its best when men steadily regard the welfare of their country and love it at all times. The limitation of patriotism to war, and to a strong emotion for one's own country in enmity

¹⁶ This is the suggestion of William James as a moral substitute.

against another country, has degraded patriotism, and made it ineffective as a constant virtue for the civic betterment and moral advance of the state. The hope of moral and religious awakening, in which men attempt to see a moral use for war, is a disappointment. The temporary stirring up during a war soon passes away, and the religious and moral after-effects of war are not for the good, but show decadence. The good will remain good, and perhaps be advanced in character by a hard experience, but the bad will remain bad and become worse. In general war produces crime in its wake.

All defenses of war fail to make it moral. On the contrary it is a perversion of the moral order. Murder is legitimatized through it, and the taking of life becomes a business. Lying and deception are the approved attitudes. Hate sweeps over peoples, revenge is developed, and the bitterness of war is handed on as a memory from generation to generation. Every war sows the seed of future war. Men are made a great machine, surrender their freedom, and submit to a severe control that asks no questions. All the evil of military rank with its destruction of democracy rules supreme. Science, that ought to be used for the help of mankind, becomes the servant of destruction. Thousands of minds think and plan how they can invent more terrible and more destructive agencies of war. Cruelty is developed and man sinks back to the primal, barbaric instincts. Impurity gains a larger hold. The moral restraints are removed. The press, the platform, and even the pulpit are commandeered to

increase the sentiment of hate. To keep up the morale of war everything is set aside but those emotions and acts that will win the war. Surely there is no part of war that does not degrade and enslave man. The effort to moralize war has not succeeded.

But shall the state become pacifistic? If war is morally wrong have we any right to suffer it? Morally pacifism is the ideal, but the state cannot surrender its existence and endanger its life in a non-pacifistic world. The citizens of the state, even if they are convinced of the essential wrong of war, may feel their obligation to the state. When there is war a conflict of duties occurs for those who know what they owe the state, and who also reject war. In this conflict the problem is whether it is better to avoid war, or to submit to the state and help to save it. At all events we should labor and strive for a warless world if need be through suffering. The ideal of peace is according to the spirit of Christianity.

The state and internationalism. What ought to be the relation of the state to other states? Is there a place for international ethics? The fact that there are many states implies that they should seek the right moral relation toward each other. No state can live only to and for itself. State must co-ordinate itself with state, not only economically and commercially, but above all ethically. There is then a demand for an international ethical code and ideal. The beginnings of moral relationship between states are indicated in international law. It records the extent to which states have

agreed upon certain principles that make for the common rights of all nations. But a law of nations must have back of it a morality between nations, that recognizes mutual liberty. The international morality ought to be the motive and ideal toward which the formulated international law moves in its progress.

In international law there are certain agreements as to the limitation of allowable actions in war on land and sea. The invention of the aeroplane will necessitate some restrictions of its use. The right of freedom especially on sea and in the air are not completely covered by the present laws. A larger sense of justice must inspire the nations to avoid the ruling selfish policies, and to guarantee the freedom of men. There are still disparities of naval equipment, and superiorities of air-attack, that are not demanded except in the interest of the maintenance of the power of the stronger as against the weaker nations. War will be crowded back by equalizing war equipment. But more important still is the recognition that arbitrament of war does not make for sane justice. Therefore there should be universal international courts to adjust disputes between nations. Such courts would no more destroy national liberty, than the social adjustment of contests between individuals takes away real and sane individual freedom. Internationalism of justice is not supernationalism, but only justice as between nations rather than power and fear.

There must be an elevation of international practice in reference to colonization. At present the economic and commercial demands of a

growing nation move it to seize land from the weaker nations wherever it can do so. The weaker nations are not protected and advanced but preyed upon. The desire for world-markets is the motive of colonization. There should be an honest and fair economic co-operation between nations in the place of the seizure of lands and products that are wanted from the less civilized and weaker nations. The imposition of civilization upon a people in the interest of commerce is not liberty but enslavement, and a contradiction of the real spirit of civilization. Even the motives for advancing a backward nation are not just if the backward nation does not freely consent. It is a pretense if any nation claims to defend a people against another nation controlling it, when the real desire is to gain entrance into areas of great economic value. Nations and peoples can be delivered from overlords with the approval of moral sanctions only when such action offers real liberty.

The ethical relations between nations can be furthered by associations across national boundaries. The modern labor movement has such international plans. But its internationalism is class internationalism, and seeks merely the advantage of one group in society. The total interest is the economic advantage of labor, and its control of society, rather than universal friendship and good-will. The moral unity of mankind is not sought except to aid labor. Therefore the internationalism of labor tends to coercion of humanity, and to the breaking down of the just right and power of separate states.

The real interest of the common brotherhood of men in liberty is furthered by friendships and associations that seek the advancement of science, literature and art.¹⁷ The more men work together in great problems of science and art, the more a common bond in the search for truth is formed. Through it a large and free life of mankind can be developed. But finally men will not be fused into the real and lasting fellowship of nations and peoples until there is a strong unity of religion. At the present all faiths ought to seek points of approach, and use what they have in common, to produce a better understanding of each other. There can be a closer relationship for advancing the common good and freedom through moral and religious purposes.¹⁸ In such contact that religion will finally win out which has the highest and best ethics for the accomplishment of the liberty of men. The missionary enterprise of Christianity ought to be carried on in this spirit, and not for the glory of any church, or for the influence of any nationality back of any church. The universal liberty of man through the development of an international moral personality should be the apex of ethical hope and the goal of all sound internationalism.

¹⁷ The Greeks were unified through their games. Can modern games be used to aid in creating international good will?

¹⁸ Among various movements of an international character the World Student Federation has been very effective in creating good will on a Christian basis.

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